i like how steve essentially brings up what Hume said: “the rules of morality are not the conclusions of our reason.”

and david, am i to assume correctly that these ‘morals’ that should guide the system you desire are based on a cost benefit analysis? as opposed to some universal morality?

but anyway, steve, who is going to be ‘above’ the international system that you promote?

What are you getting at and how does it pertain to this post?

Not if you are Child Protective Services.

With that said, I want to point out a major problem (call it an impediment) to those who believe this is the major structure that nation-states operate in within the international system. Seeing how there is no higher order other than States themselves, the international system, at the international level, is an anarchical realm. The primary objective of a state is to preserve or expand power within a rational framework–that which “justifies” an action. This is known as raison d’etat or in modern political science lexicon: the realist paradigm.

Now, I want to move along a critique, with all due respect, your foundational statement of this well intentioned article:

Two well known paradigms are based on the assumption that institutions operate in an amoral sphere: capitalism and realism. Even those who admit that individuals are subject to objective moral standards can simultaneously believe that institutions are not. This is a contradiction that needs to be addressed.

I think the use of “institutions” is too broad. If I understand you correctly, you’re defining institutions as some sort of important actor or organization. Within this definitional framework, you have lumped domestic institutions, like police and fire with what you believe to be an international institution–the state. I think you used the term institution too loosely, but for the sake of avoiding semantic debates (which we seem to do far too often) I’ll work within your definition.

Here is where you go wrong, in my opinion. A domestic institution, like the police station and its actors (the police officers) operate within a well-structure legal framework built upon the rule of law. Conversely, the state does not operate within a well-structured framework, because there is no rule of law in the international system; hence the anarchical system. This heavily influences the extent to which the two institutions are subject to moral standards. The police entity can be prosecuted for doing wrong (from a moral standpoint, upheld by the rule of law). The state, on the other hand, bar from being invaded, is not prosecuted for its actions, regardless of its actions’ perceived “morality.” The most that can be done is vocal condemnation for its actions, but I doubt anyone would consider that an effective tool of accountability. Thus the state does not consider the “morality” of its actions, per se, but whether or not they are rational (what is rational is a subject for debate–for one could theoretically make the argument that certain actions deemed “immoral” could pit a significant amount of negative opinion towards a State, so much that the State decides against a certain action. However, even then, it isn’t the “immorality” of the action that stops the State, but popular opinion).

You sort of preempt this argument with this statement:

If institutions truly operate in amoral spheres like the international system, then the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, fire bombing of Dresden, the Holocaust, ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, genocide in Rwanda, and the terrorist attacks of September 11th are all equally acceptable on a moral level.

Although one could argue against a few of these examples as “State” actions, let me reiterate the principle. It isn’t, for the State, whether its “moral,” but whether it’s rational. If its rational and immoral, the state has justified the action.

You then state the somewhat depressing nature of the international system with this statement:

Divorcing morality from institutional decision-making would be an incredible mistake. That type of absolutist amoral paradigm would justify any action that a country or company could get away with and profit from, no matter what pain and suffering it inflicted in the process.

(Note that I have a bit of a quibble with the use of institutional, in the first sentence, as a reference to a State, which is referenced in the second sentence.)

Unfortunately, you’ve pinpointed the rational decision making structure of the international system (the Realist paradigm). State action may be horrific; it may be suppressive; it may be in violation of an individual’s, or even an institution’s, set of moral beliefs. Nonetheless, if the action can be justified as in the State’s interest and pass a consideration of the perceived benefits to the perceived costs, then its a rational (however immoral) act, and will, more than likely, be done.

For my last statement, let me give a point-in-case for my argument. The recent conflict in Georgia. Russia, the perceive aggressor (that’s debatable, but work with it), invaded another country. The motherland caused great devastation. There was death, rape, pillage, and great infrastructural destruction. However “immoral” an individual perceives this action, there is no moral structure from which to official condemn and punish Russia for its aggression. Russia determined that’s its offensive into Georgia was a rational decision. They could flex their regional muscle and face down Western influence manifested in the tacitly backed State of Georgia. The decision made by Russia to invade wasn’t constrained by morality. No, it was constrained by rationality.

Let me close by stating I wish one day for their to be a structured system or morality at the international level. Obviously that would require some sort of international governing body with the right of force, deterrence, and enforcement–much like system that exists within sovereign nation-states. However, this isn’t the reality of the current situation. Call me cold-blooded or immoral, fine. But thinking that some sort of utopia exists at the international level is not only naive, but quixotic.