Humanity > the State
There is no doubt that the river of patriotism and state interest is running high right now. With the presidential election less than a week away, many people are turning their attention nationally. The ongoing, rather ridiculous, debate about which presidential candidate is more patriotic has perhaps reached its apex. Peoples’ interest in the well-being of the United States is at a level only matched by the oozing levels of patriotism present during 4th of July celebrations. Just today, I overheard a group of people talking about the “love of country” and the virtues of nationalism (they didn’t exactly use the phrase virtue of nationalism, but that’s what they were getting at). I might have even heard John Winthrop’s name dropped. So I thought this would be an opportune time to throw around some ideas that have been bouncing around my head about nationalism and humanity.
Nationalism is an intriguing concept. Its gravitational force binds people together; it gives a sense of “us-ness” and civic pride. It seems rather natural that human beings identify with those of similar background, culture, language, and the like. Nationalism serves as the unifying glue to this natural phenomenon. However, nationalism has a very negative side effect, in that it is inherently exclusive; it inevitably creates an “us vs. them” complex. It is arguable that nationalism (with a mix of religion) is a cause of most, if not all, major conflict in the world. This happens because nationalism acts not in the best interest of humanity, but in the interest of the state and its citizens.
Thoughts such as these are definitely not new. Tzvetan Todorov, a philosopher and literary critic, wrote an essay on Rousseau entitled frail Happiness. In it, Todorov explores the three types of individuals that Rousseau discusses throughout his writings: the patriotic, state-interested citizen; the self-serving, solitary individual; and the transcendent, moral individual. It is the third individual that Todoroz identifies within Rousseau’s literary expose Emile as both the superior individual and the only model that can lead the individual, and ultimately humanity, to a true, yet frail happiness.
Todoroz states in his explanation of human society and the state, as they relate to Rousseau’s moral individual, that…
Human society is no longer a matter of a single country but the entire species. Recall the parallel between Socrates and Cato. Socrates, who inhabited the entire world, was the incarnation of moral virtue, or wisdom. Cato, the patriot, embodied greatness, or civic virtue.
He quotes from Emile…
The less the object of our care is immediately involved with us, the less the illusion of particular interest is to be feared. The more one generalizes this interest, the more it becomes equitable, and the love of mankind is nothing other than the love of justice. The more his cares are consecrated to the happiness of others, the more they will be enlightened and wise and the less he will be deceived about what is good or bad.
Essentially, Todoroz says that human wisdom is not the quest for but rather the forgetting of oneself. This will lead to an instance of enlightened self-interest. Meaning that the more one looks to the betterment of others, the better one becomes themselves. He quotes more from Emile:
The good man orders himself in relation to the whole, and the wicked one orders the whole in relation to himself. The latter makes himself the center of all things; the former measures his radius and keeps to the circumference.
The moral individual will therefore live in society, but he will not totally alienate himself to a society. He will respect his State but devote himself to humanity… Through these ties with others the individual will exercise his universal spirit, and therefore his virtue.
This Rousseauian principle is not at all dissimilar from the Christian principles of denying oneself for a higher cause and serving others before oneself. What Todoroz explains, and what genuine Christians agree with, is that the particular, such as the state or society, cannot be seen as the ultimate end; something higher and universal than oneself or one’s state must be sought after. It destroys the “us v. them” complex and replaces it with a unifying “us” scenario. The moral individual attains happiness through others, not himself.
Of course, I am not blind to the fact that the moral individual model is a bit far fetched and idealistic. We live in a world dominated by egoism, selfishness, and power. However, I believe that too often the concept of a unified humanity is marginalized in favor of state interests, patriotism, and power. Rousseau’s critique of the citizen and exaltation of the moral individual is a good defense against the follies of nationalism.


I can see why it makes sense to try to live this out on a personal level. Indeed, service to others over self-interests is one of the main points of Christianity, as you said.
However, what does this look like on the nation-state level? Is humanitarian aid the equivalent of considering other nations better than your own? If so, then why is much of foreign aid determined by geographic and national security/military interests?
It doesn’t look like anything on the nation-state level. It’s improbable that any nation-state would look to other nations before itself. The only way to follow this type of paradigm from a state perspective would be if there was only one state–a world federation. Without such a system, a state will continue to look after itself and its national security/military interests (as you point out).
This is where Kant got his ideas about the categorical imperative and the global federation. He realized that Rousseau’s dream was not entirely possible with the existence of nation-states.
So, in the end, this is really more of a personal perspective. I think Rousseau knew this. He never talked about a unified world; but he did talk about how to be happy as a person.
But hey, it is solid justification for giving the U.N. more power and legitimacy.