The Kissinger Doctrine and Iraq

Henry Kissinger is one of those figures who is easily hated and berated due to his questionable human rights record and his involvement in Vietnam under the Nixon Administration. Although I hate to say put that aside, put that aside. Be it as it may that his record in certain regions of the world is dubious, the man knows how to evaluate and advise in the arena of modern diplomacy and foreign policy, as per the realist school of international relations. Kissinger served as both National Security Adviser and Secretary of State (at one point concurrently, under Nixon), and was a major proponent of the international paradigm realpolitik.

In his book Diplomacy, Kissinger traces the progressive development of American Foreign Policy since the era of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. The majority of his analysis comes from the Cold War era, which ran the span of his public service career, with special interest paid to the conflict in Vietnam — a conflict he dealt with first hand. In his critique of American involvement aboard, with particular interest given to involvement in the developing world, Kissinger outlines a three-tiered qualification structure to guide considerations of American intervention in foreign affairs — Kissinger’s recipe for success. I found this particularly appropriate to the current conflict in Iraq.  I wanted to reflect on the insight of Kissinger’s intervention qualifications as they relate to Iraq.

Let’s take a look at the three points, what I call the Kissinger Doctrine, and how it correlates to conflict in Iraq:

“First, before the United States commits itself to combat, it should have a clear understanding of the nature of the threat it will be confronting and the objectives it can realistically reach. It must have a clear military strategy and an unambiguous definition of what constitutes a successful political outcome.”

America had anything but a clear understanding of the nature of the threat in Iraq. Rumsfeld’s “light footprint” strategy in Iraq had a clear backfire. The factitious fighting and explosion in insurgency was a contingency either ignored or conveniently forgone in the pre-invasion planning stages of Iraq. The overall military strategy in Iraq was simple: take out Saddam and the rest of the cards will fall in place. This strategy was anything but clear and unambiguous. The subsequent Coalition Provisional Authority under Paul Bremer was a complete flop and may have done more harm than good.

What was considered the ideal political outcome of Iraq? That the highly factious region would throw off the chains of the Ba’ath Party and embrace democracy? When in the history of Mesopotamia has the region practiced democracy? Since when had Kurds, Shi’ites, and Sunnis lived in harmony with on another? These were all questions seriously overlooked. The ramifications of poor judgment have been made manifest in a region plagued with civil war and stained with the blood of the thousands of service men and service women and the inhabitants of a torn region.

“Second, before the United States commits itself to military action, there can be no alternative to victory. Qualms cannot be stilled by hesitant execution; prolonged stalemate will sap the endurance and hence the will of the American public. This requires a careful elaboration of political goals and the military strategy to achieve them before the decision is made to go to war.“

Five years, 3,960 deaths, $494 million dollars (and counting), and no clear end in sight has many wondering when this conflict will end. The prolonged conflict in Iraq has frustrated even those who supported the war to begin with. Set aside the false premises, the blatant lies and disinformation, and the strategic faux pas, Americans are tired of conflict. They are tired of hearing about mothers grieving over a lost son, children left fatherless, and a wife left home alone with 3 kids to raise. The lack of careful elaboration and political goals has many wondering “What for?” “What freedom?” The assertive nationalist and neo-conservatives who lead this country into the conflict in Iraq disregarded the longevity quality of  planning, and ignored the prescient woes of military strategist and their own generals. What they got in return was a quagmire and a weary public.

It seems as if the conflict in Iraq has become a self-fulfilling prophecy for Dick Cheney, one of the leading proponents of invasion. In a postmortem interview about the First Gulf War, Cheney said:

“I think that the proposition of going to Baghdad is also fallacious. And it’s my view that the President got it right … that it would have been a mistake for us to get bogged down in the quagmire inside Iraq.”

“Third, a democracy cannot conduct a serious foreign policy if the contending factions within it do not exercise a minimum of restraint toward each other. Once victory over domestic opponents becomes the sole objective of a policy, cohesion evaporates.”

The conflict has anything but public support. 70% of Americans believe that country is heading in the wrong direction (RCP), and President Bush’s approval rating is hovering around 33% (RCP). The War in Iraq is a prominent campaign issue, with Democrats advocating some sort of extrication policy and Republicans, namely John McCain, advocating a change in strategy approach. The debates over the conflict in Iraq are some of the most contentious. Americans are split into two camps: one who supports the occupation of Iraq on moral grounds and national security, and the other who thinks it is both detrimental to the U.S. global image and immoral to “stay the course.”

The question over Iraq is no longer a strategic or military question, but rather a political one. The conflict in Iraq, regardless of the merits, can no longer be considered tactically. Once an issue becomes polarized, solvency and support wither. The cohesion which once bound America together has been chipped away by an unfaithful and manipulative administration. The glue that once bound America together has melted away leaving two polarized groups. Politicians must now focus on saving face and their place on Capital Hill. Political cohesion over the policy in Iraq has completely evaporated.

What have we learned?

The test of a society is whether it can submerge its differences in the pursuit of a common, unified goal, and whether it can keep in mind that societies thrive on their cooperation and conciliation, not on conflict and strife. The current administration was hell-bent on invasion, utilizing a genuflected American populace following the events of 9/11 and subsequently floundered that immense political capital by bad policy decisions. America has failed in Iraq. Still more egregious is the failure of the American leadership. May we save some face come next year; the pride and dignity of America is balancing in the wind.