Secure Flight, Genetic ID’s, Terrorism
I have written previous criticisms of the TSA. This current analysis began on December 24th. As I on the turn on the television on the 26th, I see that a Nigerian man allegedly attempted to explode a bomb on an airliner. Here is my topical analysis unabridged, unedited (I apologize) and posted immediately as I hear this story:
This article was intended to bemoan the ludicrous inadequacies of Secure Flight spurred on myself watching Janet Napolitano testify on CSPAN 2.
Secure Flight is the synthesis of no fly list and a ‘selected’ list which encourages agents to give extra screening to tagged people. As one security expert (what makes an expert anyway?) said, “These people are so dangerous instead of arresting them we place on lists”.
In brief sidestep: 9/11 was completed by a dozen men from Iraqi and Iran the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia with box cutters. The tools they used would likely never have been discovered and/or easily assembled past the security checkpoint. The TSA is backwards looking because the biggest vulnerability has already been patched; people will never allow a plane to be peacefully hijacked again. Nor would the liquid bombs be discovered because there are simple workarounds (not to mention the London bomber was caught well before the airport)
According to the TSA, “Under Secure Flight, airlines will gather a passenger’s full name, date of birth, and gender when making an airline reservation to determine if the passenger is a match to the No Fly or Selectee lists.”
Age, sex, name? Sounds more like a late 90′s AOL chat forum than the high tech post 9/11 security countermeasures. But seriously, using these three metrics the TSA plans to check the secret list (TSA=Santa?) and ascertain if the person is a threat. Well shouldn’t be that expensive then… the GAO says 300 million dollars in funding since 2004?(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09292.pdf) $300,000,000 and here is an art exploded diagram of what they do:
I am reading “automated watchlist matching” and upon review believe I have discovered a more straightforward and simple approach:
I am skeptical about the functionality of Secure Flight. Maybe they can consult with NDIC about the HashKeeper (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HashKeeper) system. Technology can make this system work efficiently, but unfortunately there seems to be significant choke points (i.e. the metrics age/name/gender) .
Also, on a hash side note, if a person wants to generate valid credit card numbers download Python and see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luhn_algorithm#Implementation
Secure Flight will always be a failure and the TSA actually knows it. This program is reportedly known to be a wash but yet it is kept alive through federal statute, i.e. Congress mandates the TSA keep this program.
Enough complaining, lets fix it. The obvious vulnerability in the system is that the age/sex/name bit can be overcome by a fake ID. Actually, just using some fake documents will get you a valid ID. The only truly secure method to prevent known but fugitive terrorists is an ID based on a genetic derivative. This includes fingerprints, optical, facial, and genetic data itself screened and matched instantaneously. Unchangeable features of a person matched in real time.
The Real ID is the national identification act that failed in Congress in 2005 which I am using to illustrate a few concerns likely to arise from genetic ID’s. According to www.realnightmare.org, a site dedicated to stopping the Real ID ‘nightmare’, lists the concerns such a tool may bring.
1) Pointless – The claim is that the ID would not do anything to actually prevent terror. While a national ID would not do anything to prevent terror per se, a genetic ID would. There would be great difficultly to bypass a genetic identifier such as a quick optical scan at an airport. Truly dangerous and unaccounted people would be stopped and more practically much fraud would be prevented.
2) Expensive – While it may indeed be expensive, gains in efficiency will offset the cost. Obtaining government identification no longer would need long lines because a quick optical scan could verify instantly. This type of technology could be implemented in hundreds of scenarios. In addition, the reduction of fraud should account for another gain in efficiency.
3)Red Tape – This is a claim based on the notion that the government will raise fee’s and prevent people from receiving licenses. I don’t see any merits in this claim.
4) Invasive – The big claim. A national ID (like a genetic ID) would begin the tracking of individuals and a “surveillance society”. A small irony here, while writing this a article, a program aired about location tracking via Twitter. This topic alone deserves its own post; society is down an inevitable march and whether it should be accepted or fought. Is the abolition of privacy simply shedding unnecessary layers of Protestant culture? Would this allot to much power with the few? Can these systems be developed in a such a way where it becomes public and not under exclusive control of government?
I have an idea that rolling back privacy only so far as to put in government hands may be far more dangerous than democratizing information.. make it open. What monster would emerge if genetic information was public?
***Recent events prompted an early publication of the story and the meat of this discussion will be posted in a future article. This began as a criticism of the TSA and the absurdity of Secure Flight and was intended to evolve into a conversation about genetic based ID’s and whether they should be instituted.




My prediction about TSA security proved accurate.
There are always ways to get around TSA security. Between the internet and books, there is no way that an intelligent person can not skirt security. This Nigerian man used a liquid bomb sewn into his underwear. What could have prevented this?
Maybe the full body 3d scan which removes clothes or the ‘bomb’ smell detector. Unfortunately the are extremely expensive, may be very dangerous, and have a high rate of failure. Not to mention there are ways around both that have already been detailed.
The “debate” about airline security needs to change.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/12/separating_expl.html
———————————————————
Separating Explosives from the Detonator
Chechen terrorists did it in 2004. I said this in an interview with then TSA head Kip Hawley in 2007:
I don’t want to even think about how much C4 I can strap to my legs and walk through your magnetometers.
And what sort of magical thinking is behind the rumored TSA rule about keeping passengers seated during the last hour of flight? Do we really think the terrorist won’t think of blowing up their improvised explosive devices during the first hour of flight?
For years I’ve been saying this:
Only two things have made flying safer [since 9/11]: the reinforcement of cockpit doors, and the fact that passengers know now to resist hijackers.
This week, the second one worked over Detroit. Security succeeded.
EDITED TO ADD (12/26): Only one carry on? No electronics for the first hour of flight? I wish that, just once, some terrorist would try something that you can only foil by upgrading the passengers to first class and giving them free drinks.
“The bottom line is that because of the states’ objections to Real ID, the United States has not realized secure identification,” Napolitano said. “There has got to be a better way.”
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/breaking/6531353.html