North Korea

—Andrei Lankov profiles Colonel General Terenti Shytkov, NK’s first leader. Shytkov was the de facto leader of the North from 1945-46 and was responsible for the post-liberation land reforms. He stayed on as a power-behind-the-scenes in his capacity as Soviet ambassador until the outbreak of the Korean War.

—Stephen Haggard posts his in-depth analysis of this year’s annual joint editorial (신년공동사설). The editorial basically functions as Pyongyang’s version of the State of the Union Address in the US.

—Andray Abrahamian speculates about why Ri Chol, head of the North’s Joint Venture Investment Committee, left his post earlier this year.

—The DailyNK reports on the murders of four bureaucrats in Cheongjin, North Hamgyong Province. The source notes that the alleged murders were carried out as acts of rebellion against the government. No other source or media outlet has corroborated the story as of this writing.

Egypt

—Ikhwanweb has a profile of Egypt’s new Speaker of Parliment, Dr. Mohamed Katatni.

—The Arabist gives his take on the Egyptian Revolution, one year later.

Myanmar

—The Washington Post sits down with Myanmar’s president Thein Sein to chat about reform.

—Reuters explains why US sanctions on Myanmar have yet to be lifted, despite the enormous progress of reforms over the past year.

Kazakhstan

—Eurasianet looks at the Kazakh government’s lukewarm efforts to prosecute police responsible for firing on protesting oil workers in Zhanaozen.

—Eurasianet also wonders why amateur cell phone footage caught American Humvees in Zhanaozen on the day of the shootings. The Humvees were originally sold to Astana to help with the formation of a peacekeeping brigade.

Iran

—Barbara Slavin explains why the EU’s oil embargo on Iran is designed to avert war.

—Iran Primer analyzes the potential impact of EU sanctions on Iran.

North Caucasus

—The Jamestown Foundation runs down the latest spate of insurgent attacks in Dagestan.

Random

—The New Yorker profiles the oil industry in North Dakota.

Over the holidays, China’s CCTV13 broadcast an interview with the face of North Korea, Ri Chun-hee (리춘희/李春姬). Ri, KCTV’s long-time nightly news anchor, is best known for her over-the-top, emotional delivery and the tears she shed on air when announcing the deaths of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Prior to Kim’s death last year, she hadn’t been seen in public for some time, leading Pyongyang watchers to wonder if she had been purged or had fallen out of favor. But as Ri herself explains, she merely had been training new talent the whole time. Below you’ll find the report (which includes some behind-the-scenes footage of the KCTV studio) and my translation of that interview. Apologies in advance for not being tech-savvy enough to overlay subtitles on a YouTube clip.

(Tip o’ the old hat to North Korea Tech)

CCTV Anchor: Up next we take you to meet an old friend from our line of work. She appears frequently on North Korean news broadcasts and wields a profound influence.

Reporter: Just beyond this door, we finally get to meet North Korea’s most famous news anchor, Ri Chun-hee. Hello, Mrs. Ri.

Ri Chun-hee: Hi, I’m thrilled to be able to meet a reporter from CCTV during the Lunar New Year.
　
Reporter: I’m also very happy. I have always wanted to meet you.

Ri Chun-hee: Is that so? Thank you.

Narrator: Ri Chun-hee believes that each broadcast should be special and that the audience should be able to notice the differences at a glance. The tone of the broadcast (播音方式) should match the content. Some stories should be read full of militancy (战斗性), while others should not.

Ri Chun-hee: (Take, for example,) when I say “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” If I just shouted that, there would be no feeling, and no purpose. It was like that in the past, but now our target is the audience and to reach them we have to present like we are conversing. We speak softly.

Narrator: When she heard this report would be broadcast during the Lunar New Year, Chun-hee recorded a special, impromptu, warm message for us.

Ri Chun-hee: Ladies and gentlemen, today is Lunar New Year, a traditional holiday celebrated by people in both Korea and China. KCTV will now begin broadcasting.

Narrator: The elderly Chun-hee seems friendly and delighted behind the anchor desk. Recently, though, she has slowly moved from behind the desk to backstage to train new people. With the exception of important broadcasts, she rarely appears in public so that younger people may have more opportunities.

Ri Chun-hee: These days, I don’t spend much time as an anchor. My younger colleagues look quite beautiful and are very young. On the screen, you need beautiful people.

Narrator: Lunar New Year is a holiday shared by both Chinese and Koreans. Chun-hee is very happy to face our camera lens and send a Lunar New Year message to the Chinese people.

Reporter: From Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, we wish everyone in China…

Together: A happy new year!

Ri Chun-hee: Thank you.
　

Let’s say a hypothetical analyst was to ask a random North Korean to recount her understanding of Korean history. The response would probably go something like this:

The great Korean race was founded by Tangun Wanggom in 2333 BC. Racially pure, virtuous, and innocent, the Korean race just wanted to live peacefully on their peninsula, but their racial greatness made them the target of imperial expansion and aggression from the neighbors. The Korean people struggled valiantly against imperialist aggression. Led by General Kim Il Sung, the Korean race cast off the yoke of Japanese imperialism only to be subjugated by the American imperialists. The Great Leader and the people only wanted peace and reunification, but the Americans and their puppets in the south launched a war of aggression. Thanks to the shrewdness of the Great Leader and the will of the people, the imperialists were soundly defeated, but Korea remained divided. Since then, the American imperialists have spared no expense to thwart the greatest desire of the great race: to be reunified in the loving bosom of the General. While usurping the sovereignty and independence of south Korea, the imperialist aggressors and their puppet lackeys constantly whipped up the flames of war and tried in vain to destroy the system and independence of the north under the guise of various schemes like “denuclearization” and “disarmament.”

(See the works of B.R. Myers for a thorough overview of how North Koreans see themselves.)

At this point, our intrepid analyst shrugs uncomfortably and flashes that smirk normally reserved for an eight-year-old child who claims—in all seriousness—to have taken a ride on Santa’s sleigh last Christmas Eve. North Korea’s pseudohistorical, pseudoscientific, and racist historiography is easy to dismiss and even easier to debunk; it’s a collection of outright falsehoods, gross exaggerations, glaring omissions, half-truths, and blatant inaccuracies. Nevertheless, it’s important to know and understand. Now before I continue, I want to make it clear that this is not an argument in favor of a multiplicity of truths, nor for tolerance of different worldviews, nor a defense of the North Korean position, nor any other fashionable nonsense of that type. But again, understanding what North Koreans think is important for our analysis of the North, even though many experts give short shrift to ideological imperatives behind North Korean actions and dismiss such narratives as unimportant to serious policy analysis. The reasoning usually goes something like this (hypothetically):

It’s true that most rank-and-file North Koreans believe in the official state mythology, but the elite and the policymakers probably don’t. How could they seriously believe such outlandish things when they, unlike the commoners, have access to the outside world? How could worldy and cosmopolitan North Koreans like Kim Gye-gwan, Kang Sok-ju, and UN Ambassador Pak Gil-yon—people who have travelled abroad extensively, people who regularly consume foreign media and have regular contact with foreigners—believe this stuff? How could those who have worked extensively in China not take note of the impact of the Gaige Kaifang reforms? How could the North’s diplomats not be impressed with South Korea’s development, and how could they not realize that the thriving South is not an American colony? Even if they express vocal support and admiration for state narratives, deep down they know they are false; deep down they know they are in the wrong about the North’s relations with the outside world.

It’s worth wondering: does anyone question the convictions of the Pope’s cardinals regarding their faith in Christianity? Do we ever wonder if deep-down the Ayatollahs in Iran or the Ulama in Saudi Arabia question their belief in truth of the shahada? Do we ever wonder if political extremists of all stripes, cult members, and believers in New Age anti-science fiddle-faddle act not out of their firmly-held and genuine convictions but out of more earthly concerns like greed, safety, and survival? Of course we don’t. But when it comes to North Korea—especially the elite of North Korea—we tend to eschew stated ideological beliefs and instead ascribe motivations to greed, a desire to see their state survive, pressure to conform to the party-line, and fear for their lives and their family’s lives. Put another way: we generally don’t assume that there are atheists in the Vatican’s Secretariat of State, so why would we assume that there are in the North Korean Foreign Ministry and Central Committee? The flaw in our hypothetical analyst’s argument above is a hidden premise: that information plurality and access to information changes firmly-held beliefs. There’s a growing body of empirical evidence that indicates that not only does contradictory evidence not change people’s minds, but even more horrifying is that it can actually reinforce beliefs and this process is not a function of ignorance.

Our cognitions are less malleable than we would like to believe. When evidence that contradicts our beliefs is encountered, we experience a feeling of discomfort called cognitive dissonance and cognitive dissonance tends to lead one to restore consonance either by accepting a revised belief or, more likely, to rationalize away inconvenient thoughts and evidence. This process of rationalizing away that which conflicts with our closely-held beliefs is called motivated reasoning. Perhaps the most famous example of firmly-held convictions trumping reality was Festinger et al.’s classic study, When Prophecy Fails. Festinger et al. inflitrated and studied a UFO cult whose leader claimed the world would end on December 21st 1954 and that believers would be saved from the impending cataclysm. The date came and went and obviously the world did not end. One would think at that point that the cult would disband, but surprisingly the cult members’ faith in the veracity of their religion was strengthened: the members convinced themselves that their faith had spared the world. Jonestown is another example. What’s most shocking about those fateful events in jungles of Guyana is not the horrifying death toll, but rather the fact that so many people willingly went to their deaths.

Political scientists and cognitive psychologists have done much research on political biases, misperceptions, misinformation, and cognitive dissonance as of late. Such research was conducted in the United States, a country with free access to information, a free media, a culture of openness and debate, and a good education system. One would think such solid institutions would mitigate political biases, pushing them to the extremes of the political spectrum, but on the contrary, misinformation is alive and well, quite mainstream, and can actually be worse among the educated. We tend to gravitate towards fact and evidence that supports our beliefs, while rejecting and ignoring facts and evidence that contradict our beliefs (selection bias). When seeking information, we tend to prefer sources and media that reinforce our position (selective exposure theory). Political scientist John Sides found that the persistence of the false belief that Barack Obama is a Muslim tended to increase with education level. Professor Larry Bartels found that knowledgeable people were more likely to develop false beliefs about economic performance that were consistent with their political leanings. Gary Jacobson found that Republicans who believed in a link between Saddam Hussein and 9/11 were likely to “consciously reject” evidence that contradicted their justification for the Iraq War. Polling has shown that Democrats were more likely to believe that Bush was behind 9/11. (For more of this kind of research, see here and here). If all this is true in the West, what chance do the North Koreans have?

Indeed, part of the reason for why we give so little consideration to the North Korean worldview is its outlandishness and easy debunkability, but as with all non-falsifiable belief systems, no amount of evidence is enough to move believers. The North Korean ideology operates psychologically on a level that’s closer to fundamentalist religion as opposed to the typical Communist ideology of the Cold War era that we’re used to thinking about. The system is unfalsifiable in the sense that no amount of evidence brought to bear against it can disprove the system in the minds of believers. It’s like a typical paranoid conspiracy theory (e.g. 9/11 Truthers, Moonlanding Hoaxers, Anti-vaccinationists, etc.) in the sense that all evidence that proves the conspiracy proves the conspiracy; all evidence that disproves the conspiracy proves the conspiracy. For instance, take Moonlanding Hoaxers. You might want to change their minds, say, by showing them recent satellite photos of the Apollo landing sites. You might think that this would convince them, but no, of course not. The photos were staged or the landers were shipped to the moon after the fact as part of government plot to trick the “sheeple.” The testimony of a NASA scientist or a report from Russia were planted as part of the cover up. Naturally, the astronauts themselves were all in on it as well, so their testimony is not to be trusted. Going back to North Korea, B.R. Myers, in his fantastic and groundbreaking book, The Cleanest Race, posited that the North would face a crisis of legitimacy in 2012 because of the repeated propaganda references to becoming a “Great and Powerful Nation.” Well, 2012 is here and the North is neither great nor powerful, and is not facing a legitimacy crisis. Why? Because the ideology subsumes all. The propaganda makers can come up with all manner of excuses and the people will buy it: imperialist aggression is blocking the aspirations of the people, etc. Kim Jong-il’s death was also fortuitous in this regard. Neither famine, nor the collapse of the food distribution system, nor the rise of the market and the attendent influx of foreign goods and ideas, nor the rampant corruption, nor the all-pervasive oppression and extreme repression have done much to shake North Korean faith in the system.

The North Korean worldview can be summarized as being based on xenophobic ethnonationalism (Korean supremacy, if you will) a sense of victimhood and vulnerability, and a fierce distrust of outside powers (especially the US and Japan). All this is not to argue against survival, greed, etc. as motivations for the actions of the North’s elites and policymakers, but they don’t tell the whole story. Clearly if one operated under the assumption that the North Korean policy set is solely motivated by state survival, then one is unable to explain the repeated failures of various disarmament-for-aid schemes, the North’s distrust of the Sunshine Policy, and their suspicions of foreign aid, foreign NGOs, and foreign visitors. But if one accepts that, like the commoners, the North Korean elite happily drink their own Kool-Aid and let their distorted version of history inform their views, then the root of the repeated failure of bilateral relations with the US, South Korea, and Japan becomes more apparent, and suggest that new policy approaches are required.

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party of Parties so attached by taking forthwith, individual and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

This idea is also spelled out in the language set forth in the respective alliance treaties with Korea and Japan.

The related literature has revolved around questions of  alliance formation, intra-alliance politics, why alliances end, and why they endure. In addition to understanding alliances, the structure of the international system (bipolarity, multipolarity and unipolarity) will also play a role in shaping state choices. Options that states may choose are bandwagoning or balancing (there are other analytical constructs, but for sake of depth, I shall use these two), depending on their circumstances. We can think of bandwagoning as joining a particular side, whether or not this is wise. Balancing can be seen joining a coalition opposite of the other power.

Before we go into that, lets take a look at why alliances are formed. There are a few definitions that are given by Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth N. Waltz and Stephen M. Walt. However, for the purpose of this post, I will use Walt’s construct of alliance formation. Four factors will affect a states decision to enter into an alliance: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. Aggregate power is those endowments such as population size, economy and natural resources. Geographic proximity is how close your neighbors are; hence states that are situated next to potentially aggressive states may seek an alliance. Offensive power is those military capabilities that can affect your security. Finally, aggressive intentions can be official statements.

With regard to the structure of the international system, a bipolar system makes it more difficult for countries to change alliances. Multipolar systems make it easier and unpredictable regarding ally behavior and intention. States in this system will often change sides depending on their cost-benefit calculus. Unipolarity is a relatively new phenomenon and has asked where or not alliance partners can restrain their unipolar power.

Alliance formation, the structure of the international system and associated behavior all portray state behavior. A state chooses an ally to defend itself against a perceived threat. Without threat, alliances are less likely to be created. There would not be sufficient reason for states to contribute resources for alliance  management.

Now my colleague Steven wrote last week that the US-ROK alliance is an ‘unnatural’ alliance given Korea’s long history as a tributary state in the Sinic-led order. His evidence is convincing and shows the changing patterns of trade between Korea-China and Korea-US. Further, as the US economy declines relative to China, in the medium to long-term Korea’s relationship with China may change at the expense of the US, that it would be only natural. Before I go into the idea of natural/unnatural alliances, a brief background on Asia’s history will be given.

The history of East Asia is long and unique; since the mid-1300s to mid-1800s, China was the dominant power, culturally, economically, militarily and politically. David Kang, a professor from University of South California, noted the formal hierarchy between states created a durable order due to China’s cultural superiority. The Sinic-led order put China at the top, with Korea, Vietnam and Japan falling under its authority. These states, depending on their relation and place within the Chinese imperial court, paid tribute in order to have their regime legitimized. Furthermore, these states adopted many Chinese practices, such as a civil service based on knowledge and merit. As Professor Chung-In Moon and Professor Chaesung Chun point out, China’s authority and order was based on material foundation and moral foundation. Up until the Opium War, this system endured before the West came.

But this begs us to ask a different theoretical question: “are some alliances natural and others are not?” Does that mean that the alliance between US-Japan is natural while the US-ROK is not? Based upon China’s history, should it also have ‘natural’ alliances, say with Korea or Vietnam? Upon closer inspection, the reasons for alliance behavior may have more to do with threat perceptions, intentions, capabilities and size, than a history of cozy ties.

Lets take another case: US-Philippines alliance. Conceived as a part of the San Francisco System, it came under considerable duress due to differences in ‘threat perception’ after the end of the Cold War. In 1991, during the negotiation over Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the Philippines government decided that it was not in their interest to continue hosting US forces in Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base (AFB). Thus, the alliance was dis-continued until 1997 when the Philippines began to court the US back.

Why would the Philippines court the US again in 1997? Prior to the dis-continuation of the alliance, the Philippines was a large recipient of US aid. Between 1991-1997, the Philippines military began to atrophy and this was noticeable in her foreign relations. Provocations by China highlighted concerns over the Spratly Islands and the subsequent chill it sent through the Philippines. China’s actions demonstrated the lack of military preparedness and caused the Philippines to re-negotiate an agreement with the US. Philippine’s military weakness and China’s aggressive behavior toward the Spratly Islands forced a revision of current policy.

Returning to South Korea’s changing patterns of trade, will Korea make a change and dis-continue the alliance in favor of its more ‘natural’ ally?  A few other factors that need to go into consideration. The changing nature of the military and population atrophy. According to the OECD and Statistics Korea, Korea has the lowest total fertility rate and is not improving. Hence, it is predicted that the population, which is estimated at about 48 million, will peak somewhere around 50 plus million and then decline to around 45 million by 2050. Further, Korea’s graying population, in relation to the number of individuals who can work, is changing rapidly. The other side to this coin is the military. South Korea is in the process of transforming itself to a high-technology military force. This policy, outlined by the 2008 Defense White Paper, also seeks to cut the manpower necessary for South Korea’s defense.

Not all has been rosy on the Korean peninsula. The 2010 sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Youngpyong-do have highlighted the shortcomings of Korea’s defense and military preparedness. The subsequent reports that came out and the firing of the Minister of Defense all point to something else other than economics. China and Korea have had improving relations since diplomatic ties were restored, but the fumbling of the issue by the Chinese caused dought among Koreans. There is no doubt that Korea is drifting economically toward China, but the alliance is another matter. Can Korea trust its larger neighbor to safeguard its interests? Do Koreans see China as a ‘natural’ ally, given their long and unique history? Probably not, but debatable. If anything, Korea will maintain the alliance with the US due to China’s economic size, proximity and unknown intentions, not because it is unnatural or natural.

China-Centered Growth and Development

Despite the United States maintaining its position as a primary import market for finished products from East Asia, there has been a considerable shift in the balance of economic power and political influence in the region. As John Ravenhill points out, “what has occurred” since the Asian financial crisis “has been … a reorientation of trade patterns in response to the rapid emergence of China as the assembly plant to the world” and the emergence of “China-centric networks.”  This shift highlights the effects of China-centered economic growth and a relative decline of American economic power and influence.  With significant implications for the balance of power in East Asia, China has replaced the US as the number one market for Korean and Japanese exports.  The increase in China’s economic power comes at an expense to US power and influence in the region – a conventional zero-sum situation.  As explained by Thomas Christensen, the combination of China’s economic growth and the decline in exports from regional actors to the US“means that China is gaining leverage over its neighbors at US expense.”

The effect of this shift in power distribution in East Asia is revealed in China’s economic policy and East Asian trading patterns.  As Searight explains, China is courting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states through free trade agreements as a way to balance against US influence in the region.  The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), the largest free trade area in terms of population and GDP, is one example of Beijing’s efforts to use its economic power to lure states away from American influence and into the Sino-controlled sphere of influence.  David Shambaugh calls the ACFTA the “accord of greatest significance” for China, because it represents a change in the way ASEAN countries perceive China and the way China engages its neighbors.  “China and ASEAN are forging a productive and lasting relationship that is gradually erasing a history built on widespread suspicion, painful memories, and lingering tensions.”

Although the ACFTA is certainly useful as a tool to patch-up ideational rifts caused by historical animosities, the more likely reason China’s neighbors are seeking closer economic ties with Beijing is the acknowledgment of China’s growing economic might and regional influence.  As Shambaugh recognizes, the ASEAN countries “believe that China’s rise is inevitable and that the best strategy for ASEAN, to hedge against potentially disruptive or domineering behavior, is to entangle the dragon in as many ways as possible.”  However, the effectiveness of such a strategy is likely to be limited, if effective at all.  ASEAN member states are small and highly dependent on Chinese for trade and economic growth.  China is ASEAN’s top trading partner, which, as analysis in the next section suggests, may actually put ASEAN in a more vulnerable position.

Moreover, China’s engagement with regional states is not primarily about forging closer economic ties for purely commercial or ideational reasons.  If anything, China’s decision to “entangle” itself with ASEAN is a strategic move.  Policymakers in Beijing are confident that its economic might and political leverage will allow it to dictate the course of regional integration on Chinese terms.  As Christensen points out, “the Chinese leadership has kept an eye on the great power prize, has created strategic dependencies on China among its neighbors, and has prevented balancing coalitions ….” China is, like Germany in the 1930s, setting up a network of strategic asymmetric trading partnerships.

But what, exactly, is China’s “great power prize?”  According to Searight’s analysis, China is pursuing a strategy of regional hegemony with the ultimate goal of supplanting the US as the “hub” in the US-centered hub-and-spokes system.  China’s explosive economic growth, coupled with the relative decline of US regional power, has put it in a position to be the most influential regional actor and most likely candidate to challenge America’s supremacy in the region.

Competing Hubs

Searight’s revisionist view of China beckons an alternative view of East Asian geopolitics.  According to her theory, the US-centered hub-and-spokes system is giving way to a “competing hubs” system, where major powers with vested interest in the region are “vying to form competing ‘hubs’ by forging FTAs with multiple regional and trans-Pacific partners,” with China as the clear leader of states that are challenging US primacy.  Stated alternatively, East Asia is in a form of economic tug-of-war, with the US and China competing with each other for the position of dominant “hub state.”

As I briefly discussed in my article about Korea’s “unnatural” alliance with the US, international economics, particularly trade, is used as a mechanism through which to achieve international political and strategic goals.  Korea and other East Asian nations are being courted simultaneously by the US and China.  As Searight illuminates and I expound upon in my article (I go into more depth in my paper), one way through which policymakers in Washington and Beijing are attempting to accomplish this goal is using FTAs to build/rekindle (China) or strengthen/maintain (US) strategic partnerships in the region.  Although Japan was a viable contender in the 1970s and 80s, hopes at continuing the post-war manifestation of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (see James Fallows) as a direct challenge to the US’s regional hegemony have all but vanished during Japan’s descent from Everest following the burst of its real estate bubble in 1991; Japan’s major demographic shift and shrinking population makes another run that less likely.  No other power, save for perhaps India, has the market size, industrial capacity (latent or real) and population base to challenge American regional hegemony like China does.  Given the rapidity of China’s economic growth and the shift in trading patterns throughout the region, China is posed to challenge and perhaps sometime in the future supplant the US as the hub to the East Asian hubs-and-spokes system currently centered around the US.

Political Economy Effect on the Peninsula

From a geopolitical perspective on the Korean peninsula, this could have major ramifications for the future of North Korea.  As is highlighted in analysis of the effects of a China-Korea FTA, the strategic objectives underlying China’s efforts to conduct an FTA with Korea are not too difficult to speculate.  Although economic motives are not totally absent from Beijing’s perspective, given Korea’s high level of economic dependency on China for economic growth, further cementing the growing economic ties (bilateral trade between Korea and China is growing at a rate of 20% per year) opens up more opportunity for Beijing to exploit its relationship with Seoul to advance strategic objectives.  One of these goals, which is not necessarily at odds with Seoul’s strategic objectives, is channeling investment and facilitating economic growth and reform (perhaps this is what Kim Jong-nam would like to see?) in North Korea.  The DPRK, aside from international aid packages from Korea, the US and others, is entirely dependent on China for any bit of economic productivity the DPRK can muster out of its basket case of an economy.  Given Pyongyang’s dependence on economic trade and assistance form its neighbor across the Yalu, China is in the unique position as its only credible ally and nation with the connections and wherewithal to force (or incentivize) economic reforms in the Hermit Kingdom.  If Korean scholars are correct, a China-Korea FTA could be the conduit through which reforms, a la Jong-nam, could be realized.  A recent Chosuilbo article states:

If China forges closer business ties with South Korea, it could put pressure on the North Korean regime to conduct economic reforms or face even greater isolation. The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe led to a rough patch for North Korea in the 1990s.

The FTA could play a role in goading North Korea to open up its economy, some experts say — not least because products from the joint Korean Kaesong industrial complex could be included in tariff-free trade with China. That would make Kaesong an attractive place to manufacture goods, because labor is much cheaper than in South Korea.

Choi Jin-wook at the Korea Institute for National Unification said, “If China decides to include products made in Kaesong Industrial Complex, which the Korea-U.S. FTA doesn’t do, then the joint manufacturing zone could get a strong boost leading to increased South Korean investments in North Korea and play a role in getting the North to open up.”
The FTA could even become an alternative route for South Korean investment to North Korea. Some pundits speculate that some South Korean businesses would then be able to invest in North Korea from China without meeting any other legal requirements, because that is much easier than investing from South Korea.

More Changes to Come

Although it may be a stretch of the imagination to think that something like an FTA between Korea and China could lead to the “opening up” of North Korea, in something like the Chinese way, it illustrates two basic points.  One:  Beijing is increasingly becoming the center of economic attention, through trade and fostering further economic development perhaps so much so that it will soon replace the US as the hub to the historically US-centered hubs-and-spokes system.  This leads to two:  Because of China-centered growth, the geopolitical landscape is undergoing fundamental changes:  with economic power comes to ability to advance power and strategic goals.  The situation on the Korean peninsula is only one example of the shifting geopolitical landscape in the region that involves China.  Issues revolving around the speculation that the South China Sea is within China’s “core interest” and the subsequent disputes of the Spratly and Paracel Islands are likely to intensify in the coming years.  China’s economic-borne political power will only galvanize China’s efforts to advance its strategic interests.  The emerging economic structure in the region facilitates this shift in the geopolitical landscape.

Now, what does this exactly mean? How to increase Chinese cultural appeal could take many forms. For example, there is your modern day Confucian Institutes that seek to educate foreigners about the Chinese language. There is an obvious need, identified by the CCP leadership, that China needs to enhance its cultural production and appeal in order to achieve great power status.

This is all good; yet, China has taken numerous steps to curb internet freedom and restrict television content. Isn’t this counterproductive? While it can be argued that the West and China have different interpretations of internet freedom, I think it can be agreed that capitalism and the free flow of information are vital to creating an alluring culture.

We arrive at an interesting intersection. As was translated by the NYT, President Hu stated that the overall strength of Chinese culture and its international influence is not commensurate with China’s international status. China continues to rise economically and militarily, yet soft power remains sub-par compared to most modern industrial nations.

China’s desire to increase its soft power is welcomed, yet how it does it will remain important. If the CCP decides to increase its cultural production by loosening regulation, then a more vibrant culture can experiment with different historical and cultural narratives. Or, the CCP may decide that some rigid plan is needed to guide China’s culture. If that is the case, there is little hope for China to create a world-class culture that is alluring to other nations. Indeed, a lot of change is happening right now in China with the transition so we should see over the year see what kind of policy Beijing creates.

However, even a cursory glance at Korean history — or geographic location — will lead one to question whether the strong US-Korea economic and military relationship is at all “natural.”  By natural I mean, exit special circumstances (e.g. a Cold War), which country would Korea more naturally gravitate towards?  The answer is rather obvious:  China.  Korea was long an apendage of the Middle Kingdom under the tributary-state system, a political system in many ways fundamentally different from the Western European-inherited Anglo-Saxon lead nation-state system.  Cultural, institutional, linguistic influence flowed from China towards the Choson (Yi) Dynasty.  Most importantly, trade and commerce was conducted primarily with China, in addition to Korea’s status as a tutelage state – a sort of ancient security guarantee, if you will.  Given this historical precedent, Korea’s strong economic and military ties to the US during the Cold War can be characterized as “unnatural.”  The reason for Korea’s unnaturally close ties to the US is found in the chief motivation behind the establishment of the San Francisco System:  winning the Cold War.  One primary way the US did this was to effectively buy its allies, hence development by selection;  as Cumings points out, and any student of political economy is sure to note, the US did not “choose” to develop Korea for development’s sake.  It was a conscious, strategic decision on behalf of US policy makers to use their preponderance of economic and military strength to shape the US sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific that would serve the US’s Cold War strategic and political endgame.

As I explored in a recently written paper, the US-Korea relationship is a case-in-point of a large state utilizing an asymmetric trading relationship for the purpose of achieving international political and strategic goals.  The dynamics of the asymmetric relationship between the US and Korea is what permitted an unnatural alliance to be formed.  In exchange for priority market access and developmental aid, in addition to US support for Syngman Rhee over Kim Il-song, (South) Korea was pulled into the American sphere of influence and away from potential competitors, namely China and the Soviet Union.  This relationship, however, is undergoing a fundamental shift in trajectory.  As Calder points out, the US was able to “secure security” through prosperity.  Stated alternatively, America exploited its economic prosperity and dominance of global trade to achieve international political and strategic goals.

As I argue in my paper, the recent Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) is an example of the US’s efforts to preserve the San Francisco System by providing Korea with greater market access.  Despite its best efforts, Korea has begun — and will continue — to gravitate towards a closer relationship with China, its more natural partner.  Evidence for this is found in the shift in Northeast Asia’s regional economy, particularly trading patterns.

Changing Trading Patterns

A brief overview of Korean trade patterns with the US and China between the years 2004-2009 is reflective of the broader regional shift in regional economic power and an interesting case study.  Korea is an ally of the US, and thus concedes to the US benefits of a security-alliance, namely high levels of political influence and preferential trading status.  However, given the exponential growth of the Chinese market and Korea’s heavy reliance on trade for economic growth, the traditionally strong economic and political ties between the US and Korea are being challenged.

Between 2004-2009, total merchandise trade between Korea and China increased significantly, as Tables 1 and 2 below indicate.  In 2004, Korean exports to China increased approximately 72 percent from $49.76 billion to $86.7 billion.  Imports to Korea from China also show a significant jump.  In 2004, a total of $29.58 billion worth of merchandise was imported from China. In 2009, this number had increased to $52.25, an 80 percent increase.

Table 1

Source:  WTO “International Trade Statistics”

Although the nominal increase is not surprising, given China’s high levels of growth and Korea’s proximity to China, when the numbers are compared to Korea’s trade with the US , a different story is revealed.  Korea’s level of dependence on the Chinese market is increasing relative to the US.  In 2004, exports to the US market were $43.03 billion.  Between 2004-2009, total exports decreased to $37.8 billion.

Between 2004-2006, a divergence occurred in exports from Korea to China and the US, with China taking a clear lead as the largest market for Korean exports.  By 2009, imports to the Chinese market were more than double that of US imports.  As the numbers show, Korea’s dependence on China for trade has increased significantly, relative to the US, in the latter half of the previous decade.  This has significant implications for economic as well as political and strategic concerns for policymakers in Beijing, Seoul and Washington.  When the numbers are broken down further, Korea’s asymmetric trade with China is even clearer and the implications more significant.

Recent trade profiles by the World Trade Organization (WTO) reveal the high levels of asymmetry in the Sino-Korean trading relationship, as well as the degree to which Korea is dependent on trade for economic growth.  As of October 2011, China accounted for 23.8 percent of Korea’s total exports in merchandise trade and 16.8 percent of total imports in merchandise trade.  Contrast this to 4.4 percent in exports and 9.9 percent for imports for China.  This is an example, par excellence, of trade asymmetry.  If Korea’s Trade to GDP ratio is taken into account, the implications are even greater.  Between 2008-2010 Korea registered an extraordinarily high 105.8 GDP-Trade ratio, compared to 55.4 for China or 30.8 for Japan.  Korea is extraordinarily dependent on exports for economic growth.  Most important to note is the fact that Korea is becoming exceedingly dependent on China’s market to feed this growth.

Geopolitical Implications

As recent news reports indicate (see here and here for a few of the recent reports), China is set to start negotiations with Korea for a Korea-China FTA.  Although this is not anything new (China has indicated a willingness to negotiate with Korea for an FTA before), the timing of the negotiations and the motives behind China wanting to conclude an FTA with its middle-power neighbor cannot be separated from the broader geopolitical situation unfolding in the region.  Consider this quote from a Chosun Ilbo article:

The South Korea-China FTA could have a major geopolitical impact on Northeast Asia as well. Until now, the security landscape in Northeast Asia has been a Cold-War-style standoff between the South Korea-U.S.-Japan alliance on one side and China and North Korea on the other. But if the Seoul-Beijing FTA is signed and economic cooperation increases rapidly, this traditional framework would crumble.

As I indicated above, Korea is becoming increasingly dependent on China for trade (and thus economic growth); China knows this, and given the coming great power power struggle and the current balance of power tug-of-war underway between the US and China, is seeking to use its economic weight to pull Korea closer into its sphere of influence and, subsequently, away from its Cold War partner.  Immediate shifts in behavior, policymaking and public perception are not likely to change in the immediate future but certainly over the long run there is bound to be a fundamental shift in Korea’s geopolitical orientation, particularly in regards to who it considers to be its closest partner, from a trade and security perspective.  Shifts in the geopolitical makeup of the region can be seen in the US’s new defense strategy — a strategy indicative of the decline in US economic power and its inability to maintain the traditional San Francisco System.  This has significant implications for Korea, US-Korea relations and Sino-Korean relations.  Given the US’s declining economic power, China’s rising economic influence and the major shifts in trading patterns, it is only a matter of time before Korea finds itself viewing China is more favorable light, relative to the US.

It is only natural.

Organski’s Power Transition Theory:  Understanding the Global Order

Introduction: Getting Realistic
Hierarchy in the Global Order

A belief at the core of all Realists’ theories is the notion that the international system is anarchic.  This notion is so highly regarded by realists as to suggest it an absolute truth in the realm of international relations theory.  Despite its popular appeal, the theory is an incorrect assessment of the international system.  Perhaps in strictly legal terms, the international system could be conceptualized as having no central governing body, insofar as there is no “world government.”  However, a more realistic assessment of the international system reveals a different world.

Power, another key component of Realists’ theories, is the element responsible for imposing order in the international system.  The ways in which nations use their respective levels of power determines the way order is imposed.  Power, however, is not evenly distributed amongst the nations in the international system.   There is a distinguishable international hierarchy based on power.  The more powerful nations are situated at the top and the less powerful nations at the bottom.  Due to the structure of the international order, the modern international system as a whole acts in a relatively predictable way based on international norms of behavior.  “Orders,” in this sense, are created and imposed by dominant nations at the top of the hierarchy and obliged by the relatively less powerful nations.  These established world orders consist of a system of political and economic norms by which all member nations are expected to oblige.  Failure to abide by prevailing international norms typically results in some form of reactionary measures.  Diplomatic wrangling and economic sanctions are popular measures taken by the international community against non-complying states.  In more extreme cases, complete isolation, like the U.S. diplomatic and economic response to Cuba after the Cuban Missile Crisis or North Korea’s relationship with most of the international community today.  The rarest of the extreme comes in the form of forced regime change of a reticent nation’s government; the most recent example being the U.S. invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein and his government from power.  The bottom line is that in real anarchy no such organized structure can exist.

The global order is relatively rigid and structured, meaning nations cannot easily enter and exit the system.  As A.F.K. Organski points out, “nations are not free to shift from one international order to another without serious internal changes, usually involving a change in economic systems, a change in the predominant class, a change in the political system, and a change in ideology.”[1]  Nations may compete with each other for better positions vis-à-vis one another, but the system under which this power tug-of-war takes place remains relatively the same.  This does not mean, however, that the global order of today will be the international order in the next era, much in the same way that the global order of today is different from previous eras.  As all students and scholars of international relations know, international orders are not fixed; changes and transitions occur.  Nations dissatisfied with the status quo global order may attempt to use their power to change the system to reflect the way they see the world and to make it operate under conditions best suiting their particular interests. Understanding when, why, and how these transitions occur is essential to understanding the way the international system works.

Under the current global order, America is the dominant global power of a so-called Anglo-American world order, established during the glory days of the British Empire and continued by the emergence of America as the dominant power after World War II.  The political and economic norms of the Anglo-American world order that “govern” the international system can be summarized by two basic characteristics:  liberal democracy, as the preferred form of government, and free and open markets, as the preferred economic model.  The degree to which these two general traits are promoted under the current global order is tempered by the circumstances of each case.  It is naive to assume that the United States and nations supportive of her role as dominant global power will at all times and under any circumstances promote the two dominant traits of the Anglo-American world order.  Myriad of other important factors play a part in determining the way in which the global order is maintained.  However, these two general characteristics are the most fundamental characteristics of the current global order.  This, however, may not be the case for much longer.

In light of the rise in the East Asian development model, the recent financial crisis and the ongoing American occupations of countries in the Far East and central Asia, the status of the current Anglo-American world order as the standard bearer for international norms of behavior appears to be coming under challenge by the strongest of all the nations under the banner of the East Asian development model: China.  How this challenge came to be and the implications for the international system are of paramount importance to understanding the direction the current global order is heading.

I’m not nearly convinced of the positive social value and good precedent setting of humanitarian intervention to begin with, but assuming, for the time being, that humanitarian intervention is net positive and a good international precedent to set, I’m finding it hard, in light of recent reports, to see the intervention in Libya as a necessary humanitarian mission (aside from Kuperman’s article, see here and here).  Instead, things are shaping up to look more like another case of western powers intermeddling with the internal affairs and violating the sovereignty of another middle eastern nation resulting in instability and chaos.  But, lest I go on a idealist realist tangent about western imperialism and the cooked-up notion of the right to sovereignty, let’s stick squarely to the humanitarian issue.

If the justification for the intervention in Libya is truly about saving innocent civilians from being ruthlessly massacred by a merciless government, then, as Kuperman suggests, the pretense for intervention in Libya may turn out to be false.  Even though protecting civilians was the stated reason, I still think it’s rather unclear for why, exactly, the U.S. and her NATO allies were so gun-ho about wanting to bomb Libya (especially France).  Regardless of the real intent, the stated reason of preventing the massacres of civilians isn’t holding up under the current information being revealed.  Contrary to expectations, there seems to be nothing close to a “bloodbath” being perpetrated by the Libyan government on its people.  Instead Khadafy seems to be targeting rebels – those actively revolting against the central government.  As Kuperman reports,

Human Rights Watch has released data on Misurata, the next-biggest city in Libya and scene of protracted fighting, revealing that Moammar Khadafy is not deliberately massacring civilians but rather narrowly targeting the armed rebels who fight against his government.

Misurata’s population is roughly 400,000. In nearly two months of war, only 257 people — including combatants — have died there. Of the 949 wounded, only 22 — less than 3 percent — are women. If Khadafy were indiscriminately targeting civilians, women would comprise about half the casualties.

Instead of stopping the deaths of civilians, the intervention by western powers seems to be causing them.  The intervention by NATO has, in effect, thrown a life-line to the rebels and turned what would have certainly been a suppressed resurrection, into a continuing civil war.

It is true that Khadafy (I’m going with Kuperman’s spelling here) is killing his own countrymen, but probably in the same way that any central government dealing with a rebel insurrection would.  There is a major misconception that Khadafy had pledged to show no-mercy to the civilians in the rebel-occupied cities, that he was intent on using the military to massacre civilians.  This isn’t true.  Back to Kuperman’s article,

Khadafy [never] threaten civilian massacre in Benghazi, as Obama alleged. The “no mercy’’ warning, of March 17, targeted rebels only, as reported by The New York Times, which noted that Libya’s leader promised amnesty for those “who throw their weapons away.’’ Khadafy even offered the rebels an escape route and open border to Egypt, to avoid a fight “to the bitter end.’’

It seems, instead, that the U.S. and her NATO allies were either deliberately duped by rebel propaganda, which made it seem as if a massacre of civilians was an inevitable barring western intervention, as Kuperman suggests.  Either that, or, the real reason lies elsewhere.  Questions like why, if saving civilians from slaughter is the reason for bombing Libya, are air-strikes being carried out on retreating government forces and forces stationed in areas of the country not currently in contention with the rebel forces?  And why was there such an abrupt change in position regarding whether Khadafy stayed in power or not?

Whatever the case, the net result is still uncertain.  Will intervention by the western powers end up being directly or indirectly responsible for the death of civilians?  Despite our “good intentions,” have we ended up perpetuating civil war and humanitarian suffering?  The Obama Doctrine may be based on a noble principle that innocent lives ought to be protected when possible from merciless governments.  But what happens with the doctrine has the reverse effect?  Or, what happens when the doctrine is invoked in an inapplicable situation?

The road to hell is paved with good intentions, isn’t it?