Iran: Rethinking Sanctions
Has it ever crossed anyone’s mind that sanctions on Iran could be counterproductive and do nothing but strengthen the grip of the authoritarian right-wing radicals. The logic behind sanctions on Iran is convincingly simple: Iran’s push for nuclear power status and regional hegemony is a threat to the security of the Persian Gulf region, particularly to Israel, and a weighty piece of iron likely to alter the balance of power in the region in a way unfavorable to the West. Thus, the logic goes, sanctions are the most effective way to alter the behavior of Iran without actually having to resort to more confrontational means, like military intervention or other mechanisms of hard power. Despite the straightforwardness of this line of reasoning, the use of sanctions against Iran is not only effective but highly counterproductive and morally dubious. I’ve a multitude of reasons explaining why this is so.
The position rests on a theoretical rejection of using sanctions as a political ploy to alter the behavior of a dedicated and well entrenched “enemy.” I reluctant to use the word enemy in reference to Iran, because I think that Iran is our natural ally who has been undeservedly turned into a diametrical enemy of the United States through our imprudent meddling of Middle East affairs (I leave it at that for now, maybe another post on it later). It should be to no one’s surprise that the United States views Iran as a great threat to our national interests and vice versa. Seeing how the U.S. has been sanctioning Iran since 1979 without any significant alteration of Iran’s political behavior, I think it’s safe to say that Iran is determined to stand against the imposition of sanctions by the U.S. But before I go any further, let’s consider the objective of sanctions.
To do this I want to make a parallel between sanctions and blockades, which at first glance may seem like a stretch of the imagination, but in reality aren’t at all different. Sanctions are similar to blockades, because their objectives are essential the same. They both seek to weaken the popularity and the resolve of the targeted government. The sought after result is either a change in behavior brought about by an angry and suffering public who resort to mass protest or rebellion, or at the behest of the governing power in order to avoid mass protest or rebellion.
The flaw in this seemingly logical tactic is that it simply doesn’t work. The case for the use of blockades or sanctions doesn’t hold form when scrutinized. John Mearsheimer, in his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, tells why tactics like blockades fail to achieve their intended goal. In the section titled “Why Blockades Fail,” he cites two reasons adopted from Mancur Olson’s book, The Economics of the Wartime Shortage, why isolating a country by means of blockade is an ineffective strategy. The first reason he gives is “modern bureaucratic states are especially adept at adjusting and rationalizing their economies to counter wartime blockades.” I know U.S. sanctions on Iran aren’t technically “wartime blockades” but I don’t think many would disagree we’re just a hop, skip, and jump away from such a scenario. We are, if you like, in a cold, diplomatic war; regime change is on the minds of many U.S. strategists.
If case you’re under the impression that Iran isn’t a “modern bureaucratic state” capable of “adjusting and rationalizing” to counter a blockade (or in this case, sanctions), let me convince you otherwise. Late last week, our highly esteemed and always rational House of Representatives passed the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act (IRPSA), an act aimed at limiting the amount of fuel exports to Iran in hopes of dampering the leaderships nuclear ambitions. There’s but one significant problem: the effort won’t amount to much except the pissing off of a lot of ordinary Iranians and further cementing the Iranian hardliners’ already tight political grip.
Why? It’s simple. As Foreign Policy analyst Gal Luft points out, Iran can get by without it. How can they do that? Well, it’s not too terribly difficult for a “modern bureaucratic state” to adjust its sails in order to stay on course. Here’s how Iran is dealing with the withholding of vital petroleum:
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has imposed dramatic measures to eliminate this strategic vulnerability. He has massively expanded the country’s refinery infrastructure. Seven of Iran’s nine existing refineries are undergoing expansion projects; seven new refineries are on the drawing board or already under construction. In three to five years, these projects will double Iran’s refining capacity, putting it on par with Saudi Arabia.
These efforts, in addition to an effective petrol rationing scheme, have slashed Iran’s need to import petroleum products. As of this fall, Iran’s daily gasoline dependence will stand below 25 percent. This figure is expected to decline even further to roughly 15 percent over the next year as new refining capacity comes online. By 2012 Iran is projected to be gasoline self-sufficient; shortly after that, the Islamic Republic is likely to become a net gasoline exporter.
This new sanction will accomplish one thing though. It will certainly cause a significant degree of problems for ordinary citizens. It’s pretty simple logic. Who uses gasoline the most? Answer: the citizens! Not only will it hamper the ordinary deeds of Iranian citizens, it also has the potential to kill the privatization movement currently underway in Iran’s economy.
Iran is attempting to privatize state-held enterprises. Although this is supposed to be a competitive process, the [Revolutionary] Guards have managed to use their political influence and national security powers to sideline most private competitors. Sanctions on gasoline would not only hurt consumers, but damage businesses and companies that have struggled to compete with the Guards’ economic expansion. With a virtual stranglehold on the state, the Guards would be able to bypass sanctions through their access to government gasoline reserves and the coffers of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration. Their competitors will not be so lucky.
Not the soundest piece of foreign policy to ever leave the House. It not only make life harder on average factory worker Joe Khomeini, it gives even more power to the not-so-liberal friendly Revolutionary Guards and their beneficiaries. The motivation behind these sanctions is extremely ill-founded and the effects are anything but desirable. Aside from doing nothing to alter the behavior of the Iranian leadership, it reinforces the popular perception that Uncle Sam doesn’t give two shits about you or your dog and wants nothing other than to see you suffer. It should be to no one’s surprise that most of the Middle East, Iran included, sees Uncle Sam as indifferent to their sufferings. Sanctions upon sanctions do nothing but to reinforce this popular view. This leads nicely into Olson’s second point.
The second reason that blockades/sanctions are ineffective tools for altering political behavior in a more favorable way is that populations of modern states can absorb great amounts of pain without rising up against their government. Olson finds that, contrary to popular belief, “punishment generates more public anger against the attacker than against the target government.” It’s like a boomerang effect. You throw it out, but it comes right back at you. In fact, Mearsheimer says later on the same page that there isn’t a single case in great power conflict history in which a blockade ever “caused significant public protests against the target government.”
Hold on, don’t berate me yet. I know what you’re thinking: By Jove, Steve! Have you been living in a cave over the last half year!? There have been massive protests against the central government in Iran! My answers are no, and those protests weren’t sparked off by the indirect pressure of U.S. sanctions. They were caused by the belief that Ahmedenijad’s election was illegitimate and the reformist camp was being deliberately undermined. Remember, the U.S. has had sanctions in some form or another since the overthrow of the Shah. Iranians have adjusted to life under constant U.S. shunning. We didn’t provoke such an internal stirring; educated, young, liberal students and reformist elites did. This, if anything, shows Iran as a potential partner in the oil rich and politically volatile Persian Gulf. Senseless political gesturing and illogical sanctions will do nothing but foment even more anti-U.S. sentiment and strengthen the grip of the far-right radical.
There’s also the issue – perhaps the issue – of nuclear research and development with intentions of achieving nuclear power status. Although I’m not going to do any justice to this topic here, I will say that anyone who thinks that Iran is going to give up on its nuclear ambitions doesn’t understand the politics of international relations. Nuclear armaments are, hands down, the strongest deterrent to date and the only offensive weapon that will triple your power stock. In the realm of international relations, fear and uncertainty, above everything else, drives states to seek security by whatever means reasonably possible. A simple deduction of logic revels that a nuclear armed state is a vastly more secure state. Thus, given the current standing between Iran and the U.S. (see: sanctions, isolation, threats of invasion) it’s foolish to think that Iran will willingly give up its goal of achieving nuclear power status. If I were part of the Iranian governing elite, I’d be doing everything in my power to ensure my state’s nuclearization.
If you’ve made it all the way through my rant against the ill-founded policy of sanctions, you’ve perhaps been asking yourself, what’s his alternative? Well, it’s quite simple. We ought to foster a healthier dialogue between us and Iran. This, I believe, will cultivate a friendlier relationship and will help foster pro-U.S. attitude from within Iran. Iran, it seems, is at a crossroads. Feelings of dissident and dissatisfaction with the current regime are palpable – even amongst Iranian Clerics. But as recent events clearly established, the chances of reform by public protest aren’t likely. Despite the recent reform movement letdowns, it doesn’t forgo the possibility of internal change. To foster such change doesn’t mean to further isolate an already isolated Iran that pushes an already struggling population to rally around radical religious-nationalism. It means directly engaging Iran to encourage and support pro-liberal and anti-radical figures that have the ability to make real, positive change. Such adjustments are more favorable to our national interests and to the condition of Iranian society. Despite my optimistic tone, I can’t help but to feel as if Iran sees Uncle Sam as the inglorious bastard he can sometimes be.
By Jove, Steve! Have you been living in a cave over the last half year!?
Just kidding…
You are dead on with the analysis about how sanctions entrench the radicals in Iran.
Diplomacy is about carrots and sticks. Recently, we’ve relied too much on the sticks with Iran. We have a lot of carrots to offer them, though, and it would be more effective overall.
I really like this “read more” thing. It could make the front page a lot cleaner if we all did it.
Here’s major problem with actually doing anything close to what I’m suggesting: any significant lax in pressure on Iran absent major concessions on their behalf (e.g. abandoning their nuclear weapons/power ambitions) would be interpreted by right-wing nuts in our country as the legitimization of authoritarian rule. It’s bullshit on stilts, but it would kick up all the hawkish tendencies in Washington and would certainly bring fire and brimstone from Rush, Beck and Co.
Except this latest sanctions bill. It’s just mindbogglingly stupid.
I am not sold that a nuclear Iran—even an Iran with nuclear weapons—is really such a bad thing. First of all, it would have the immediate effect of uniting the Arab world against it. As you mentioned, we already have common interests with Iran. We would suddenly have one very significant common interest with the Arab world. Plus, Israel is already positioned to counter any threat that Iran could ever make. And lastly, Israel would no longer be viewed as the sole threat to the Arab world.
I “like” the prospects of a nuclear Iran for similar reasons.
For starters, it would force the United States to deal with Iran in more a more reasonable way. It would immediately and effectively side-line the advocates of military force against Iran; no one is insane enough to invade or openly attack a nuclear state. With nuclearization a fait accompli, the United States could then move toward more constructive dialogue with Iran.
Let’s be honest, since all recent negotiations have been initiated under conditions that Iran terminate its nuclear ambitions, the chance for any constructive dialogue has been practically nil (with the exceptions of a few close “breakthroughs” that in the end amounted to nothing). A nuclear Iran would shuffle the diplomatic playing cards and force the U.S. to play a more level-headed game. Of course, this is assuming the United States doesn’t break all diplomatic ties with Iran were they to go nuclear (a move that would certainly seal our fate as a non-negotiating partner).
Perhaps what’s most interesting in all of this is the emergence of a post-Cold War balance of power structure. What goes often unmentioned in discussions about Iran is their recent energy deals with eastern European and Asian states – and not the minor players either. Powerful states such as Russia, China, India, and Pakistan have enabled Iran to continue to develop despite the shaft its received from the West (primarily the United States) by making energy deals to boost its economy and further distance itself from reliance on energy from Western states or Western-based corporations. Most pointedly, these states have made it explicitly clear that they don’t intend to cease or alter the conditions of their deals with Iran because of U.S. pressure. Gal Luft’s article that I mentioned in my post discusses the recent dealings between Iran and other non-Western power players, which hints at the emergence of a new international power structure (it rings of Hunnington overtones about “civilizational” conflict).
Great points. I will add that it seems nearly inconceivable that Iran would not return to being an ally of the US in the next decade or so. Today’s protests in Qum make that seem all the more likely. And since the US historically has bent over backwards to accommodate nuclear powers, it seems that a nuclear Iran would only accelerate that.
It should be clear that a nuclear Iran in a vacuum doesn’t worry me. What does worry me is the proliferation of nuclear powers that would follow. I think it’s fair to say that Saudi Arabia and Egypt— upon finding themselves between a nuclear Israel and nuclear Iran—would quickly follow suit should Iran go nuclear. After that, who knows what would happen.
I often don’t speak from the ‘personal knowledge’ perspective… but I have a great friend whom is Persian and has his whole family in Iran.
This is how his line of logic went:
Having sanctions cuts off business relations with the West. Iran has a middle class that can see the disadvantages of this relationship. A large portion of current revolutionaries are people spurred fourth by the degrading economy. People who care for more than the essentials (hierarchy of need) want the country to grow economically. Also, the kicker is that they have widespread internet access which does not isolate them like poorer nations. Not to mention Iranians can and do come to the USA for work and school. The effect is that Iran is acutely aware of life in the West.
I think the idea of sanctions are often a bad idea. Like Bruce Hoffman says in Inside Terrorism. However, there might be some applications in which they work better.
Consider the fact the internet allows a cultural connection that can exist alongside sanctions. The old logic that it hurts the citizens and become isolated to Western life is gone. At any rate, the depression in Iran is a driving force behind this regime change. But this is also not to say it is the only way change can occur.
Being a techno-optimist, I think technology can serve to justify sanctions in certain capacities. I never think an outright declaration of policy is *always* correct. Perhaps used intelligently, sanctions can be a “carrot and stick” method to change a regime.