Is Atheism Belief?
The question is: is atheism a belief in the same way that religious belief is? This may seem like a trivial academic question, but it has powerful implications for any discussion involving religion, from the cosmic to the political to the mundane. Some people, especially religious believers, refer to atheism as a belief system itself. Others, including most atheists, argue that their positions do not flow from belief or faith.
Atheism is a belief
Many people, especially theists, like to label atheism as a belief. This approach has some philosophical merit, and definitely makes tactical sense for those who are religious.
On some level, everything that a person holds to be true is a belief. The first school’s firmest foundation is found in this kind of general agnosticism. This is an odd home for religious people because it is the principle that nothing is really knowable and everything is held by belief. We can never really be 100% sure of anything. Our senses don’t even give us an objective view of the world; sensory data are corrupted and the brain actively constructs models. Causality must be inferred because it can never be directly observed. That kind of thing.
Even most atheists, including Richard Dawkins, cannot disagree with the general agnosticism critique. But they dismiss it as a boring argument that could equally be applied to anything, but can never be taken seriously as a practical matter. General agnosticism can certainly become practically irrelevant as well. Even accepting the proposition that “we can never really be 100% sure of anything,” there are things we can be 99.99…% sure about.
The graphic below illustrates the view that atheism is a belief in the same way that religious belief is.
Under this approach, neither the position “there is a god” nor the position “there is no god” can be proved. Neither the religious person nor the atheist can be 100% certain in their position. Both, however, require a leap of faith. The religious conclusion requires a leap of faith via religious institutions, traditions, or texts. The atheist conclusion requires a leap of faith as well, because the position cannot be directly proved.
Atheism is not a belief
The opposite conclusion is that atheism is not a belief in the same way that theism is a belief. The graphic below, representing the position that atheism is not a belief, contrasts with the graphic above.
The key difference between this view and the first is that under this view, the path to the atheist position does not require any leap of faith. A Political Cartel commenter recently remarked:
Certainly it is unknowable whether an all-powerful spiritual being created what we affectionately call the Universe… However, every written account of creation and origins contained in a religious source text has been manifestly discredited by facts. Pick your religious text and geology, genetics, biology, archaeology, physics, astronomy, math, linguistics, medicine and even a reasonable amount of common sense are more than sufficient to prove that good book false.
Another way of looking at the universe and answering the theist appeal to general agnosticism is to say that although the supernatural claims of any particular religion may be technically unknowable, those claims are either outside of or in conflict with all reason and evidence.
For atheists, whether something is a belief or not depends largely on the means instead of the ends: “how do you get to that position?” For atheists, the path is constructed of reason and evidence. Conclusions that do not logically flow from these things are dismissed and conclusions that logically conflict with these things are attacked.
What is “belief?”
At the core of this disagreement is a complex definitional argument. The first two definitions from Dictionary.com illustrate the conflict:
- something believed; an opinion or conviction: a belief that the earth is flat.
- confidence in the truth or existence of something not immediately susceptible to rigorous proof: a statement unworthy of belief.
Under the first definition, any position articulated by any person would be a belief, regardless of the nature of the position. A precise scientific statement supported by rigorous testing would be described with the same word as a vague statement about supernatural beings or forces. The second definition begins to show how the word belief is actually used in this context. Labeling everything as belief ignores significant philosophical differences between certain categories of positions.
I have labeled the orange box “Leap of Faith/Belief” instead of merely “Belief” for this reason. The orange box represents a barrier across which a bridge of reason and logic cannot be built.
Conclusion and implications
So is the lack of belief in a god a belief? David Nicholls, writing for the Atheist Foundation of Australia sums up the the best way to resolve the definitional and philosophical difficulties in answering this question:
As a child I can hold a “belief” that the Tooth Fairy and Santa Claus are real characters. I can have a “belief” that Unicorns exist and that Ghosts and Goblins etc. are also real. As an adult I can hold a “belief” that any one of the numerous gods purported, do actually exist, and that humans have an immortal “soul.” Some even have a “belief” in UFO’s, the power of crystals and a myriad of other unproven paranormal activity. Atheists do not accept that any of the above imaginary creatures or powers do exist as no scientific evidence is extant in support of those propositions. This is not a “belief,” it is just lack of scientific evidence in their support.
It makes no logical sense to label non-belief as belief. A devout Christian has many identifiable beliefs, perhaps including the belief that God exists or that Jesus was divine. The devout Christian does not believe that Zeus exists or that Joseph Smith received divine revelation, though. The Christian does not have “beliefs” regarding the validity of Greek mythology or Mormonism in the same way that an atheist does not have beliefs regarding the validity of Greek mythology, Mormonism, or Christianity.
The implications of this question are significant for atheists. Rejecting the idea that atheism is a belief is an important first step for non-believers to distinguish their worldview from the religious worldview. Atheism does not belong in an intellectual category along with every other possible religion and every possible claim. It stems from the (relatively) common basis of warranted assumptions about reality, self-evident truths, and basic reason. Instead of being on the same level as religion, atheism undercuts it.
The implications for religious adherents can be disastrous or miraculous, depending on the perspective. On one hand, religious believers risk being labeled as irrational because their conclusions do not follow directly from commonly accepted reason and evidence. On the other hand, religious believers may be comforted by insulating themselves from rational critique.
This question will continue to be asked and answered, especially as the world’s non-religious community increases in population and influence. Religion’s influence will likely continue to decline, but religious beliefs will not be replaced by atheist “beliefs.” Atheism may be described as a belief in the broadest sense, but it is not a belief in the same way that religious belief is.
Nice post, I’ve had this debate with a lot of people and I think its important to clearly distinguish the extent of ambiguity in beliefs and non-beliefs.
I’m glad you started a new thread because I felt the last got a little diverted. I’ll go back to that one shortly.
The thing is: I don’t feel like atheism is necessarily a belief system. As a matter of fact, it’s just one single position: Not believing in a god.
Penn Jillette makes an interesting distinction and since you have not mentioned it, I guess you’re unaware. He says that atheism can have two descriptions. 1. I believe there is no god. 2. I do not believe there is a god. The first is a positive statement of belief. The second is a negative, almost dismissive, statement.
I go by the second. I’ve just found no evidence. Therefore, I conduct my life the way I see fit, not ascribing to any particular set of rules set forth by the atheist community.
Now, the important thing is to realize that atheists have the non-belief thing in common. After that the world is wide open. It just seems that many, if not most, atheists tend to share beliefs in other things. Namely, science and rationality.
Atheism, to me, is not the start of something but, rather, the conclusion. It’s not a belief but an acceptance. You’re friend tells you that he is now dating this really awesome guy. He’s handsome, smart, funny, a great cook, a doctor, has a really cool car, etc. But they’ve been dating a year and you have yet to see this guy. There are no pictures or texts. You only hear about him through your friend who’s supposedly dating him. What conclusions would you draw? Once you conclude that your friend’s boyfriend does not exist, would you then use that non-belief to figure out how to lead the rest of your life?
This is why so many people trend away from the term “atheist”. It’s like saying that my hobbies include not collecting stamps. I am a humanist. A secularist. A scientist. A philosopher. A Bright. A skeptic. Etc.
Shanghai, I like the distinction between the positive and negative, but I don’t think that is the only way of looking at it. I also think that the questions begged by religious people who allege special supernatural insight require more active resistance than mere dismissal.
The alleged boyfriend analogy would only work if, based on that belief in the boyfriend, your friend and a billion of her friends went around pushing for laws and other real world things based on their beliefs. There would have to be lots of different boyfriend belief systems in competition and they would occasionally have to start wars against each other because of their boyfriend beliefs. At that point, simply dismissing the apparent boyfriend delusion of one friend no longer seems like an appropriate response to the problem.
The label issue is a big problem for, uh, non-theists/atheists/humanists/secularists/Brights. I think atheist is as good of a label as any other.
My problem with humanist as a label is that it sounds specist. ^^
I think the term “belief” is too ambiguous to have a philosophical debate over. If you believe something, then you have a “belief”, however I think when it is used in spiritual terms, the definition/connotation changes. At the end of the day, Atheism is still Atheism regardless if it is defined as a belief or not. I will say this however, it is philosophically impossible to disprove the existence of God and therefore it is only to be “believed”. But just because it is a belief does not mean it is a “belief”.
Actually, David, let’s go the other way with the analogy.
You and I and Brian and Neffs decide that we’re going to confront out friend about his belief in his boyfriend. I mean, it’s clearly not very healthy. But when we do he calls us a-boyfriendists and yada, yada, we clearly have our own agenda. Why can’t we let him have his beliefs and we can have ours?
Hell, you could even write a book called “The Boyfriend Delusion”.
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I have noticed that when I tell believers that I don’t believe in any gods, they ask what I do believe. As if, once I got rid of my belief in gods–or Yahweh, there was a vacuum that had to be filled by some sort of belief. That maybe be an important part of this discussion.
Also, that atheism is not a system of beliefs. It is merely one belief(or unbelief, if you will).
I do think there is a vacuum – not a vacuum of belief per se, but a vacuum. The vacuum comes from the two things that religion purports to do, explain things and prescribe morality. That’s where the more positive beliefs that many atheists have come in. Explanation comes from science and moral prescription comes from humanism.
How do you answer when they ask what you do believe? By the way, I hear the same thing all the time.
Well, I take a deep breath, light a cigarette and proceed to lecture about exactly those things you just mentioned. But that approach has changed as of last night actually. I watched the latest discussion(i won’t call it a debate) between Rabbi Wolpe and Christopher Hitchens. Wolpe actually talks about how Hitchens does have faith. Faith in things like justice, science, philosophy, etc. And Hitchens’ faith in those things is just as strong as the Rabbi’s faith in God.
But I remember a time when I believed in humanism, science, philosophy, justice and God all at the same time. Maybe one had to go. I don’t really know.
Since you drug me into it, I think that I started to weary of it all somewhere along the time that I realized that pestering the shit out of people to go to church, be all good, don’t cuss, blah dee blah dee blah, made as much sense as pestering the shit out of somebody to do anything in the name of an imaginary boyfriend. Whenever somebody says to me ‘God says this or that’ I always go ‘God is not here right now–you and I are, and you are bugging the hell out of me.’
I wish I could just “like” this.
http://www.ted.com/talks/richard_dawkins_on_militant_atheism.html
Since this site somehow led to traffic to mine, I decided to check out this post. (sorry for the length of my comment)
I think the position “There is no god” is a belief. It is a position. It posits.
However, what I’d argue is that atheism doesn’t necessitate taking the position “there is no god.” Rather, the minimal quality of an atheist is that he does *not* take the position “there is a god.” Note that when you quote Nicholls, he never says that atheists believe that gods do not exist. Rather, he notes that atheists do not believe that gods do exist.
I’d argue furthermore that various parties (so-called “agnostics”, and theists definitely) are waging a semantic war (but atheists of course are too). After all, how do you get agnosticism as a position mutually exclusive to atheism and theism? You only get it if you make theism and atheism two beliefs. “I BELIEVE There is a god.” and “I BELIEVE There is not a god.”
I think this is a false dichotomy. While believing there is no god is certainly part of the atheist set, I think that the real dichotomy is: “I believe there is a god” and “I do not believe there is a god.” The modifier “not” describes the action that *the individual* takes, not the proposition itself.
I think that theists in particular resist granting this “not believe” definition to atheism because it really changes the game. “I believe gods do not exist” certainly IS a belief, and it is made with certain assumptions. You have listed these in the second graph as “common rationality”, and you argue that such common rationality makes “I believe gods do not exist” not a belief. This isn’t the case. “Common rationality” simply becomes the presupposition that the atheist has “faith” in (although I don’t think the faith is quite the same as religious faith.)
But if atheism is simply lacking belief in gods, then things are quite different.
What does it even matter? Well, let me use an analogy.
Let’s say we were in Europe in a time before Australia had been discovered. So, we have no “evidence” of black swans. So, there are a few positions we can take and the implications of the positions.
1) I believe black swans do exist. (This position, even though it will eventually be shown true [by discovering black swans on Australia] is not entirely justified to the European. As you might note, they don’t have evidence of black swans. They take it on faith.)
2) I do not believe black swans exist. (This position simply reflect not being convinced by the evidences available. When black swans are discovered, one can easily change his position. HOWEVER, it’s important to note that even when black swans are discovered, the individual who did not believe black swans existed will NOT have been “wrong”. After all, who can dispute that the individual wasn’t convinced of the existence of black swans?)
3) I believe black swans do not exist. (While the individual can change his position when black swans are found, just like individual 2, the difference is that individual 3 would have been *wrong*. The reason? He made a logical leap that did not hold and which was ultimately unwarranted. For example, “Absence of evidence of black swans is evidence of their nonexistence.” Obviously, this tenet — which may have been justified by every prior experience — was unjustified and untrue.)
I think that theists and self-proclaimed agnostics would like atheism to be exclusively a “3″ position, while I haven’t conducted any studies, but I best that most atheists would actually take a “2″ position. Of course, there are many people who think 2 and 3 are the same position, or that 2 implies 3, or that there is no meaningful difference…
@Andrew, thanks for the comment. Lengthy, but good.
You are right that it boils down to a semantic war. It does appear that there is a difference difference between the two statements that you label (2) and (3). The semantic argument you identify – how one chooses to arrange the words in the sentence – is interesting enough. There is definitely some truth to that discussion. Some in the non-theist camp are honestly agnostic and others are affirmatively atheistic or anti-theistic.
There is a second layer in the semantic debate which is more neglected and has to do with the word “belief” in (3). Is that kind of belief the same kind of belief as the one in (1)? That was the point of my article. I don’t think that they are the same at all, and I attempted to distinguish the two kinds of belief.
Let me ask you a question because black swans are not a very good analogy to gods. It is probably safe to assume that most people in the modern world are nonbelievers with respect to fire-breathing dragons (although such things have been historically believed in). What kind of non-believers are they? (2) or (3)? If they are strong non-believers, i.e. (3), then is their belief the same kind of belief as the holdouts who do still “believe” in dragons?
When an assertion of truth is made, the negation or denial need not be forced into the dichotomy of agnosticism or belief. There is a third option of rational conclusion. The existence of fire-breathing dragons has been thoroughly debunked, and it is an insult to to consider the strong non-belief in dragons to be intellectually equivalent to belief in dragons. Not only is there a lack of evidence for fire-breathing dragons, but the evidence that induced belief in the first place is now understood to be creative legend. A rational conclusion may be tentative to the extent that all rational people should be open to adapting their positions if new evidence comes to light. That doesn’t mean that these conclusions require the same kind of “leap of faith” belief that the (1) position does.
It’s an interesting point that reliance on “common rationality” (whatever that even means) could be a kind of faith. The thing that still seems to distinguish it from religious faith is that one is connected to observable reality. Reason and the scientific method have to do with what we can interact with and predict. There are inherent flaws with relying on that to be ultimate truth in the cosmic sense, but as a practical matter, nothing else is competitive.
As a side note, I think you are right that most self-identifying atheists would choose the (2) position rather than the (3). It is a safer description, after all. But that isn’t entirely germane to the question of whether the (3) position is actually belief in the same way that the (1) position is.
I think that the kind of belief in (3) is similar enough to the kind of belief in (1) in the way that it relies on an uncertain premise. We would say that (1) relies on some sort of faith, but (3) nevertheless holds to some sort of similar premise, like, “Absence of evidence is evidence of absence.” In the case of black swans, we can tell that this argumentation is demonstrably false. Absence of evidence is absence of evidence. Lacking evidence may not give us reason to belief in the existence of a thing (so it justifies position 2), but it doesn’t necessarily provide justification that a thing does not exist (that is, position 3).
I would say that to the extent that people often DO hold to the assertion, “lack/absence of evidence is an evidence of absence/lack,” people may actually believe dragons do not exist, rather than simply not believing that they do exist. Without any further qualification, I would say that position 3 is only MARGINALLY better than position 1 for one reason. The assertion “absence of evidence is evidence of absence”, while not *universally* sound, is at least partially backed up. We don’t have experiences where we suddenly discover things that had no noted evidence all the time. So to assume such things don’t exist, while lazy, is practical.
But that’s without any further qualification. I of course think there is a more important reason why the black swan analogy doesn’t fully capture the god analogy, but it MAY relate to the dragon analogy.
When we are talking about the existence of black swans, the range of our claim is the earth. Now, if our range were merely Europe, then someone might very well be correct in saying “I believe there are no black swans.” But since the range is Earth, then the unknown existence of black swans in Australia puts a damper on that belief. Our lack of evidence in Europe doesn’t soundly cover an assertion that swans do not exist.
The relevant range for dragons, likewise, would probably be earth.
But what is the relevant range for deities?
…but I’ll get back to what you argue:
I disagree. I believe that such a dichotomy is logical and necessary. To say one either believes or does not believe (and there is no third option) is just as valid as saying there is either “A” or “not A” (and there are no third options). The alleged middle is excluded.
The problem is that this so-called “third option” *is* a belief, and it is predicated *upon* beliefs. You simply hide the belief by saying “rational conclusion,” as if a rational conclusion is not a belief and it is divorced from the individual, floating out somewhere.
How is it debunked? I assume that you mean that we have scoured the entirety of the range of the assertion (the earth), and so we know the totality of the earth’s contents, and so we know that it is a logical impossibility for dragons to exist on the earth, because two things (e.g., the entirety of the earth’s contents…and dragons) cannot exist in the same place. If this is the case, then congratulations. Because fortunately, we *can* decisively say that illogical things do not exist, so to debunk something is to show how it is logically impossible.
But this is significantly different than the pre-australia black swan condition, or of our condition with deities. Back then, we didn’t know the entirety of Earth’s contents, and now, we don’t know the entirety of the universe’s contents. So it is not insulting to consider belief in the nonexistence of dragons (as opposed to nonbelief in the existence of dragons) to be intellectually equivalent to belief in dragons (which, as I actually pointed out a little earlier in this topic. It wouldn’t be intellectually equivalent — because although the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, it is a good practical shortcut for such — but still intellectually inferior to nonbelief.)
Irrelevant. Consider we go back to pre-australia discovery Europe. Let’s say that no one ever sails across the ocean. However, the range for the claim is still earth. If the evidence that induced belief in black swans is denounced (which shouldn’t be difficult), this *still* doesn’t justify saying that black swans do not exist. The lack of evidence in Europe can NEVER trump the unknown evidence elsewhere. To be honest, believing that swans do not exist would not have much practical, day-to-day difference, but it would still be an intellectually lazy conclusion.
Duly noted. However, I guess if I could summarize my point, it would be like this. Your argument implies that we understand the whole of observable reality. When you say “we have thoroughly debunked the existence of dragons,” it sounds like you believe we know everything about observable reality for the relevant area of the claim. I think that the reason why you dislike the black swan analogy is because you feel there isn’t an Australia around somewhere that harbors dragons and gods. So, you feel that it is a “rational” enough “conclusion” to make that dragons and gods positively do not exist.
But I would point out that, if we are going to be scientific, then we should recognize that this position actually hasn’t been sustained by scientific exploration. Before we had evidence of bacteria (because we lacked the tools to discern them), did that mean that people were fit to believe that bacteria do not exist? I’m sure plenty of people believed that, but they were not justified in doing so. However, anyone who simply did not believe bacteria exist (based on the dearth of evidence to convince them) would certainly be justified. Before we could observe infrared (our eyes don’t see it, but our tools can), quarks, higgs bosons (oh ho ho), and whatever else, at best we were justified in *not believing*.
Actually, my point here was to note that in a discussion like this, when considering what atheism at its core is, the semantic warfare used by different parties matters. The question of whether (3) is as unjustifiable a belief in the way that (1) is certainly is a bit of a different question. But the thing I was trying to get at is…should we let theists try to pidgeonhole atheists into position 3? I don’t think so. Should we let so-called “agnostics” twist the word to mean something like position 2 (which I think you have acquiesced to, as far as I can tell)? I don’t think so. And, finally, even if (3) is not as unjustifiable a belief as (1), is it still an unjustified belief? Since we have reason to believe that we do not have full knowledge of observable reality, I don’t think we have reason enough to believe that we have “thoroughly debunked” certain things from observable reality, so ultimately, I don’t believe we have reason enough to positively belief that those things do not exist.
However, I ultimately recognize that whereas a lack of evidence doesn’t provide evidence of nonexistence, it most certainly doesn’t give us reason to believe that things exist.
Ultimately, I think that if atheists can stick with position 2 instead of playing around with position 3, then we will have a high road.
“Ultimately, I think that if atheists can stick with position 2 instead of playing around with position 3, then we will have a high road.”
If you mean a tactical high road within the confines of a purely logical debate, perhaps. But pervasive agnosticism that refuses to make positive assertions (even about negative things) isn’t necessarily the best argument. It doesn’t give a strong alternative to the strong positive assertion that god does exist.
“I think that the reason why you dislike the black swan analogy is because you feel there isn’t an Australia around somewhere that harbors dragons and gods.”
It’s true that the difference between the swan and dragon analogies is that in the end, black swans were found.
I think you are too quick to dismiss the evidence-debunking as “irrelevant.” The evidence supporting a claim or its opposite is important. For an example, step into the world of science. J.J. Thomson’s atomic plum pudding model was proposed early in the 20th century. There was a certain amount of evidence that supported Thomson’s claim and there were certain expectations that should be met if his theory were to be accurate. Eventually, the evidence supporting his claim was destroyed and others disproved his model because experiments led to contrary outcomes. Newer, better models have developed since.
The god theory in various forms has been around as a model to explain various things: weather, animal migration, disease, battlefield success, humanity’s presence, the basis for morality, and the physical origins of the world. For most of the history of civilization, the god theory probably seemed like the best explanation, but now there are newer, better theories that have more explanatory power. Furthermore, the evidence supporting the various god theories has been exposed as fraudulent (or at the very least, highly questionable).
I am most familiar with Christianity (I used to be one), so I am aware of the problems with the Bible, essentially the only reason why anyone today would think that Christianity’s version of the god theory was worth subscribing to: it has deep internal contradictions; many of its historical claims are contradicted by more reliable data; many of the ethical standards contained in it are barbaric by today’s standards; it has a long and incredibly dubious textual history that includes lots of edits, deletions, and post-dated writings. Furthermore, there are certain expectations of Christianity’s god theory that are contradicted by observable reality. Some expectations have to do with the influence of prayer or the occurrence of natural disasters, and both appear to be contradicted. Others have to do with the history of the Earth and the universe, the biology of our species, and the alleged “design” of nature. The expectations created by the Christian god theory are disconfirmed by observable reality. To me, the double-punch of the original evidence being debunked and the expectations created by the Christian god theory is good evidence for a strong denial. The evidence matters.
To summarize the point I am trying to make, I think there is more than a “lack of evidence” going against the god theory in any particular form. It isn’t just that we haven’t been to Australia or wherever god is lurking. We have uncovered lots of rocks under which he has been said to be hiding and each time he isn’t there. We have seen outcomes in observable reality that do not fit with a theory that involves a god designer and certainly not with a god intervener.
Here is another thing I think your analysis might be missing. You see arguments from a structural point of view: assumption –> evidence + reasoning = conclusion. In that way, you can reduce (1) and (3) to the same thing. They both rest on assumptions, after all – (3) resting on the assumptions of observable reality, the scientific method, etc. But not all assumptions are equally valid.
“Since we have reason to believe that we do not have full knowledge of observable reality, I don’t think we have reason enough to believe that we have “thoroughly debunked” certain things from observable reality, so ultimately, I don’t believe we have reason enough to positively belief that those things do not exist.”
I know what you are saying here, and it is tempting to take this route for the tactical reasons you know and because it seems very consistent. But sometimes consistency becomes absurd. Your position seems to be that since human knowledge about the universe is inherently limited, no human can ever make a strong assertion that any thing does not exist. Consider this example:
What if we came across a person who lived his life based on a holy book that was supposedly written 10,000 years ago by a large chocolate cake the size of Ireland that lived eternally at the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean. Let’s say the supposed residence of the cake had never been explored and exploration was not feasible. We did, however, determine rather quickly that the book was a forgery, written by another person who was definitely not a chocolate cake or deity of any kind. The chocolate cake seems to be entirely the work of this second person’s imagination. Additionally, the premise of a 10,000 year-old underwater alive chocolate cake is utterly absurd. Could we possibly say to this poor sap who believes in the cake that we believe there is not a supreme chocolate cake? Couldn’t we have a very high amount of confidence in our assertion, even though it is a negative assertion and human knowledge about the universe is inherently limited?
Our goal is not to make “strong alternatives to the strong positive assertion that God exists” Our job is simply to show that the strong positive assertion that God exists is unlikely, and people are justified in not believing such an assertion.
To stress it again, when we say, “God does not exist,” then we are making a claim that needs to be justified and backed up (as theists will point out). But this is a runaround. This is a confusion. We are not making a claim. We are pointing out how a different claim “God exists” is ultimately unconvincing.
…now, I will qualify. I don’t think that atheists make no assertions or positions. Rather, I don’t think that the assertion, “God does not exist” needs to be that position. Rather, atheism doesn’t exist in a void, but it is a conclusion of several frameworks. For example, in your critiques of Christianity, you imply and presuppose strong and positive beliefs about epistemology, evidence, reasoning, etc., So, if it seems like saying “I do not believe gods exist” as opposed to saying “I believe gods do not exist” isn’t a strong enough “positive” assertion to the belief that gods do exist, then I would say…make your positive assertions be, “Science is the best way for ascertaining valid evidence from the world” or “rationalism is the best way…” or “empiricism is…” or “whatever is…” And then show how, from following these methods, theism isn’t compelling.
In your lengthy description of the evidence debunking of, say, the God hypothesis, the problem is that the god hypothesis isn’t static. Christianity, for that matter, isn’t static. Yet, when Christianity (and theism in general) redevelop and reshape, we nontheists and non- or ex-Christians say that they are retreating, they have a god of the gaps, they are changing the goal posts.
But obviously and apparently, it doesn’t seem like people are so certain of the things that you say (that there are deep internal contradictions, that the historical claims of Christianity are contradicted by reliable data, and so on, and so forth). In fact, not everyone even ascribes to your premises about history and what counts as good history, evidence and what counts as good evidence, etc., So you talk about certain expectations of Christianity that are not borne out by observable reality, but other Christians can easily say, “You are ignoring x evidence out of your bias for y kinds of evidence.” or even “These expectations are not true to Christianity; you are attacking a straw man.”
Actually, I *have* noted this in my prior comment. That is why I have also noted that I don’t say 1 and 3 are equivalent. However, I do believe 1 and 3 are both inferior to 2.
Not at all. I have said nothing about *inherent* limitation. And in fact, I have offered ways to argue for the nonexistence of a thing. Show the logical impossibility of that thing or reduce the relevant range of the claim.
I think that if we did say such a thing (I believe there is not a supreme chocolate cake), it would be by reducing the relevant range. This is the same way that theists counter arguments like invisible pink unicorns and flying spaghetti monsters. When we talk about “spaghetti” or “unicorns” or “chocolate cakes” or…even in some languages, I think, “swans”, we have a limiting of our range. Spaghetti is known in a context of a nonsentient, nonflying, nonmonstrous food product. Unicorns are known in a context of being a proposed animal (however nonexistent). Chocolate cakes, see spaghetti. And here’s the clincher for swans. I hear that in some languages, swans are defined as “white birds.” In this case, there literally cannot be a black swan. It is logically impossible.
But I would stick by my position. If you wanted to say such a thing, you should wholeheartedly be willing to also admit that you are taking a linguistic shortcut out of laziness. I don’t think that you want to do this. I don’t think that strong atheists want to do it either. I think that if they don’t want to do it, then what they should admit is that what they REALLY mean is this: “We have no good, compelling reason to believe there are supreme chocolate cakes, and if I have any beliefs about it, it is that I believe that you also don’t have good reasons to believe in it either.”
I don’t understand why this is so tough to say? I don’t understand why getting rid of lazy shortcuts “I believe x doesn’t exist” with more precise, and still commonly understandable phrases “I am not convinced that x exists” or “I don’t find compelling reasons to believe x exists” should be considered outlandish or “absurd.”
I don’t think we disagree on where the lines are drawn. You have made good points distinguishing the (2) position from the (3) position as you define them. You have also made good points for preferring the (2) “I do not believe” or “I am not convinced” position. As I understand your argument, you think that (2) is more technically accurate as well as tactical.
I must admit that in the purely technical world of logic or science, you are right. You cannot “prove” a negative. We don’t really disagree on the fundamental point here. The only difference comes when we move to the practical level, and I argue that some things are so detached from reality or so obviously false that one can reasonably assert a strong negative position. You label this approach as intellectually lazy. It is only such if you stick rigidly to the formalistic rules of logic, but I don’t think that is the only acceptable way of living. If there were some platonic ideal world of logic out there, we would necessarily fall short of it in a million ways. Our thinking is not purely rational, and our language is imprecise.
I don’t think the (2) position is absurd at all, and I didn’t mean to express that. There are plenty of people who are honestly agnostic. There is a continuum between strong belief, doubt, agnosticism, and strong disbelief. Technically, no matter how close one gets to the furthest edge of strong disbelief, it never achieves the impossible negative proof. However, it can get so close that it is indistinguishable for all realistic purposes. The examples may seem demeaning, but one can rationally assert negative statements.
It isn’t lazy to be flexible enough to step outside of the formal technical rules of logic, especially when discussing something like religion with other random people. What is the actual negative impact of stepping outside of those rigid confines, anyway?
As for the tactical side, we disagree here as well. You think that non-theists have a stronger debate position if they take the (2) position because it is ultimately agnostic and therefore not open to direct refutation. Again, your flaw is that you approach this issue from a highly formalistic, technical viewpoint. In the world of pure logic, I would have to agree with you. That’s why in formal competitive debate, there often exists a bias toward the negative side. To win, the negative side need only attack the affirmative’s assertion and need not necessarily put forward its own positive assertions.
Nevertheless, most people in the real world do not recognize the constraints of the purely logical debate world. To them, the agnostic position is wishy washy and fails to offer a strong alternative to the (1) position. If Believer A says, “I believe that God exists,” and Skeptic B responds, “I’m not convinced,” B is very unlikely to persuade A or anyone else observing the interchange.
Even in the debate world, the flaws of a purely defensive (2) strategy are evident. I have seen a lot of intense debate rounds where the negative did a great job attacking the affirmative’s arguments, but lost because she did not provide any offensive arguments. If you envision the debate as a set of scales, the affirmative begins by placing several arguments to weigh down his side. One viable strategy for the negative is to remove the affirmative’s arguments, but at some point, the negative must place her own offensive arguments on her side or else there is no chance of her winning.
I don’t hate, judge, or condemn anyone honestly in the (2) camp or those who choose to use (2) to articulate their position. It is a fine way to present the non-theist position. I only recognize that (3) is also a valid approach, and may in fact be more practical and tactical.
D.M., while I see *some* merit in the way you argue for the “practical level,” (and I think that positions 2 and 3 are close enough in most practical ways,) I feel like at some point, this kind of distinction actually becomes quite impractical.
For example, you said: “It is only [intellectually lazy] if you stick rigidly to the formalistic rules of logic, but I don’t think that is the only acceptable way of living. If there were some platonic ideal world of logic out there, we would necessarily fall short of it in a million ways. Our thinking is not purely rational, and our language is imprecise.”
This is a surprising argument, because it is one that I encounter most often from theists who use it to counter atheists. (And one which I am not necessarily opposed to). I agree that humanity is not purely rational, and I agree that we do not “stick rigidly to the formalistic rules of logical,” and neither should we (because that is not the *only acceptable way of living*.)
But if this is the case, then we have to recognize that in living, we are taking some irrational positions. I think that if we were to recognize this, there wouldn’t be a problem. However, what I think is the trend (especially with the “new” atheism) is to emphasize rationality so heavily and then emphasize that atheism is the epitome of rationality and that only rationality should be accepted, because everything else is subpar. This kind of argumentation will not work if in living, its adherents do not live “rigidly according to the formalistic rules of logic”.
Even though I agree that position 1 isn’t equivalent to position 3, I do think that where they are similar, then if you concede, “We shouldn’t have to live “rigidly according to formalistic rules of logic; we aren’t completely rational,” then at some point, you concede that some people may be justified in taking position 1. Or…even if you take position 3, it isn’t an “objective” “grounded-away-from-everything” perfect position that is “obviously true” and “obviously rational.”
I personally think we should be moving away from this kind of paradigm anyway, and move toward one where we recognize subjectivity. For example, you note, “our language is imperfect.” But what if we took things another step forward, and noted that truth is and always must be tied to our language, so therefore, our truth must always be as imperfect as our language? What if we moved beyond a correspondence theory of truth, searching for truth “out there” and recognized that while there is stuff “out there,” in order to have truth about it, we have to open our mouths…and our language is *not* “out there”?
I guess I’ve neglected to address this, but still.
As you’ve already alluded to (perhaps without realizing it), the (2) position isn’t the only one that is “honestly agnostic”. What I’m trying to argue is that it is not the case that (1) is theism and (3) is atheism and (2) is the “middle ground agnosticism.” Rather, what I am trying to argue is that (1) is theism, and 2 and 3 are atheism. There is not “middle ground” because it is a binary. There is no third alternative. So, there isn’t this “continuum between strong belief, doubt, agnosticism, and strong disbelief,” because you are conflating two different things.
You’re conflating *belief* with *certainty* or *knowledge*. Agnosticism is a position about *knowledge*, so it doesn’t follow to keep lumping it in a discussion about belief.
If the question is, “Does God exist?” then I think this question, without the introduction of “Do you believe,” implies knowledge. So, if one answers “yes” or “no,” then I think that they imply a knowing, gnostic position.
The agnostic, however, recognizing he doesn’t have such knowledge, says, “I don’t know.”
But from here, we know nothing about the agnostic’s beliefs.
The real question is, “Do you believe God exists?”
To which here, there are only two coherent answers, “yes” or “no.” “I don’t know” ceases to become coherent here because whereas before, the question was inventorying some outside knowledge claim (do you know this external fact about the universe?), a question about BELIEF doesn’t involve anything outside of oneself (do you know this internal fact about your mental states?) While someone may find external facts inaccessible (and thus not know), it shouldn’t be the case that they find internal facts inaccessible.
So, the person who answers “yes” notes that he or she BELIEVES God to exist. The person who answers “no” notes that he or she DOES NOT believe God to exist. The person who believes in God does not necessarily cease to be agnostic. After all, she can say, “I don’t know that God exists, but I have faith that he does.” or “I hope that he does”. Or, quite simply, “I believe that he does.”
Note that this question cannot tell us whether a person believes God does not exist, because it never asked about that claim. For that, we would need a different question: “Do you believe God does not exist?”
(To which case, the person who claims “yes” would be our position (3) atheist, while the person who says no could EITHER be a theist or a position (2) atheist. nonbelief in the nonexistence of god is NOT sufficient for theism, but nonbelief in the existence of god IS sufficient for atheism. But continuing on, we still don’t know if any of these guys are gnostics or not. After all, someone who answers “yes” to the God nonexistence belief question could say, “I don’t know that God does not exist, but I believe he does not because…”
Do you see the problem here? Without knowledge, someone needs something else to back up the belief claim. With theism, we call it faith. Whatever the parallel is for atheism (“I believe he does not because I’m a pretty sure that absence of evidence is evidence of absence”) will naturally be compared and contrasted with faith.)
The examples may seem demeaning, but one can rationally assert negative statements.
See, you keep on wanting to hold fast to this position, but that is the position you *must* give up. You must give up the fixation of “rational assertions” — and all the great connotations you have with it — if you do not want to be bound by it (which, you don’t. You want a *practical level* where people aren’t purely rational, living according to rigid formulas of logic is not the only acceptable way, etc.,)
What is the actual negative impact of stepping outside of those rigid confines, anyway?
You make a mockery of those rigid confines if you argue FOR them while not arguing IN them. For example, your point is that “rational assertions” are good. Better, in fact. They are justified. So, for you, when you say that “one can rationally assert negative statements,” your use of “rationally” implies something like “one can justifiably. Anything that would get your stamp of “irrational” actually gets a stamp of “unjustifiable” or “unjustified.”
So, you place rationality on a pedestal in your argumentation. It becomes a prized good. Many atheists do this with rationality. Some do it with science and the scientific method. You can find it with empiricism, objectivity, etc., So, all that’s left is to ensure that your position is rational/scientific/empirical/objective/whatever your fancy is….and that your opponent’s is not.
Of course, your opposition can see this. And they can see too that you’re actually being lazy with the thing you claim to champion. Your position actually *isn’t* purely rational. Furthermore, if pressed, you will admit that humans aren’t fully rational. What you claimed as a prized good actually isn’t…because you recognize a more “practical level” where these things are less in importance.
But from here, there’s a crack in the pedestal, and all people will want to do is stick a wedge in there and widen the crack. Why should rationality be a prized good anyway? Why should rationality be the only justified way in coming to conclusions? Does it even really work? Or do people actually not live according to it?
I think you’re mixing two arguments here. I’ll address the second one. How would a (2) atheist argue? Well, Skeptic B doesn’t *only* say, “I’m not convinced.” Rather, he isn’t convinced for several reasons…and he can still point out those reasons to Believer A. That is why, in a previous comment, I noted that someone can easily say, “I don’t find your evidence of a supreme chocolate cake compelling, and furthermore, I don’t believe you should find it compelling either. Here’s why.”
But I’ll address the first argument. Why is a purely logical debate unpersuasive to the real world? Because, as you’ve already conceded…people are not purely logical. People are not purely rational. But this actually strikes at position 3 harder than it does position 2. Because position 3 relies upon putting rationality and logic up on a pedestal…but it then won’t even live by it!
I would note that person 2′s goal is not to convert someone to personally stop believing (whether that there is a god or that there is not). Rather, person 2′s goal is to convince someone that the 2 position is reasonable (and perhaps more reasonable than either 1 or 3). I think he can be very successful here.
And of course, I would note something further. Position 3 isn’t very effective in persuading people either. I think that’s because position 3 is blind of its presuppositions, so it takes the high road too early. It wants rationality and objectivity to be the prize of the day…and then it assumes that position 3 *is* rational. You asked “Is Atheism Belief?” Your argument against that was, “no, it is a rational conclusion” What I have pointed out is first, it’s not ALL that rational, and second, a “rational conclusion” is still a belief. (If you have noticed, your argument changed very quickly from “Atheism is not a belief” to “Atheism is not the same kind of belief as theism.”
But what I have said is not that position 2 atheists lack beliefs in total. I have noted that they lack beliefs regarding the existence of deities. They can easily use offensive arguments, but it would be relating to more foundational claims. What counts as good evidence? What counts as knowledge? Etc., These questions are answered affirmatively by every individual, and the answers to these (and more) will determine whether other claims (e.g., theism) are compelling or uncompelling.
Andrew, I appreciate your comments and I think you are articulating your position very well. I also think you are exaggerating the difference between what you are saying and what I am saying. It seems the only difference is that I think it is fine for strong atheists to describe themselves using your (3) label. Even though this may not be 100% technically accurate, it is an acceptable (not lazy) way of self-identifying and it is so close to the reality that the difference is negligible. Your position is to dogmatically uphold the technical rules of logic that prohibit any negative assertion.
You are right that the question is, “do you believe God exists?” But that does not mean that the answer must be binary. You also said:
I think you are exaggerating the differences here. Each of these three terms is highly interrelated. There is no such thing as objective knowledge, merely data that can be relied upon to various degrees of certainty, and beliefs are formed on the basis of the other two. Any good interviewer, pollster, or scientist knows that questions like these do not elicit binary responses in human subjects. You can choose to simplify the world into a yes vs. no dichotomy as long as you stay in the world of your own thoughts and blog comments, but the real world is not like that.
Maybe it will be helpful to introduce more categories than your initial three. Three categories is too limiting for something as complex as religious belief or nonbelief, and funnily enough, you want to reduce it further to two. Anyway, these are the seven that Richard Dawkins uses. They may not be perfect, but I like 7-point scales. This is from The God Delusion:
For what it’s worth, Dawkins places himself between 6 and 7, which is probably close to where I would place myself. How about you?
Now let’s turn to the words, because this has turned out to be a debate over semantics. You propose that these are acceptable ways of self-identification:
(a) “I do not believe that God exists.”
(b) “We have no good, compelling reason to believe [that God exists] and if I have any beliefs about it, it is that I believe that you also don’t have good reasons to believe in it either”
I think those are fine things to say, I really do. But I also think these are acceptable:
(c) “There is almost certainly no god.”
(d) “There is no god.”
Maybe you would be fine with (c)? I can’t tell. But you apparently have some hang up with the tiny step into (d) territory. You repeatedly point out the logical flaw in asserting a negative position, and technically, it is undeniable. But you go on to inflate the impact of such a minor deviation from formality and paint an unrealistic doomsday scenario. The (d) statement may be technically irrational, but only to the same extent that telling your children (when they grow up) that “there is no Santa Claus.” I dunno, maybe you are the type of person to tell your 7 year-old “I cannot be completely sure, but I have not seen any compelling evidence that Santa Claus actually exists.”
I fear you have misunderstood me just a teeny bit. I also think it is fine for strong atheists to describe themselves with the 3 label. After all, I think that strong, or positive atheism *is* the 3 label.
But I don’t think that strong atheism is the only label, or that position 2 is “agnosticism” and position 3 is “atheism.” And I think that if you’re asking “Is atheism belief?”, then if you take the position that 3 is atheism, then atheism most certainly (and not controversially so) is a belief: the belief that there is no god.
…and I think that this has implications for the entire argument…I think that’s why theists would like to make atheism *exclusively* the strong atheist position. Because it’s much easier for them to argue against the difference in logic of that position (even if you and many other people think that difference is negligible) and dismiss atheism that it is for them to address the “2″ position. Heck, it’s easy for *me* to argue, and I’m not a theist.
What other options are there than “believe” and “non-believe”? What other options are there than “a” or “not-a”. No matter how you put it, these sets hold all supposed options. an A is still in the “a” category, just modified as capital. a “b” is still in the “not-a” category. So, you’re trying to conflate the diversity of answers when logically and simply, in such a question as this, they *do* represent a binary. I sense that you don’t fully get the logic of the law of the excluded middle.
The issue is that you’re failing to realize the set which have been lain. The seven-point scale does not falsify that “Do you believe in god” is a binary. In fact, it really just conflates several different things incorrectly.
For example, probability is not the same as belief. One can believe strongly in things that one recognizes are extremely improbable, or one can believe weakly (or even not believe) in things that one recognizes are extremely probable. That’s because when we ask, “Do you believe in god?” we are not asking about belief in probability or possibility. We are asking about belief in actuality At the end of the day, a “yes” answer to the “Do you believe god exists” questions is a set of all of these (and more). To use an analogy, it can be a 2% chance of rain and be raining hard. One shouldn’t get mad at this occurrence…the actuality of rain can be the case regardless of the possibility.
The 4 position, if you’ll note, says nothing about belief. It is simply about probability and certainty (which I’ve already stated to miss the mark). That one says, “there’s equiprobability that god exists as doesn’t” does NOT make one a “completely impartial” agnostic. Rather, one can believe or not believe, while noting that the existence or nonexistence is equiprobable. What Dawkins probably actually trying to get at with the position 4 is a conflation of TWO questions “Do you believe god exists” and “do you believe god does not exist?” to which the 4 person probably would not believe either. But his nonbelief of either question does not make him “completely impartial.” Since atheism minimally concerns a no answer to the question “Do you believe god exists,” someone who also answers no to believing god does not exist is still an atheist.
So on goes with the rest of the positions.
What I’m saying however is that even if the latter positions adds a new question “Do you believe there is no god” to which the latter positions answer, “I am more certain of…I strongly believe…I know”, these answer can and do fit in the subsets of the question “do you believe there is a god?”
I’d also note that to start talking about probabilities conflates more about belief and knowledge. As an agnostic, I’d have to say I don’t know whether god exists or not and I also don’t know how probable or improbable his existence is. But as an atheist, I certainly would say I do not believe god’s existence is all that probable (but that is not the same as saying “I believe” his existence is improbable…), and whatever the probability, I don’t believe he exists.)
Again, I’m not saying that “I believe there is no god” and “There is no god” and “There almost certainly is no god” are unacceptable positions. But these are positions that must be backed up, and even have, *gasp*, a burden of proof, because from here, they ARE making claims. And I think that when atheists try to back these up, we must admit that these positions are made with trusted assumptions OR that the atheist in question is really just trying to make a shortcut for nonbelief, rather than a belief in nonexistence. I have mentioned what I believe some of these assumptions are, and why I believe they are problematic.
You misunderstand my position in another way. I do not say that asserting nonexistence cannot be done, or it is logically flawed. After all, we *can* assert the nonexistence of logically impossible things. So, an argument that showed god to be logically impossible would fit the bill. But most people don’t want to do that.
I feel like we might be going around in circles a little bit, and it now seems that we have even less disagreement than before. That’s what tends to happen in semantic arguments over minutia. I know you like them, so that’s fine.
This was not at all clear. At other points, you argued things like, “I don’t understand why this is so tough to say? I don’t understand why getting rid of lazy shortcuts ‘I believe x doesn’t exist’ with more precise, and still commonly understandable phrases ‘I am not convinced that x exists.’ If you are fine with both your (2) and (3) positions, then there is no disagreement there and no reason to discuss it further.
I don’t think (3) is the only legitimate possibility either, but I have already stated that. Different people have different views on this complex issue of religious belief. As for (2) being “agnosticism,” a problem emerges because your (2) covers a lot of territory. When you look at a scale with more points (like Dawkins’), you can see how (2) contains diversity. I know that some of the territory encompassed by (2) would definitely be de facto atheists, but there are others who could legitimately be described as agnostics.
I think perhaps we have already beaten this horse dead. If you define belief broadly as a positive assertion of any kind, then fine, both (1) and (3) are beliefs. My argument has been that under a more narrow and appropriate definition of belief, (1) is belief but (3) is not.
I wrote something similar on your blog yesterday, but this issue really typifies our discussion. You viewing it as “A” vs. “Not-A” is problematic because it oversimplifies an immensely complex human phenomenon. Another complex modern human phenomenon is politics. Do you think it makes sense to classify Americans into “Republicans” and “Not-Republicans?” No doubt you could do it, but it would be silly. It’s just as silly to reduce the spectrum and variety of belief and non-belief to a binary variable. There are lots of different “Not-Republicans” in America – Democrats, socialists, independents, libertarians, etc. In fact, it is obvious that the diversity within the group “Not-Republicans” makes that distinction useless.
The same thing is true with your “A” and “Not-A” distinction with belief. Yes, it is logically possible to classify all individuals as “theists” or “Not-Theists.” But that distinction lacks almost any meaning because of the extreme diversity in both groups, especially “Not-Theists.”
Perhaps the problems goes back to the question that you like: “Do you believe in God?” If you have familiarity with political polls or with social psychology surveys, this should remind you of a bad question. A good researcher will ask a more focused question that reveals more meaningful data. Instead of asking “Are you an outgoing person? Yes or No?” a good researcher will ask something like “How comfortable are you talking to someone you just met? Very uncomfortable, slightly uncomfortable, etc…”
You distinction of “Theist” or “Not-Theist” is logically sound from a formal perspective, but once again, you fail to realize that the distinctions in the real world are far more complex than those that you can create in your head. There is a lot of good information from the big Pew religious survey, and this discussion reminds me of one aspect of it. “Not All Nonbelievers Call Themselves Atheists”
http://pewforum.org/Not-All-Nonbelievers-Call-Themselves-Atheists.aspx
I don’t disagree, and when I make claims like that I back them up, just like I would if I were revealing to my kid that there was no Santa Claus.
If you don’t see how detrimental it is to oversimplify a complex issue into an artificial binary variable, consider these similar examples:
You could classify all humans as blond or not-blond. You would obviously lose a great deal of precision in the data because not-blond includes all sorts of hair colors. But you could make that classification.
You could classify all humans as English speakers or not-English speakers.
You could classify all humans as teenagers or not-teenagers.
You could classify all humans into people named Andrew and people not named Andrew. Every single person would fit into either the first or the second category.
Just because you can ask a question and make a clean distinction doesn’t mean you should. Each of these examples would be absurd, and no good academic would use false dichotomies like these. Why do you persist in your false dichotomy regarding the immensely complex phenomenon of religious belief? Is there any advantage (besides making it easier to think about) to be had from painting with so broad a brush?
That’s because I certainly believe that in any case where “I believe x doesn’t exist” or “x doesn’t exist” or “x probably doesn’t exist” actually seems to be a shorter way of simply saying, “I don’t believe x exists,” I *am* opposed to the shortcut. I do not buy that we should say “x doesn’t exist” simply because it’s easier/shorter/”more practical” to say that than to say “I am not convinced…” or “I do not believe…”
To the extent someone says “I believe x does not exist” or “x does not exist” because they actually have a belief that x does not exist, then I do not have a problem with people having this position, other than I think that they should recognize that they *are* relying upon some assumptions that I do not agree with, and which I think are particularly vulnerable. It’s the same as I would say to a theist: I do not have a problem with their having the theistic position, although I think they should recognize that they are relying on some assumptions that I do not agree with, and which I think are vulnerable. Not to say I think the (1) position has assumptions equally as vulnerable as the (3) position.
That is not a problem. That is entirely the point. Number 2 is a set. An umbrella.
My point is that anyone who occupies the territory encompassed by (2), anyone who fits under that umbrella, *is* an atheist. To say “there are many other who could legitimately be described as agnostics” is trivially true, in the same way we could say “there are many others who could legitimately be described as agnostics” in group 1 or group 3. My point is that agnosticism is not a “third way” separate of atheism or theism, because atheism and theism are umbrellas (sets) the cover all options.
To be perfectly clear, I was looking at belief as a psychological state where an individual holds a proposition or premise to be true. The “proposition” or “premise” is the positive assertion. So, I must say I’m unfamiliar with your “narrow” and “more appropriate” definition, and am somewhat skeptical of its more appropriateness.
OK, I think I have a way to talk about this. “A” vs. “Not-A” is not problematic, and it doesn’t oversimplify an immensely complex human phenomenon. Rather, it is a human sociological way to address a particular issue according to a criteria that is deemed relevant. “A” and “not-A” represent sets that encompass subsets of everything else. So, complexity is preserved and can be dug down deeper, based on whatever criteria we have deemed relevant.
If we want to address a particular issue according to a criteria that can be captured by the distinction “Republican” and “Not-Republican,” then yes, it would make sense to classify Americans into Republicans and Not-Republicans. If you are a Republican clerk, trying to do an inventory of the membership of the Republican party ranks, then you don’t really care how many Democrats vs. Green partiers there are…rather, you care how many people are in the Republican Party proper vs. how many people are not. You assume this would be silly out of lack of creativity or a lack of a sociologically relevant purpose, not because it *actually* is silly. Therefore…
This argument fails. It’s like saying, “It’s just as silly to reduce the spectrum and diversity of life and non-life to a binary variable.” Actually, no. Just because you can’t think of a reason (or have not thought of the reason why people currently would look at this set view), doesn’t mean that such an exercise would be silly. We can easily think of times where the nuances (of which we can agree there are many) between a bacteria and a human being don’t matter as much as the bits of commonality shared between life and not shared by non-life.
To continue *my* argument, I’m not arguing simply for the logical possibility of classifying all individuals as theists or not-theists. I’m arguing for the sociological purpose in classifying them on the areas of commonality.
You argue that “that distinction lacks almost any meaning because of the extreme diversity in both groups, especially “not-theists.” You act like I am not cognizant of this diversity. I assure you I am not a fool, but note that despite the diversity, we most certainly are in a world where “belief in god” is a socially relevant measuring stick.
I’m not arguing that atheist is supposed to have a lot of meaning. But the mere, mere meaning it has, “lacks belief in deities,” is enough to wrap together every person who does *not* fit in the theist camp. And this has social purpose, especially if we are trying to play a numbers game.
This is a bad *survey* question not because it is inherently a bad question, but because social researchers are trying to tap deeper, across more levels, to achieve more nuance. But that does not mean that if we zoom out to the umbrella level, (with a therefore different context), this is a bad question.
You act like I haven’t seen this or haven’t comprehended this. The Pew Forum survey is a survey of self-identification. I understand why plenty of nonbelievers wouldn’t identify as atheists. Atheism is a socially despised word with socially despised “beliefs” and implications.
The real question is this: can atheism be used to describe people in a certain situation? Does this apply whether they accept the label or not? Since the definition of atheist does *not* include “someone who identifies as an atheist,” that’s not the relevant criteria. However, the definition of atheist *does* include anyone who does not believe in deities.
nevertheless, in both cases, your “backing up” of the claim includes an assumption that absence of evidence is the evidence of absence and that you have adequate knowledge of the range of the claim.
Right, and in this situation, “theist” and “atheist” is a clean distinction that many people have already determined that we should.
Note: these are not false dichotomies, since they cover every subset of data within one of the options. You can argue for absurdity if you wish, but false dichotomy is a stricter term
I’ll tell you a false dichotomy. A false dichotomy would be if I defined atheist as “someone who believes there is no god” and then said, “everyone is either a theist or an atheist.” The reason this would be a false dichotomy is because I would be failing to account for those who are not theists (e.g., those who do not believe there is a god) and those who were not atheists (e.g., those who do not believe there is no god).
However, if the dichotomy is “A” and “not-A”, as is the case with theism and atheism, then you can yell all you want about the relevance of such a dichotomy, the usefulness of such a dichotomy, the justification of using such a dichotomy in decisionmaking, or whatever else, but you cannot argue that it is a false dichotomy. Because you cannot show a third option that is not contained with either the A set or the not-A set.
Let’s take one scenario particular to our country. We live in a society where belief is used to set people apart. At first, I guess you could say, the social dichotomy wasn’t between theist and atheist. Rather, it was between Christians and non-Christians. If you were a Christian, then you are a “good person”, and if you were a non-Christian, then you were a “bad person.”
Since those days, there have been more movement to interfaith dialogue, ecumenical discussion, and so forth. But you know what the problem is with this? Interfaith dialogue, if it works, only works best to increase the fellowship between those of faith. In other words, theists.
And I think that’s what has happened. Although you will find people who insularly believe that only their group is good/moral/right/worthy/whatever, you now see different arguments, fears, and anxieties. Now, people often say, “As long as you believe in some kind of higher force.” (Note what this does. They are making their relevant set the set of ALL theists. Anyone who believes in some higher power.)
What happens to people not in that set? Well, we know that nonbelievers are distrusted. People are more likely to believe that someone who does not believe in any higher power will not share critical values, should not be trusted, should not be married, etc,
Does it matter whether the nonbeliever identifies as an atheist or an agnostic or a secular humanist or whatever else? No. Because the relevant set is “nonbeliever in a higher power.”
You say the division is absurd. You act like I make the division on a whim. I don’t. This division is socially and sociologically active. Maybe you’re right and humans just do absurd things. Nevertheless, the division exists and it has practical significance.
So, let’s use another scenario.
Let’s say someone was a member of the despised minority. In trying to fight for rights and increased status, what would someone want to do? Would they want to A) fragment based on the differences or B) join together based on what little commonality they did have.
My argument is that B) is a sounder position. And so, regardless of what people identify as, whatever the nuances are, nonbelievers in deities have a prerogative to form a coalition based on the one, teeny, tiny aspect that we all share — our nonbelief in deities. In fact, the diversity among our ranks, I believe, helps us. We have a prerogative to show that nonbelievers in deities can be uncertain (agnostic) or certain, can be secular humanist or existentialist or practice a nontheistic religion or not practice anything of the sort. Nevertheless, despite the differences in what we do believe (which I do not deny are many and numerous), we can and should point out that we all share a nonbelief in deities, and…at the very least, a belief that this should not be held against us.
I don’t have time to respond to every little thing, but there seem to be two big issues going on here that I can address.
So… you would tell your child, “I am not convinced that Santa Claus exists because I haven’t seen sufficient compelling evidence to lead me to such a conclusion.” Right? It seems utterly ridiculous to me to go through life bound by such a technical formation of the English language in pure logical form. When I talk about Santa Claus, unicorns, flying spaghetti, or gods, I think it is reasonable to take the shortcut and just say “they don’t exist.” It may be true that the shortcut makes it 0.001% inaccurate from a technical standpoint, but that doesn’t keep me up at night.
The second issue has to do with the binary vs. spectrum debate.
Honestly, I can’t even remember how we got on this tangent. I didn’t argue or imply in my original article that “Religious theism” and “atheism” were the only two categories for human religious belief. I know you don’t think they are, either. I don’t know at what point you got the fixation on theism and not-theism, but I tried to argue that it was a meaningless distinction because it was far too broad. Your response was predictably technical, you argued that it was not a false dichotomy because everything must fit into one subset or the other. Who cares? It is a bad dichotomy, a misleading dichotomy, a false dichotomy.
Finally, I mostly agree that atheists should “join together based on what little commonality they did have,” and “form a coalition based on the one, teeny, tiny aspect that we all share — our nonbelief in deities.” But this discussion illustrates one reason why it is so hard. Atheists think too much and like to argue too much. You and I seem to agree on basically everything except we would word some things a little differently. (Right? I mean, every time I think I find where you are disagreeing with me, you end up agreeing but writing 5 paragraphs about the tiniest semantic difference. Yawn.) Atheists are terrible at organizing. They can’t even agree on what to call themselves. Religious people naturally congregate and form coalitions because it is very easy for their personality types to delegate intellectual reasoning away from themselves, and that is why I am so fascinated with studying them.
I apologize for the length with each comment. As should be evident, I do believe in striving for precision, even if I sometimes fail and am just wordy.
If you find it reasonable to take the shortcut and say they don’t exist, so be it. But understand that you *are* taking such a shortcut, and that your judgment that it is a reasonable shortcut to take does not mean that everyone will judge it to be a reasonable shortcut to take. Most importantly, in a conversation, it should not surprise you if and when others challenge and question such a shortcut, or your assumptions (e.g., your assumptions in saying that it is only 0.001% inaccurate. Your assumptions in saying that x% is “reasonable” for accuracy, etc.,) in justifying such a shortcut.
I am completely in agreement on not even remembering (or comprehending how we got on this tangent). Nevertheless, from my standpoint, it seems to me that *you* were the one who first started trying to argue against the binary (which, from my standpoint, makes little sense, since this is not relevant to the major argument.) I still don’t think you completely understand the nuance of the binary, but that’s a different argument.
I take big problem with this. If you want to say it is a bad dichotomy, that is what you can argue. If you want to say it is a misleading dichotomy, that is what you can argue. “Bad” and “misleading” are subjective positions. Your beliefs.
But it doesn’t become a false dichotomy just because you believe it so or feel it to be so. Here, you ARE trying to intrude upon something that is already clearly defined. It is not a false dichotomy unless you can show the third option that is exclusive of either two presented. It is not a false dichotomy unless you can disprove the law of the excluded middle.
Heck, even if you want to argue it to be a “bad” dichotomy or a “misleading” dichotomy — which are certainly up for debate — then I think you have to go against society and the status quo. But you can do that, if you want.
Disagreeing on the semantics is not so much a big deal. Disagreeing on the *nature*, *role*, and *importance* of semantics is much greater. That you say “yawn” and I write 5 paragraphs is a big difference. That you say “Yawn” leads you to think that this difference is so slight that you say we “seem to agree on basically everything…” That I write 5 paragraphs leads me to think that the difference is much larger.
I have to disagree with your analysis, and I think why is *because* of the impact of semantic differences, as I mentioned before. One of the reasons you dislike the dichotomy is because you believe it is “misleading” and it makes a “meaningless distinction because it is far too broad.” So, as a result, I sense that you would like categories that are narrower to be meaningful. So, you want to say that atheists are similar (in some respects), and that as a result, we can make several comments that necessarily apply to many/most of us because of our atheism. E.g., atheists are terrible at organizing. It’s in our “personality type”, whereas the personality type for religious people lets them “naturally congregate and form coalitions” by delegating intellectual reasoning away from themselves.
I disagree. I think that atheism *is* a broad category — merely anyone and everyone who does not believe in god. From here, an atheist does *not* have to share anything in common with another atheist — if he does, it is not because of his atheism. So, we see atheists as being terrible at organizing not because they/we have similar personalities that do not dispose us to organization. Rather, I think the reason is because we are so different, we have different beliefs, different assumptions, way or reasoning, etc., that organization often doesn’t make sense. Nevertheless, our commonality is in one thing, which we have recognized STILL can be capitalized: our lack of belief in deities.
I think the same *is* true of theism, even despite recent attempts. Theists do *not* have to share anything in common with other theists other than belief in some form of deity or deities. We see organizations of theists not as theists, but as subgroups of theists. As Catholics or (denominations of) Protestants, Sunni or Shia Muslims, Hindus, etc.,
We actually see the same thing within atheist subgroups, as you have tried to point out (as if I don’t already know). There *are* secular humanist organizations. There *are* existentialist groups. Unitarian Universalism. There are strong or positive atheists, and there are weak or negative atheists. Agnostics. Etc., Etc.,
However, that is not the dichotomy. Those are subsets. The dichotomy, the overarching umbrellas with which we have decided to frame all of the subsets, is atheism and theism. Not-believe and believe.
Andrew, none of these things that we have been going back and forth on is interesting to me in the least anymore. The binary argument – nobody even remembers how that came about or what its implications are. I don’t want to argue over the definition of a false dichotomy or the importance of semantics. It takes too much time and there are too many interesting things to talk about.
Read the original article again, and just summarize what your response is. I just re-read it myself, and I re-read a good bit of your comments – and I am having a hard time seeing what your position actually is on the issue overall. Is atheism belief?
OK, to comply:
Atheism as you label it is a belief. Not only that, but it is an insecure belief. It is a belief that assumes and insists that it is not a belief (or at least, not the “bad” kind of belief) in an attempt to exempt itself from needing to prove its case and to argue its merits and evidence. It is a belief that insists upon its superiority, its “obviousness,” its rationality, its normality, whatever, in order to make question and challenge against it seem like folly, impracticality, stupidity, insanity, or some other defect. Ultimately, it is THAT sense (of assuming its normality) that ultimately makes it similar to theism. It is ultimately easy to see why many theists (and many “agnostics”) have a bad perception of atheism.
This is much more interesting.
I don’t think the attempt has anything to do with exemption from evidence and reason. It is all about embracing those things. I’ll refer you to the second graphic above, in which atheism is supported by reasoning and evidence. That’s my view of ideal atheism, anyway. It would be foolish (on the level of theism) to just assert atheism without support and expect it to be self-evident to all. You are right that some atheists make that mistake* and give the rest of us a bad name.
Notice that I admit that atheism like that is a positive position that must be supported, but don’t forget that the support for atheism is very different from the leap of faith/belief that supports religious theism.
Of course, when you refer to “evidence and reason,” you refer to a particular view about what composes evidence, what composes reason, etc., Of course, since you believe that the evidence that back your position are superior evidence, since you have that kind of evidence for your position, you conclude that yours is not a belief.
But the idea that your evidence is superior evidence, or the only reliable evidence, or the “rational” kind of evidence is precisely part of the package that is exempted from questioning. When people do question this, you or anyone else can label them irrational and dismiss them, blinded by faith (and dismiss them), obviously impractical and too rigid to logic (and dismiss them).
This is pretty similar to theism, ultimately. The two groups simply have different frameworks, so they have very different foundations as to what establishes “superior” evidences that are so “obviously” true or “obviously” reliable that they resist and defy being challenged.
I don’t think I do this when I talk to believers and they make arguments. I hope I don’t do this, anyway. Even if I am guilty of having done this on occasion, it isn’t the ideal atheism I am talking about, and it certainly isn’t a necessary trait of an atheist. The alternative (to dismissing them) is obviously to counter with superior arguments, and that is why I participate in so many discussions online and in real life about religion. I don’t instigate all of them just for the purpose of dismissing the other side.
There is a pair of articles I wrote on a similar topic, the Irrational Christian and the Rational Christian. The illustrative graphics in these articles are meant to be from the Christian’s point of view (it could just as easily be Theist, Mormon, or whatever). Some of them willingly participate in the world of rational argument, but many (most?) remove themselves from it voluntarily and depend on an irrational faith assumption of some sort. I would be interested to hear your take on this categorization of rational believers and irrational believers.
http://politicalcartel.org/2010/04/26/the-irrational-christian/
http://politicalcartel.org/2010/04/26/the-rational-christian/
I very much appreciate the categorization of rational believers and irrational believers. I would argue that more believers are rational than one suspects, and I would argue as well that faith isn’t necessarily the divider between “rational” and “irrational” (faith simple provides part of the “reasons,” so to speak, as listed in your rational Christian table.) Of course, I would also argue for a broader understanding of rationality anyway…one that doesn’t imply premises one *must* use.
I think that with the distinction, you are admirably trying to separate rationality from particular conclusions that might come about from rationality (so, there can be a rational Christian as well as a rational atheist), but I sense a struggle. The rational Christian seems to be rational, ultimately, because he still plays on your turf of premises (regarding what constitutes good or reliable evidence, what justifies making conclusions, etc.,), so to speak. The irrational Christian is irrational because his framework is not on your turf. He has different premises, of course, but you call his assumption “faith assumptions,” while your assumptions are “rational.” I sense that when you have this struggle, then S.C. Denney’s comment on the “Rational” article seems particularly relevant. By your labeling of what “rationality” and “evidence” is, then religions may not be (and some other atheists would even more narrowly define rationality so that religions are automatically irrational). But if this is the case, then the question arises: is it even worthwhile to be rational in such a sense? (This reminds me of what you have said to me. “At some point, being purely logical isn’t practical.”)
Brian’s comments on the “Irrational” article, I think, begin to touch this as well. What if ideas like equality and liberty don’t have anything going for them that fit the hard science definitions for “evidence”, etc.,? (Regardless of your position on it, I think the debate is uncertain enough that some people think that might be the case). Even if these ideas were deemed to be irrational, this doesn’t mean we should get rid of these ideas. Rather, it might cast doubt on our idea of rationality in the first place.
What is your argument for a broader understanding of rationality? I hear where you are coming from, but it’s not always necessary to change the definition of words so that everyone can play and nobody gets their feelings hurt.
I wrote those articles after a frustrating experience arguing with a very irrational Christian. We went back and forth for a while, but eventually, I basically challenged him by asking “why do you believe, what are your reasons for belief, why should anyone else believe, what can you say to make them believe?” These seem like the core questions that determine whether a believer is rational or not. He could have given rational answers. I’ve read mountains of books that attempt to argue rationally for God, Jesus, or whomever. Instead, this fellow admitted that he had no reasons to give, it was just something that he believed. I informed him that he was not only entirely unconvincing, but an absolutely ineffective evangelist (trying to coax him into arguing anyway), and he banned me from his blog.
I just hope you don’t want to expand “rationality” so much that we include people like that. If we do that, then we might as well not use the word.
The difference in the bases for these different worldviews is the difference between warranted assumptions and unwarranted assumptions. The secular scientific worldview and potentially the Rational Believer worldview rests on very few assumptions that few could argue with. Irrational Believers include specific assumptions about their chosen religion, and I don’t think it at all unfair to call those “faith assumptions,” unnecessary assumptions, or unwarranted assumptions.
My understanding of “rationality” is similar to my understanding of “logic.” Logic does not specifically lead to any particular conclusions. Logic is just a system of making reliable inferences based on assumed premises. Since we can have different assumed premises, we can have different conclusions and still be logically valid. (The issue is that an argument may not be *sound*, but that says nothing of whether it is logical or not…Logic isn’t about soundness, but validity and coherency.) Similarly, rationality does not lead to any particular conclusions. It is the exercise of reason, but reason, once again, doesn’t lead us to any particular conclusions. It is just a faculty that leads us to form conclusions, judgments, and inferences.
In my mind, I am not changing the definitions of words so no one gets their feelings hurt. I just don’t think that the words have the cutting edge that people often think they do. I *do* think there are people who make fallacious arguments. So, in this case, those are illogical. If someone truly doesn’t have “reasons” for his claim (even if I may happen to disagree with those reasons), then in that case, that is irrational. (But I don’t really see such all that often.)
Since I take a particularly subjective view of belief formation though, I think that *every* “reason” one has for believing in anything is going to eventually drill down to, “I just do.” That is because even though our arguments are based on inferences, those inferences are based from assumed premises. At some point, we hit premises that just are. As Rorty said, we have a set of beliefs whose contingency is ignored.
The difference between a “warranted” and “unwarranted” assumption is the difference between worldviews. I guess that sounds like I just flipped what you said around — but I think that language about “warrants” and “rational” and “necessary” or whatever else often ends up being circular…of course it will point BACK to the worldview one has. Obviously, if the worldview you take *is* scientific, then you will see the assumptions that methodological naturalists take as being warranted and few. Foreign assumptions, then, are “faith assumptions,” “unnecessary assumptions,” and “unwarranted assumptions.