Critique of Institutional Morality
This post was an initial reply to David’s post entitled Institutional Morality. David’s post, and my critique, are a small glimpse at our an ongoing dialogue about morality, institutions, and the international system. I think I can speak for the both of us when I say, what we’ve wrote isn’t a forgone conclusion in our minds; we’re simply exploring.
This obviously refers to our conversations over the past week or so. And let me say first off that I agree that institutions–whatever that term refers to–should be held to some sort of moral structure, preferably the rule of law, since its hard to imagine any other moral structure that would hold institutions accountable for their actions.
With that said, I want to point out a major problem (call it an impediment) to those who believe this is the major structure that nation-states operate in within the international system. Seeing how there is no higher order other than States themselves, the international system, at the international level, is an anarchical realm. The primary objective of a state is to preserve or expand power within a rational framework–that which “justifies” an action. This is known as raison d’etat or in modern political science lexicon: the realist paradigm.
Now, I want to move along a critique, with all due respect, your foundational statement of this well intentioned article:
Two well known paradigms are based on the assumption that institutions operate in an amoral sphere: capitalism and realism. Even those who admit that individuals are subject to objective moral standards can simultaneously believe that institutions are not. This is a contradiction that needs to be addressed.
I think the use of “institutions” is too broad. If I understand you correctly, you’re defining institutions as some sort of important actor or organization. Within this definitional framework, you have lumped domestic institutions, like police and fire with what you believe to be an international institution–the state. I think you used the term institution too loosely, but for the sake of avoiding semantic debates (which we seem to do far too often) I’ll work within your definition.
Here is where you go wrong, in my opinion. A domestic institution, like the police station and its actors (the police officers), operates within a well-structure legal framework built upon the rule of law. Conversely, the state does not operate within a well-structured framework, because there is no rule of law in the international system; hence the anarchical system. This heavily influences the extent to which the two institutions are subject to moral standards. The police entity can be prosecuted for doing wrong (from a moral standpoint, upheld by the rule of law). The state, on the other hand, bar from being invaded, is not prosecuted for its actions, regardless of its actions’ perceived “morality.” The most that can be done is vocal condemnation for its actions, but I doubt anyone would consider that an effective tool of accountability. Thus, the state does not consider the “morality” of its actions, per se, but whether or not they are rational, (what is rational is a subject for debate–for one could theoretically make the argument that certain actions deemed “immoral” could pit a significant amount of negative opinion towards a State, so much that the State decides against a certain action. However, even then, it isn’t the “immorality” of the action that stops the State, but popular opinion).
You sort of preempt this argument with this statement:
If institutions truly operate in amoral spheres like the international system, then the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, fire bombing of Dresden, the Holocaust, ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, genocide in Rwanda, and the terrorist attacks of September 11th are all equally acceptable on a moral level.
Although one could argue against a few of these examples as “State” actions, let me reiterate the principle. It isn’t, for the State, whether its “moral,” but whether it’s rational. If its rational and immoral, the state has justified the action.
You then state the somewhat depressing nature of the international system with this statement:
Divorcing morality from institutional decision-making would be an incredible mistake. That type of absolutist amoral paradigm would justify any action that a country or company could get away with and profit from, no matter what pain and suffering it inflicted in the process.
(Note that I have a bit of a quibble with the use of institutional, in the first sentence, as a reference to a State, which is referenced in the second sentence.)
Unfortunately, you’ve pinpointed the rational decision making structure of the international system (the Realist paradigm). State action may be horrific; it may be suppressive; it may be in violation of an individual’s, or even an institution’s, set of moral beliefs. Nonetheless, if the action can be justified as in the State’s interest and pass a consideration of the perceived benefits to the perceived costs, then its a rational (however immoral) act, and will, more than likely, be done.
For my last statement, let me give a point-in-case for my argument: the recent conflict in Georgia. Russia, the perceive aggressor (that’s debatable, but work with it), invaded another country. The motherland caused great devastation. There was death, rape, pillage, and great infrastructural destruction. However “immoral” an individual perceives this action, there is no moral structure from which to official condemn and punish Russia for its aggression. Russia determined that’s its offensive into Georgia was a rational decision. They could flex their regional muscle and face down Western influence manifested in the tacitly backed State of Georgia. The decision made by Russia to invade wasn’t constrained by morality. No, it was constrained by rationality.
Let me close by stating I wish one day for their to be a structured system or morality at the international level. Obviously that would require some sort of international governing body with the right of force, deterrence, and enforcement–much like system that exists within sovereign nation-states. However, this isn’t the reality of the current situation. Call me cold-blooded or immoral, fine. But thinking that some sort of utopia exists at the international level is not only naive, but quixotic.
It sounds like we agree a lot more than we disagree, but we like to talk about different things. You like to be descriptive and historical, focusing on how and why decisions are made in the international realm. I tend toward the ethical and idealistic.
I don’t disagree that the past and present international system has seen decisions mostly made out of a realist paradigm. But that doesn’t directly controvert what I claimed. There can be a moral standard, even if nobody is following it. Even if the whole world were populated by Machiavellians, it would not destroy the abstract value of altruism.
One place where we do seem to disagree is on the idea of where morality comes from. If I read you right, you argue that morality comes from a hierarchical structure that has the means to enforce it (rule of law). But I think that morality exists above any structure, and it is not dependent on enforcement. Even if I knew I could get away with murder, it would be immoral. Even if a nation knew it could get away with genocide, it would still be immoral. So the difference is that while the rule of law is a construct, morality is not. Our ways of understanding morality may be constructs, and they may change over time, but that does not change the underlying objective existence of moral standards.
“If I read you right, you argue that morality comes from a hierarchical structure that has the means to enforce it (rule of law).”
Yes. The rule of law (and moral structures in general) are our concepts of morality, in my humble and probably wrong opinion. Structure out of abstract (order out of chaos). The use of the imaginative entity in the mind to create structure and thus create reality, as we know it.
In short, morals evolve, change, and transform as their conceptualized structures change.
At least I’m consistent. Remember this one–Mommy, Where Do Morals Come From?
… And my comment, after yours:
You guys seriously need to drop this intelligent, substantive discussion. Two posts on this crap and zero on lipstick and pigs? Your priorities are waaay out of whack.
For the record, I largely agree with Steven’s diagnosis.
The perception is reality mantra is cute, and I like it, too. But with this caveat: perception is reality the best way we can understand it, but our perception does not supplant the existence of an objective reality.
“The rule of law (and moral structures in general) are our concepts of morality”
True that; however, we cannot become so obsessed with our structures that we think they actually are the morality. The structures are our best way of representing what we deem to be closest to the objective truth and morality. Our expression of morals changes and our structures change, but there are universal standards of morality that we are uncovering.
Cute? That’s funny. Caricaturing something doesn’t mitigate its truth. But that’s a cute effort.
Of course the structures themselves aren’t “the morality.” They are systems, conceptualized by society, that determine what is right or wrong.
I understand that the universality stance is popular and rather believable. But it has one major aspect that I find unsettling: this “uncovering” aspect. What is that? Some universal morals lay dormant until we stumble upon them, or are enlightened enough to realize them? Wouldn’t that just be as I stated, that we conceptualize structures that recognize morals?
What is wrong with the uncovering aspect? Isn’t it the same way with other types of knowledge, such as knowledge about the physical universe?
Once, we thought the earth was flat and the center of the universe, but gradually we developed current theories that seem to have uncovered a lot more truth about that reality.
Once, we thought the atom was the smallest particle possible, that it was indestructable, and that it was like plumb pudding. Gradually, we have uncovered a great deal more about the atom; we can split them, fuse them, look inside them, and we are a lot closer to reality in that respect as well.
Why would it be any different with morality?
There’s a pretty big difference.
People are bound by physical limits, whether they “recognize” them or not. On the contrary, people aren’t bound by the limits of “unrecognized” morals.
It was harmless to believe that the world was flat–indeed, it was just plain ignorant. However, it wasn’t harmless to believe that blacks were only 3/4 human and need not be covered by law or awarded human dignity.
Your effort is cute, though.
I presented a perfectly valid analogy and asked how you differentiate the situation with uncovering morality from uncovering other kinds of truth. If I understand you right, you are basically saying that the difference is that ignorance of physical or scientific truth never hurt anybody.
Here are just a couple of ideas off the top of my head. These are scientific truths that have been gradually discovered over the course of human history. However, they upset your framework because each of them resulted in significant harm to those who suffered under these under-evolved versions of scientific truth: blood lettingm amputation, head drilling, and lobotomizing. Ignorance always has the potential for harm, whether it is ignorance of a moral principle (as you suggest with your 3/4ths reference), or ignorance of a physical, social, or biological principle.
Your boundaries argument is empty as well. Most people never directly encounter 99% of the physical boundaries that are undeniable facets of the universe. The solar system revolves around the sun. In an abstract way, I suppose I am bound by that. But I can very easily deny it and never face any consequences of that denial. The same is true for morality. Similarly, a person can deny a moral principle (or maybe knowledge of morality hasn’t evolved enough in that respect for the person to know the truth about it), but they cannot change the fact of its existence with their denial/ignorance.
Also, you are once again resorting to substituting an enforcer for the existence of an objective morality. You cannot simply say that without an enforcer (your “boundaries”), that the thing itself does not exist.
The fact is that morality is just as much a part of the universe as everything else – medical science, astronomy, geology, or whatever else. All of our knowledge is collective and evolving with these fields, and nothing really distinguishes them from each other on a fundamental level.
“If I understand you right, you are basically saying that the difference is that ignorance of physical or scientific truth never hurt anybody.”
No, you didn’t understand me right. I said the basic difference is that “[p]eople are bound by physical limits, whether they “recognize” them or not. On the contrary, people aren’t bound by the limits of “unrecognized” morals.” My flat-earth example was a direct response to your mention of it above. I think perhaps this mislead your response.
As for paragraph two: Was “blood lettingm amputation, head drilling, and lobotomizing” an immoral act, given the time period in which they were practiced? Not according to the Hippocratic Oath (a human devised moral construct), since doctors preforming the operations were doing so under good intent (most were, anyway).
As for paragraph three: Sure, we’re bound by physical limitations of our universe, whether we acknowledge them or not (that was my point). However, the same isn’t true for morality. If it isn’t recognized (your “uncovering” argument), then it can be blatantly disregarded, as was slavery (my example) without any immediate implications. An alternative example is abortion (despite its controversial nature). What if some “unrecognized” universal standard says that the killing of a zygote/fetus/baby/whatever is universally wrong? Well, until that point in time, it will continue to happen with absolute or relative impunity. This is why I called the “recognition” factor of you objective morality approach a bit ridiculous. The abortion issues, like many other moral issues, is defined by the human structures that address them. Surely you can attests to this. I’m seen you spit an elaborate, albeit pedantic, legal (human) structure by which you judge abortion morally justifiable. The “recognition” factor of your objective morality is too nebulous for me to buy into.
As to the statement that I am “substituting an enforcer for the existence of an objective morality.” My response is rather simple, but underlines our fundamental disagreement. Without a belief in objective morality, the establishment of an enforcer is necessary for civilized, structured life.
With that last statement, let me provide some closure before we start to debate in circles. We obviously have a fundamental disagreement. You believe in objective morals (recognized and unrecognized). I think that system is a bit of a farce and prefer the non-ethereal, human construct approach to understanding morality. Our fundamental differences notwithstanding, we still envsion the same end-result: a higher-standard of morality.
I think I speak for the both of us when I say that we believe in the evolution of morality, for the better, and that human beings are becoming a more “enlightened” race, despite our shortcomings. Our approach to the arrival at this conclusion (our fundamental difference) is the only thing that is different. You think that by human enlightenment, certain objective morals are “recognized.” I think that by enlightenment, human beings re-make, through their self-enlightened view (a new perception), a better moral structure that governs life.
Can we agree on an “evolving morality” approach, regardless of the means we take to get there?
Of course we both agree on the evolving morality thing; I think that is pretty much undeniable. But the difference iis very significant since you think that it is an evolving construct and I think it is an evolving recognition.
I still think the evolving recognition fits in with every other element of the universe, and you have not given any answer to why it doesn’t or why morality is different. I think maybe you are just scared of what you perceive as “ethereal.” I am not a very ethereal person.
You missed the point about blood letting and head drilling. I wasn’t trying to say that those were immoral and combine the two things. I was showing the similarity between them that proves the larger point that morality is gradually discovered just like medical science.
This is interesting stuff, though, for sure.
“I still think the evolving recognition fits in with every other element of the universe, and you have not given any answer to why it doesn’t or why morality is different. I think maybe you are just scared of what you perceive as ‘ethereal.’ I am not a very ethereal person.”
Yeah, scared. That’s it.
Like I said: “People are bound by physical limits, whether they ‘recognize’ them or not. On the contrary, people aren’t bound by the limits of ‘unrecognized’ morals.” That is what is wrong with this whole “discovering” morality/physics approach. If a certain moral hasn’t been recognized, as in your case, or constructed, as in mine–then that undefined moral continues. However, physical limits remain in place, regardless. We don’t have to recognize them for them to be in effect, unlike your recognized morals.
“You missed the point about blood letting and head drilling. I wasn’t trying to say that those were immoral and combine the two things. I was showing the similarity between them that proves the larger point that morality is gradually discovered just like medical science.”
I think your point was based off of you faulty presumption of what I believe. I didn’t miss anything. I just used it to show a human construct of morality.
I already responded to the boundaries thing above (the denial of the solar system, etc.). I am curious to hear your response to that, not just your restatement of your original position.
These aren’t just issues of presuppositions, or else there would be no need for a thing called philosophy. This involves logic, examples, intuition, and rhetoric to decipher. If you and I just had different presuppositions, then it would be useless to discuss this.
Let me clarify my approach to the physical/moral boundary analogy and why it’s stupid.
Take gravity. It has been a physical limitation since forever. Whether you recognized gravity or not didn’t matter. It kept you grounded.
Now, see gender equality. If, according to your theory, and assuming you think gender equality is a matter of morality, it has been a moral forever and just took us dumb humans a long time to recognize. Whether you recognized it or not did matter, because it didn’t prevent gender inequality on its own.
So, this free-floating universal morality cannot hold people accountable when it isn’t recognized. Perhaps it’s true (can we really know?). But the concept is still ridiculous.
I never talked about denying what we consider moral. Drop the analogies, because I think we’ve deviated beyond the point.
I was trying to point out that the whole “uncovering” aspect of objective morality is ridiculous. The statement that spurred this discussion was your belief that certain universal truths lie dormant in space awaiting to be recognized. Do you really think there are morals that have been “floating around” since time immemorial that simply haven’t … been recognized? So, some cultures are better at recognizing these than others? How do you know who’s right–who has uncovered the all elusive moral?
Look ma! A moral!
The more I think about it the more I think that your approach demands relativism and cannot tolerate objectivism. If you really think that morals are just constructs, then that is the definition of cultural relativism. That type of thinking prevents you from judging anything that other cultures deem to be acceptable – honor killings, female circumcision, slavery, etc. Is that really where you want to go? I really thought that you bought into a natural law approach (objectivism). If there is no objective standard (like natural law) against which individual moral principles can be judged because they are all just social constructs, then you cannot say that any one moral principle is better than any other. That’s fine if you’re willing to be that consistent, but I think you want to say that slavery is wrong and women should have rights.
The analogy is actually very useful, so I’m not quite done with it. Yes, you can name a handful of physical truths that cannot reasonably be denied without suffering immediate consequences – like denying gravity and plummeting to your death. But as I said, that the exception not the rule. I can (and people do) deny all kinds of physical truths, and never face any consequences that show how I am bound by those physical truths regardless of my acceptance of them. You have gravity and a handful of others, I have everything ever written in geology, astronomy, molecular biology, and history. I could deny the existence of every single truth in every one of those fields, and never come to realize that I am bound by them.
So you and others can keep on denying that we are all bound by basic moral impulses that can be gradually uncovered. There’s nothing anyone can do to force you to believe in them, just like nobody can force me to believe in plate tectonics, heliocentrism, mytosis, or the holocaust. But in general, we look at people who deny those truths to be ignorant, even though they will never plummet to their death as a result of their denial.
Your right, I’m ignorant and I can’t condemn honor killings.
My worldview standard on morality is based on the criterion of evolving morality. Seeking the best moral construct by which to govern life. This construct is codified into laws, adapted by society as norms, and often interpreted to be inalienable rights. This perception doesn’t have to come from “recognized” morals–whatever that is. It comes from a self-enlightened view that certain principles should be the rule. A moral construct based on these principles makes for a sound structure and, in fact, the very structure we live by today. For as of today, we (Western Civilization) believe in certain fundamental rights–individual liberty, toleration, property rights, intellectual rights, etc. Simply because I espouse the notion that this was a human construct based on their own enlightened perceptions doesn’t make me subservient to cultural relativism.
I’ll admit, cultural relativism is a good way to understand cultures but as far as relativism goes, that’s about it. I do draw the line at some point. You see, I can hold fast to my belief in constructivist thought and simultaneously condemn actions such as honor killings, female circumcision, etc. because I can believe in a superior construct–in this case, Western Civilization.
By the way, natural law is a Western construct. I suppose I do believe in natural law, in the sense that it was conceptualized with the presupposition that certain ideas that were dominant and should be adopted and implemented by everyone (viz. Western Civilization’s ideas). However, even natural law evolves, albeit for the better.
In case you missed it, let met quote myself:
By the way, quit acting like this is debate. Are we having a constructive conversation or are you trying to pin me down as an immoral heathen?
I’m not trying to pin your or insult you, and you know that. I am just critiquing your approach to morality and carrying some of your beliefs to their logical conclusion.
I am still not understanding how you can believe that morality is a construct ( that is the definition of relativism) and still be able to use cross-cultural judgments and hierarchies (which requires some objective standard). To me, those seem incompatible, but I could be wrong.
I think this went a bit far. If I know us as well as I think do, then I know that neither one of us are completely sold on either idea.
Your right in saying that the textbook definition of relativism is that morality is a construct. However, one of the critiques provided by relativists is that one construct can be better than another.
Perhaps the biggest critique was provided by the very person who is attributed to the person who laid the foundation for cultural relativist thought, Kant. He argued that human beings are not capable of direct, unmediated knowledge of the world. All of our experiences of the world are mediated through the human mind, which universally structures perceptions according to sensibilities concerning time and space (i.e. time, laws, and morals).
However, as I am sure that you know, Kant sought to establish some sort of universally applicable standard in his categorical imperative.
So, we you are bound by prima facie book definitions of relativism (and cultural relativism), then perhaps there is no such thing as the ability to make a judgment. Just because moral constructs are made relative to culture doesn’t mean that one culture cannot declare itself superior to another.
Points-in-case:
Hellenism > The Rest.
Roman Virtues > ” ”
British Virtues > ” ”
Western Virtues > ” “
… which I suppose is an objective statement, in and of itself.
I think I got far too caught up trying to disprove your “unrecognized” thing and wounded up arguing against myself. Obviously, I believe in the superiority of some moral constructs to others. There are certain “rights of [people]” that should not be violated. However, beyond certain obvious natural rights you run into the problem of ambiguity and uncertainty. Is abortion morally wrong? At that point the moral consideration for many becomes muddled with legalism, definiton, and metaethics (semiotics, in genearl)–and the true nature of the question is often lost, methinks. Morality may exist above all structures, what how do you find this elusive moral?
This is what I think:
At the aggregate level, human beings use the imaginative entity of their collective minds to create structure and thus create reality out of the abstract (that which transcends structure but nonetheless requires it). For cultures/societies/civilizations, they create moral structures out of the abstract. These morals, determined “right” by the enlightened minds of the engineers (i.e. law makers, philosophers, etc), are then systematized by the process of legal codification or the collective acceptance by society as cultural norms. This process is ever evolving, changing, and transforming.
The nebulous component of this entire concept (and of objective morality in general) is that if you believe in the existence of any type of objectivism undergirded by universal/natural law then that means morality existed before structure was conceptualized. What was the catalyst to enlightenment and recognition? Some form of ethereal force–a transcendent impetus?
Here’s where it deconstructs. Without morality you can’t have an objective structure, but without an objective structure how do you know you have morality?
… I think this is where the human conscious may fill the void and act as an outside component that unifies the ethereal (morality) with the temporal (structure). That may be the elusive “impetus.”
have you ever read The Anatomy of the State?
What the State Is Not
http://mises.org/easaran/chap3.asp
The Paradox of Imperialism (Origin and Nature of International Conflict)
http://mises.org/story/2383
[audio: http://mises.org/multimedia/mp3/ss06/Hoppe.mp3