Unnatural Alliances and Northeast Asia’s Shifting Geopolitical Landscape
The alliance between Korea and the United States was borne out in the post-Korean war period and the start of what would become a very hot Cold War. Following the war, Korea, with other regionally strategic states, was installed as a spoke to the US-centered hub-and-spokes system. The primary purpose behind this move was strategic: construct a bulwark against Soviet and Chinese influence in the region and establish a military and ideological perimeter against Communism. This is, in short, the “San Francisco System,” as described by Kent Calder – the Marshal Plan’s oriental cousin. Korea was brought into the US’s sphere of influence by the lure of military protection and economic opportunity. As Bruce Cumings points out, Korea, like Japan and Taiwan, was strategically selected for development – what he calls “development by invitation” (here is one reason why Thailand and the Philippines are not Korea and Japan — but only one, there are many, many more). For being on the outer, most strategic edge of the post-Acheson defensive perimeter in the Asia-Pacific, Korea received preferential and lucrative loans in addition to a massive export market it could use to fuel its industrializing, export-driven economy. With a security guarantee (US-Korea alliance) and an economic guarantee (loans and an export market), Korea was able to take-off, catch-up and eventually reach a level of economic development on par with the rest of the developed world.
However, even a cursory glance at Korean history — or geographic location — will lead one to question whether the strong US-Korea economic and military relationship is at all “natural.” By natural I mean, exit special circumstances (e.g. a Cold War), which country would Korea more naturally gravitate towards? The answer is rather obvious: China. Korea was long an apendage of the Middle Kingdom under the tributary-state system, a political system in many ways fundamentally different from the Western European-inherited Anglo-Saxon lead nation-state system. Cultural, institutional, linguistic influence flowed from China towards the Choson (Yi) Dynasty. Most importantly, trade and commerce was conducted primarily with China, in addition to Korea’s status as a tutelage state – a sort of ancient security guarantee, if you will. Given this historical precedent, Korea’s strong economic and military ties to the US during the Cold War can be characterized as “unnatural.” The reason for Korea’s unnaturally close ties to the US is found in the chief motivation behind the establishment of the San Francisco System: winning the Cold War. One primary way the US did this was to effectively buy its allies, hence development by selection; as Cumings points out, and any student of political economy is sure to note, the US did not “choose” to develop Korea for development’s sake. It was a conscious, strategic decision on behalf of US policy makers to use their preponderance of economic and military strength to shape the US sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific that would serve the US’s Cold War strategic and political endgame.
As I explored in a recently written paper, the US-Korea relationship is a case-in-point of a large state utilizing an asymmetric trading relationship for the purpose of achieving international political and strategic goals. The dynamics of the asymmetric relationship between the US and Korea is what permitted an unnatural alliance to be formed. In exchange for priority market access and developmental aid, in addition to US support for Syngman Rhee over Kim Il-song, (South) Korea was pulled into the American sphere of influence and away from potential competitors, namely China and the Soviet Union. This relationship, however, is undergoing a fundamental shift in trajectory. As Calder points out, the US was able to “secure security” through prosperity. Stated alternatively, America exploited its economic prosperity and dominance of global trade to achieve international political and strategic goals.
Also, as I argue in my paper, the recent Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) is an example of the US’s efforts to preserve the San Francisco System by providing Korea with greater market access. Despite its best efforts, Korea has begun — and will continue — to gravitate towards a closer relationship with China, its more natural partner. Evidence for this is found in the shift in Northeast Asia’s regional economy, particularly trading patterns.
Changing Trading Patterns
A brief overview of Korean trade patterns with the US and China between the years 2004-2009 is reflective of the broader regional shift in regional economic power and an interesting case study. Korea is an ally of the US, and thus concedes to the US benefits of a security-alliance, namely high levels of political influence and preferential trading status. However, given the exponential growth of the Chinese market and Korea’s heavy reliance on trade for economic growth, the traditionally strong economic and political ties between the US and Korea are being challenged.
Between 2004-2009, total merchandise trade between Korea and China increased significantly, as Tables 1 and 2 below indicate. In 2004, Korean exports to China increased approximately 72 percent from $49.76 billion to $86.7 billion. Imports to Korea from China also show a significant jump. In 2004, a total of $29.58 billion worth of merchandise was imported from China. In 2009, this number had increased to $52.25, an 80 percent increase.
Table 1
| Korean Exports (in billions $) |
2004 |
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
| China |
49.76 |
61.91 |
69.46 |
81.99 |
91.39 |
86.7 |
| US |
43.03 |
41.5 |
43.32 |
45.88 |
46.5 |
37.8 |
| Korea Imports (in billions $) |
2004 |
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
| China |
29.58 |
38.65 |
48.56 |
63.03 |
76.93 |
54.25 |
| US |
28.92 |
30.79 |
38 |
37.39 |
38.56 |
21.77 |
Source: WTO “International Trade Statistics”
Although the nominal increase is not surprising, given China’s high levels of growth and Korea’s proximity to China, when the numbers are compared to Korea’s trade with the US , a different story is revealed. Korea’s level of dependence on the Chinese market is increasing relative to the US. In 2004, exports to the US market were $43.03 billion. Between 2004-2009, total exports decreased to $37.8 billion.
Between 2004-2006, a divergence occurred in exports from Korea to China and the US, with China taking a clear lead as the largest market for Korean exports. By 2009, imports to the Chinese market were more than double that of US imports. As the numbers show, Korea’s dependence on China for trade has increased significantly, relative to the US, in the latter half of the previous decade. This has significant implications for economic as well as political and strategic concerns for policymakers in Beijing, Seoul and Washington. When the numbers are broken down further, Korea’s asymmetric trade with China is even clearer and the implications more significant.
Recent trade profiles by the World Trade Organization (WTO) reveal the high levels of asymmetry in the Sino-Korean trading relationship, as well as the degree to which Korea is dependent on trade for economic growth. As of October 2011, China accounted for 23.8 percent of Korea’s total exports in merchandise trade and 16.8 percent of total imports in merchandise trade. Contrast this to 4.4 percent in exports and 9.9 percent for imports for China. This is an example, par excellence, of trade asymmetry. If Korea’s Trade to GDP ratio is taken into account, the implications are even greater. Between 2008-2010 Korea registered an extraordinarily high 105.8 GDP-Trade ratio, compared to 55.4 for China or 30.8 for Japan. Korea is extraordinarily dependent on exports for economic growth. Most important to note is the fact that Korea is becoming exceedingly dependent on China’s market to feed this growth.
Geopolitical Implications
As recent news reports indicate (see here and here for a few of the recent reports), China is set to start negotiations with Korea for a Korea-China FTA. Although this is not anything new (China has indicated a willingness to negotiate with Korea for an FTA before), the timing of the negotiations and the motives behind China wanting to conclude an FTA with its middle-power neighbor cannot be separated from the broader geopolitical situation unfolding in the region. Consider this quote from a Chosun Ilbo article:
The South Korea-China FTA could have a major geopolitical impact on Northeast Asia as well. Until now, the security landscape in Northeast Asia has been a Cold-War-style standoff between the South Korea-U.S.-Japan alliance on one side and China and North Korea on the other. But if the Seoul-Beijing FTA is signed and economic cooperation increases rapidly, this traditional framework would crumble.
As I indicated above, Korea is becoming increasingly dependent on China for trade (and thus economic growth); China knows this, and given the coming great power power struggle and the current balance of power tug-of-war underway between the US and China, is seeking to use its economic weight to pull Korea closer into its sphere of influence and, subsequently, away from its Cold War partner. Immediate shifts in behavior, policymaking and public perception are not likely to change in the immediate future but certainly over the long run there is bound to be a fundamental shift in Korea’s geopolitical orientation, particularly in regards to who it considers to be its closest partner, from a trade and security perspective. Shifts in the geopolitical makeup of the region can be seen in the US’s new defense strategy — a strategy indicative of the decline in US economic power and its inability to maintain the traditional San Francisco System. This has significant implications for Korea, US-Korea relations and Sino-Korean relations. Given the US’s declining economic power, China’s rising economic influence and the major shifts in trading patterns, it is only a matter of time before Korea finds itself viewing China is more favorable light, relative to the US.
It is only natural.
Trackbacks
- China Plays, Too | The Woods
- Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Natural or Un-natural? « The Political Cartel Foundation
- Changing Economic Architecture: A Conduit into the Hermit Kingdom? « The Political Cartel Foundation
- Problems of Korean Domestic Politics – The KORUS FTA as a Case Study « The Political Cartel Foundation
- Unipolar Era Debate | The Woods
- Unipolar Era Debate | The Woods
- World Politics, Realism and John Mearsheimer « The Political Cartel Foundation
- Weekly Digest « SINO-NK
From the US strategic perspective, I’m not sure that increasing China-ROK relations would be a bad thing at all. The US started that relationship to oppose China and North Korea. Now, there is no geopolitical reason to oppose China, and opposition to North Korea hasn’t accomplished anything (certainly not regime change, openness, or reunification).
If the US still does care about opening up North Korea, probably the best way is to let China become more invested in the situation.
Perhaps.
However, China is seen by not a small number of scholars to pose a major threat to regional stability — be it through coercive and reactive responses to minor trade disputes (see: Garlic War of 200 and Mushroom War of 2002), keeping their currency artificially low (thus causing a major global trade imbalance), cyber warfare, giving diplomatic and economic support to the DPRK (thus enabling the Hermit Kingdom to be overtly offensive, see: Yong-pyong Do and the Chonan incidents) or indicating that the South China Sea falls within its “core interest.” This, in addition to broader, more grandiose claims like China’s desire to return to a tributary-state system (thus overthrowing the current, Eurocentric nation-state system) is ample reason enough for policymakers in Washington to be fearful, or at least suspicious, of China’s rise and the expansion of its economic and political influence in the region. Such behavior may indicate that there will be plenty of geopolitical pegs upon which to hang a balance of power strategy targeted at containing, or at least mitigating, Chinese influence in the region. In fact, this is probably already happening; the KORUS FTA is a smaller strategy, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a larger effort to entangle China in a web of trade agreements if joins, or surround it if it doesn’t. All of this can be interpreted as a strategy to mitigate China’s ability to project its economic-borne power.
Basic power transition theory, as first established by Organski, states that the power at the pinnacle of power is responsible for whether the transition of power goes about smoothly,roughly or violently. The US is the pinnacle power, so to speak, on its way down. How policymakers in Washington respond will determine whether things go relatively peachy or disappointedly sour.
In any case, Korea’s eventual shift back towards China’s “tutelage” is, barring a catastrophe, inevitable. Every Korean scholar I talked with on this issue agrees, to some degree or another — some less comfortably than others.
Another potential geopolitical reason to oppose China: its tacit backing of Iran.
Whether one agrees with the US strategy to sanction Iran and cut its oil revenues by sanctioning financial institutions that do business with Iran’s central bank, it is the current US policy. Pressuring China into stopping its support of Iran isn’t likely, but getting other Northeast Asian countries to severe or curtail the amount of oil they import from Iran is a viable strategy; this, of course, depends on the amount of political influence the US holds over countries like Korea and Japan (who make up a significant percent of Iranian oil exports; 10% of Korea’s oil exports and 7% of Japan’s come from Iran – combined they account for about 20% of Iran’s oil exports). If Japan or Korea are “closer” to China, they would be significantly less responsive to American pressure.
We can see this geopolitical dynamic playing out right now, as Geithner moves about Asia.
I don’t think China wants, desires or can afford to return to a tributary system. The former states that paid tribute (Korea, Japan and Vietnam) are completely different in their domestic make-up. Aside from Vietnam, Korea and Japan are both thriving democracies. To ask their populations to explicitly acknowledge Chinese cultural superiority would definitely backfire.
While the current US-ROK alliance may appear to be “un-natural,” I also think it would be un-natural for Korea to return into some strategic agreement with China. Putting aside their domestic differences, one being a democracy and the other an authoritarian regime, in terms of strategic considerations, it makes perfect sense for Korea to keep the alliance with the US. Yes, their trade links have increased since 2003, but having an extra-regional ally provides considerable credibility to any potential aggressors.
China-centered geopolitical order, at least in East Asia, is inevitable — if it hasn’t already happened. It was Japan-centered during most the 70s and 80s, therefore highly subject to US political influence. But China isn’t Japan — its 100% autonomous. In any case, the tributary-state political system is probably impossible to re-create, if even desirable. Point is that China’s economic-borne influence is on the rise and China is not a Western/European state.
Professor SY talked a bit this a few times in passing over the last semester. He seems to believe that some “modern” form of the tributary-state system will eventually be implemented in the region. Jacques and other sensationalists agree — there is a small bit of truth in what they say, despite their bombastic claims about the end of the Western world.
As for how the ROK will respond to the shift in geopolitical winds, a good (early) indication should be the way Korea’s responds to the ratcheting up of pressure on Iran by the US.
And what would this modern form look like? Trainloads of European luxury cars? I don’t think a neo-tributary system could exist unless peripheral countries were willing to explicitly acknowledge chinas cultural superiority.
I think SY’s term, “modern” form of the tributary-state system, could include the US in it (under the condition that I know him quite well). Any system in East Asia without the US seems unpredictable in a near future. I know it sounds strange, but it is quite reliable in some points.
First, the US will never give up its presence in East Asia any time soon. Second, the neighboring states such as Japan and South Korea are not likely to be included in a China-centered system because, as Mark pointed out above, the system’s differences would be a huge obstacle to it.
Good question. I don’t have an answer.
Suffice it to say for now that China’s influence over her neighbors will become increasingly noticeable in near future. And most, if not all, starts with the change in trading patterns and increasing asymmetry between China and her neighbors.