Is it Really a War of Necessity?

I’ve been thinking really hard lately about the U.S.military intervention in Afghanistan and the overall commitment to central Asia’s Af-Pak region.  The question I have repeatedly asked myself is:  what is our national interest there?  Is it really a “war of necessity” as Obama called it?  How do you determine what is necessary for a state to do?  To answer this question I think it’s important to answer a more basic one:  what is a state’s primary role in international affairs? I think it’s pretty much accepted that the state’s primary role in the international arena is to make decisions that will maximize it’s power position and secure it’s national interests at home and aboard.  Or, in other, words for it to make rational decisions.  With that said, I’m having a hard time finding just cause for U.S. intervention in central Asia.

As I pointed out before in Chris’s post about the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, I think the justification for intervention hinges on the “safe haven” argument (which, if true, would best justify Obama’s war of necessity).  But, if you break down the argument into its individual components, I think its legitimacy as a sort of casus belli shows major weaknesses and casts some serious doubt upon the justification for a war of necessity.

First, who exactly are these terrorist we’re supposedly fighting?  It seems that all the “terrorist groups” are lumped together into the same category:  groups that want to attack America or American interests. This is a huge mistake.  As we now know, terrorist networks like Al-Queda are highly decentralized organizations with many independently functioning cells – all of which have different missions and agendas. Putting American lives and money at stake to fight groups that we don’t really know very well seems rather illogical to me.  It’s wrong to assume that all these groups want to harm America or her vital interests.  All politics is local, even for Islamists.

Second, what’s wrong with leaving the “terrorists” be in the Afghanistan region? If there’s any place in the entire world that I would want terrorist to be, central Asia seems ideal. Central Asia is characterized by extremely poor infrastructure, rugged terrain, low populations, and a lot of sand and dirt. In other words, it’s one region of the world yet to experience modernity. And unless you think that totally eradicating terrorism by military force is a feasible goal, then perhaps our “terrorist” enemies are exactly where we want them.  Perhaps our interests are safest now.

Third, can a state like Afghanistan really be modernized, in the Western sense of the word?  This is a question so vital and complex that it deserves its own discussion, so I’ll just briefly touch on it here.  Also, to put things into better context, we’re not just talking about Afghanistan modernizing itself — we’re looking at a larger nation building exercise.   I think the central questions here is:  can you centralize control over a region ruled by tribes and local chieftains?  How much time would this take?  Years?  Decades?  Outside of Kabul, the state known as Afghanistan is anything but a state, in any modern sense. Territorial sovereignty, the rule of law, civil rights and liberties, and respect for the central government are foreign concepts.  I can’t think of many other places (save for a few African countries) that are further from modernity and industrial development than Afghanistan (and the rest of central Asia for that matter).  To make such a large commitment to an unfeasible task also comes across are more costly than beneficial.

Moreover, the discussion of modernity, in the context of nation building, opens up a huge can of worms.  The concept of modernity involves more than just government and institutions.  It involves more broad and complex concepts like social relations, culture, religion, and philosophy.  From this perspective, I think it’s plain to see that our intervention in Afghanistan is far more complex than a simple catch-all-phrase.

Lastly, assuming some form of American intervention is necessary, could the same goals be achieved without massive military intervention? If the primary goal of American foreign and military policy is to secure American interest at home and aboard, then could this be done by some other means? I cast some serious doubt upon the efficacy of occupational strategies in highly underdeveloped regions. And we’re not just talking roads. Afghanistan is a state that is socially, politically, and industrially underdeveloped. Standing armies have done remarkably poor occupying underdeveloped nations. What’s to say that’s changed?  I’ve wrote before about the “Insanity of American Intervention.” America has a dismal track record when it comes to intervening for the sake of democracy.  The idea that democracy, modernity, and all the good things of developed societies can be imposed form the top down may be the wrong idea.

To add to the doubt, Stephen Waltz’s latest post on Afghanistan does a good job pointing out why the odds of succeeding in Afghanistan are stacked against us.  Here’s a brief summary of a few of his more sobering points.

1. The more money we give Afghanistan, the more corrupt it will become.  Afghanistan isn’t prepared to handle large injections of U.S. aid.  It has neither the proper institutional structure nor the right leaders, as exemplified by the recent election issues.
2. If we keep telling the Afghans that we’re here to stay, many may actually believe it and that’s not a good thing.  Just like Al-Queda in Iraq, U.S. opposition will more than likely be galvanized by a large troop occupation.
3. The more committed we become, the less leverage we actually have. Committing a large number of personal, materials, and money to Afghanistan gives us less leverage over their conduct, thus making it more difficult to get what we want.  Furthermore, it will give us more influence over neighbor nations like Pakistan, whose supply lines we’ll have to depend on.

In the end, I’m finding it hard to justify such a costly commitment. The amount of capital – human, material, and financial – that a long-term commitment requires must have sound justification grounded in realistic expectations. I understand that radical Islam poses a considerable threat to regional stability and even potentially to American security.  So, some form of aid is necessary.  But an all out effort to bring Afghanistan up to modern standards and too secure the better part of central Asia may be too ambitious a plan.  I’m just afraid that a long term commitment to central Asia will end up doing more harm than good to America’s interests.