Power in Transition
The absence of a central governing body is a short definition of anarchy. Despite what may be the better intentions of past world leaders, nothing of the sort has ever existed, nor does it appear to be on the way. In a anarchic system, power rules. A better part of the nation-state era is marked by the rise and fall of potential great powers, each epoch marked by pivotal conflicts that decided the fate of nations and the course of history. This, one could argue, is the natural order of things in the international system. For most of modern history, the power bearer has been America. Anytime a challenger arose to challenge her rule, the intrepid challenger was struck down. On the eastern horizon, there seems to be a new conflict taking shape.
Articles, books, and interviews detailing the rise of China, economically and militarily, are aplenty. Despite the differences in emphasis, the different opinions regarding China’s rise have a similar underlying theme: China’s rise in power, both real and potential, is redefining the international system and altering China’s perception of its role in global affairs. Articles like this one from Christian Caryl at Foreign Policy point to the shifting in China’s perception of its role on the global stage. Caryl states that China’s diplomacy-centered “good neighbor” policy of the past can no longer be equated with the more assertive China of today. Articles like these confirm that China is setting the stage for a transition from dormant rising start to assertive regional, and perhaps hemispheric, great power. “Charm Offensive” is out, power politics is in.
The question of whether China will continue to assert itself as the dominant player in East Asia is moot. The more important question is, how will this affect the global balance of power? If history is to be an accurate guide of the future, the answer may not be very pleasant. Unless China and the United States are able to find a modus operandi that allows the two superpowers to share a role as global superpower, some form of conflict is more than likely to occur.
Of the various “systemic schools of thought” one of the more bare-bones theory is set forth by A.F.K. Organski. In his Power Transition Theory, Organski posits the idea that when a dominant power (a hegemon or superpower) is challenged by a rising superpower, conflict is the end result. In other words, when the status quo is challenged by a rising power, the current superpower isn’t likely to stand by idly while the challenger assumes a new, more powerful position. China’s recent “aggression” may be a harbinger of conflict between the roaring dragon from the east and the soaring eagle from the west.
Organski and Kugler make the argument that a power transition presents the necessary but not sufficient grounds for interstate conflict. So there’s a good chance that hegemony could pass to the PRC from the US in the next few decades but that does not guarantee superpower war.
Particularly since there has never been a transition in the nuclear age. So, it will be interesting to see how this one progresses.
Right. I probably misrepresented Organski’s theory a bit by saying “conflict is the end result.” Instead, something like “makes conflict more likely” is a more accurate statement. If I understand Organski’s terminology correctly, the United States is the “dominant” state, while China, despite its recent power surge and loads of latent power, is a “great power.” The point at which the U.S. finds its position directly challenged by China is the point at which a war is most likely to occur.
The concept of “war” probably needs to be redefined as well. Even working under the assumptions of Macthpolitik, war doesn’t necessary mean direct military conflict. “War,” as its known today, comes in many different manifestations. Wars, like the great power wars of the 20th century, seem highly unlikely in today. There is economic warfare, political warfare, and cyber-warfare (?). In fact, many of these are probably already happening as we speak – albeit in very subtle forms. I think we can all agree that in the event of a conventional war between two nuclear powers, the world might as well cash in their chips and pray to whomever or whatever they think decides their fate hereafter. That (hopefully) is a strong enough deterrent.