Worth It?
From the outset, President Obama has been admirably firm in his support for our intervention in Afghanistan, calling it a “war of necessity.” But as time has progressed, skepticism at home and abroad is mounting. According to the most recent Gallup Polls, U.S. support for the war in Afghanistan is at an all-time low. At present, more Americans than not still believe we should be there. But looking at the trend, that soon might not be the case; the poll was conducted immediately before the most recent NATO airstrike which killed many civilians. Being that the war is likely to become increasingly unpopular and ugly and that General McChrystal will soon be requesting troop increases, it behooves us to determine whether we should continue to be there. Many opinions on this issue can be found all over the internet; I bring you two of the more thoughtful.
Andrew Bacevich of Boston University, questions the assumption that Afghanistan is of vital interest to the United States. He does not challenge the assumptions that Afghanistan has a weak government, that a Taliban takeover following a NATO withdrawal would be likely, and that a Taliban-controlling government would allow al-Qaeda to operate freely within its borders. However, he insists that the United States could mitigate these threats without engaging tens of thousands of soldiers and spending hundreds of billions of dollars in a war that will never have a happy ending. Bacevich and like-minded thinkers advocate the use of “intensive intelligence, Predator drones, cruise missiles, raids by Special Operation commandoes, and even payment to local warlords to deny haven to al Qaeda.” Advocates of this approach claim that in addition to being less costly would “have at least as much chance of preventing attacks on the United States as a large-scale insurgency effort…”
On the other side, Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, claims that the US has two basic interests in Afghanistan. They are: keeping it from becoming a terrorist haven against the US and keeping it from destabilizing its neighbors. However, Biddle argues as a causus belli, only the second interest carries real weight; the first interest could have us engaged anywhere from Yemen to Somalia to the Philippines (my birthplace). However, Pakistani state collapse is certainly the most likely scenario in which a terrorist organization could ever get a hold of atomic material. Were the Taliban to regain control of Afghanistan, it would certainly be destabilizing to Pakistan as they are currently in the middle of civil war that is “not going well.” Biddle argues that because we have so little influence in Pakistan, we should at least do our best to not harm them.
No matter what Obama does, he will be wide open to criticism fromm the Republican Party. If he keeps fighting and the inevitable difficulty follows, he is an inept commander in chief. If he withdraws, he is a radical leftist. I think this discussion is important to have right now because the rhetoric is about to become thoughtless. If we can articulate clear reasons for staying or not staying, then we will have a framework for making the best decisions in the months and years ahead.
I think the way that Obama and his supporters viewed the legitimacy of the war in Afghanistan was influenced by Iraq. Next to the illegitimate war against Saddam Hussein, the war against the Taliban looked pretty reasonable.
Maybe it even was reasonable in 2002 and for a few years after. Maybe it is still reasonable. But what do we hope to accomplish, really?
If I’ve noticed anything in the past few months, it’s that Obama can’t clip his fingernails without drawing criticism from the right.
If any fighting at all is really necessary, I definitely prefer option 1 (Bacevich).
What do you think about Afghanistan, Chris? Steve? Brian? Anybody else?
Yeah, I’ve definitely been thinking about it more lately. The other night I was having coffee with a British friend of mine and he asked me what I thought the U.S. national interest was in the Af-Pak region. At first I wasn’t quite sure what to say. The only plausible argument I can think of is the “safe-haven” argument (and Obama too, for that matter).
However, this concept is too huge and complicated to be discussed simply using a single phrase. Once you break it down, I think you’ll see where many issues arise. It is here where I find myself debating the merit of Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan (let’s call it the Af-Pak region – it seems the be more accurate and the under use in current policy lexicon).
First, who exactly are these terrorist that we’re fighting? All are ostensibly under the Al-Queda banner – but what does that mean? As we now know, Al-Queda is a highly decentralized organization with many independently functioning cells – all of which have different missions and agendas. If we’re out to fight all Al-Queda linked (or even those sympathetic to Al-Queda) we’re fighting the wrong kind of war. One that can’t be won by a large occupying force.
Second, what’s wrong with leaving the “terrorist” be in the Af-Pak region? If there’s any place in the entire world (save Antarctica) that I would want terrorist to be, the Af-Pak region is ideal. As most of central Asia goes, there is extremely poor infrastructure, rugged terrain, low populations, and a lot of sand and dirt. In other words, it’s one region of the world yet to experience modernity. And unless you think that totally eradicating terrorism by military force is a feasible goal, then the Af-Pak region seems an ideal place for these terrorist to be.
Thirdly, can a state like Afghanistan really be modernized, in the Western sense of the word? I’m assuming that U.S. planners see a modernized Afghanistan as less likely to be a safe haven for terrorism. Can you centralize control over a region ruled by tribes and local chieftains? Outside of Kabul, the state known as Afghanistan is anything but a state, in any modern sense. Territorial sovereignty, the rule of law, civil rights and liberties, and respect for the central government are foreign concepts.
Lastly, and perhaps the most important question, is whether the current strategy of large troop occupation plus institutional assistance is the optimal strategy. If the primary goal of American foreign and military policy is to secure American interest at home and aboard, then can this be done by some other means? I cast some serious doubt upon the efficacy of occupational strategies in highly underdeveloped regions. And we’re not just talking roads. Afghanistan is a state that is socially, politically, and industrially underdeveloped. Standing armies have done remarkably poor occupying underdeveloped nations. What’s to say that’s changed?
We could, on the other hand, use good intelligence and special force to deal with urgent threats. Of course institutional building is important and would need to be dealt with, but occupying a vast foreign land, of which we know little about, seems to have many undesired effects. Sometimes it seems that by intervening somewhere we only make matters worse, e.g. Al-Queda in Iraq. It just seems to piss people off when you come guns a’blazing into their land, regardless of the reason.
So, sorry, I haven’t really stated where I stand. But, I don’t think I can just yet. I understand Obama’s “safe haven” argument as much as I understood the need to stay longer in Iraq. However, I’m having an extremely hard time justifying such a massive intervention in such a remote and underdeveloped part of the world. It just seems so Vietnam-like.
Stephen Walt does a far better job dissecting the “safe haven” argument here.
I think the safe haven argument is not as important as the institutional and infrastructural development arguments. I know you generally lean towards those things, too.
The best argument for an occupation in my mind is that it is absolutely necessary to protect the embryonic development of those institutions and infrastructure that may ultimately reform the country.
You bring up a lot of good points and I would like to discuss them more when I am not in class.
I agree with the safe haven criticism. And for basically the same reasons Mr Biddle and Walt give.
The truth is though, I’m split between competing ideas (part of the reason I opened up this discussion). Part of me is worried about Afghanistan’s affect on Pakistan. Yet, at the same time, I am beside myself as to how we could actually be effective in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is not really a nation-state in the Western sense. Its people don’t really belong to a state, they belong to hundreds of various tribes. We criticized the Bushies for nation-building in Iraq. But what we are attempting in Afghanistan is nation-building on steroids.
So I think Afghanistan is worthy cause, but a hopeless one. And if not hopeless, then cost-prohibitive.
What do you mean by Afghanistan’s impact on Pakistan? I’m not sure if it is better for Pakistan to have a US occupation of Afghanistan or not.
On the one hand, it is actively working against Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. It is definitely making life harder on those people by denying them resources as well as killing a good number of them.
On the other hand, the US occupation of a neighbor state probably inflames the more radical elements within Pakistan and forces the Pakistani government into a lot of awkward positions.
I know this is a hard question – whether the impact of the occupation on Pakistan is a good thing or not – especially because nobody can tell what the best thing for Pakistan is, anyway. Would they be better off with more democracy or more pro-American dictatorship? Nuclear weapons and Islamic extremists make it a fascinating but difficult situation.