Iran and Nuclearization: What Do You Expect?

Last Thursday, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran is a “nuclear state.”  According to all the gloating and moaning, Iran has successfully enriched its first batch of uranium to 20%, the necessary level to power nuclear reactors.  Iran’s official statement is that the enriched uranium is for use in a research reactor for production of medical isotopes, ostensibly to help the treatment of Iranian cancer patients.  It seems that Iran has risk further international isolation, sanctioning, and threats of military action so that it can better provide treatment for nonmelanoma.  What altruism!  The West, not surprisingly, condemned Iran’s nuclear program and recent accomplishment.  Western talking heads, such as Gordon Brown, offered the usual denunciations and polite imprecations.  They fear Iran won’t stop at 20%.  The West distrusts Iran’s official position regarding its enrichment of uranium.  Perhaps not far fetched.  It only requires a small leap 90% enrichment level, the necessary level for weapons-grade material.  This would give Iran the ability to build a nuke.

First and foremost, it’s crucial to distinguish between states utilizing enriched uranium for peaceful purposes (e.g. nuclear power plants or medical reactors) and those using it for nuclear weapons – there’s quite a significant difference.  As of now, Iran is still technically part of the former group.  As far as anyone (who reports publicly) knows, Iran doesn’t have nuclear weapons of nuclear-grade materials.  Furthermore, there has been no “official” declaration that Iran intends to use enriched uranium for the creation of a nuclear weapon. Iran’s official position is that its nuclear program is a peaceful initiative intended for the production of reactor fuel for power purposes, not for use in nuclear weapons.  Iran first notified the IAEA on September 21st that that it had begun construction on an additional enrichment plant for the development of reactor fuel.  Legally speaking, Iran is in compliance with NPT’s Comprehensive Full Scope Safeguards Agreement.  Despite its unilateral withdrawal from Agreement 3.1, which requires more timely and detailed notification of enrichment intentions, Iran is still, more or less, within the legal confines of the NPT.

Such legal discussion is interesting but a bit divorced form reality.  When it comes to the NPT and isolated nations seeking strong deterrents, legal debates tend to come across as quixotic, Western “formalism.”  Or even outright hypocrisy. I’m not sure why I wrote it, except to show that Iran isn’t technically doing anything “illegal,” yet.  But lets move beyond that.  I find it rather obvious that Iran is more than likely seeking to acquire weapons-grade uranium.  I’m interested in Iran’s particular geopolitical status and how that’s galvanized to their efforts to nuclearize.  I don’t get a lot of that from the news.  Aside from the predictably “westerncentric” rhetoric:  pretentious moralism with a hint of bellicosity, there isn’t a whole lot of discussion about why Iran’s doing what they’re doing.

Unless you think Iran is satisfied with the current state of affairs, then it isn’t hard to understand the lure of being a nuclear power with a nuclear weapons stockpile.  Let’s review the status quo:  Iran is considered an international pariah and lone member of Bush’s infamous “axis of evil.”  It occupies a relatively weak position of power in an international system whose most powerful states often make indirect (sometimes direct) references at using force against the country.  It’s primary regional challenger and most vocal opponent, Israel, currently has nuclear weapons and quite an “offensive” track record.  China serves as backdoor salesman and even as tacit ally of Iran, acting as one of Iran’s most profitable trading partners and as a bulwark against tougher sanctions at the U.N.  All of these factors, just to name a few, provide quite a strong incentive for Iran to acquire an effective deterrent.

In today’s international system there isn’t anything comparable to a nuke.  The structure of the international system itself encourages states in positions like Iran’s to do everything realistically possible to acquire nuclear capabilities.  The current power vacuum that exists in the Middle East (thanks to US!) has Iran as the front runner to regional hegemony, or, at the least, the regions strongest power.  And as most realist theories make emphatically clear, states maximize relative power with hegemony as their ultimate goal.  Add this to everything mentioned under the status quo and you’ve got a rather plausible explanation for why Iran is doing everything it can to secure itself as a more powerful player.  Not to mentioned the anxious demeanor of the US and other western nations towards Iran.  The militant posturing by the West isn’t slowing the process any.  It is, by all measures, increasing Iran’s incentive to get an actual deterrent.

Official statements by Ahmedinejad, like “we have the capability to enrich uranium more than 20 percent or 80 percent but we don’t enrich (to this level) because we don’t need it… we do not believe in manufacturing a bomb,” is an attempt to downplay the issue and (try) to assuage Western fears.  However, I think we all know the likely intentions behind Iran’s ostensibly peaceful nuclear program – acquiring the strongest deterrent and power granting device known to man.  If you don’t think they’re doing everything in their power to acquire a nuclear deterrent, you may suffering from have blurry vision as a result of too many shots of optimism.

Put yourself in Ahmedinejad’s shoes:  what would you do?  Or, more appropriately, what would Ahmedinejad do?  WWAD?  Bracelets hit the shelves March 1st!