NEWS: Political Cartel on Facebook
Like Political Cartel on Facebook.
Media Digest (1/26/12)
A few stories from a few places in the world that I’m interested in.
North Korea
—Andrei Lankov profiles Colonel General Terenti Shytkov, NK’s first leader. Shytkov was the de facto leader of the North from 1945-46 and was responsible for the post-liberation land reforms. He stayed on as a power-behind-the-scenes in his capacity as Soviet ambassador until the outbreak of the Korean War.
—Stephen Haggard posts his in-depth analysis of this year’s annual joint editorial (신년공동사설). The editorial basically functions as Pyongyang’s version of the State of the Union Address in the US.
—Andray Abrahamian speculates about why Ri Chol, head of the North’s Joint Venture Investment Committee, left his post earlier this year.
—The DailyNK reports on the murders of four bureaucrats in Cheongjin, North Hamgyong Province. The source notes that the alleged murders were carried out as acts of rebellion against the government. No other source or media outlet has corroborated the story as of this writing.
Egypt
—Ikhwanweb has a profile of Egypt’s new Speaker of Parliment, Dr. Mohamed Katatni.
—The Arabist gives his take on the Egyptian Revolution, one year later.
Myanmar
—The Washington Post sits down with Myanmar’s president Thein Sein to chat about reform.
—Reuters explains why US sanctions on Myanmar have yet to be lifted, despite the enormous progress of reforms over the past year.
Kazakhstan
—Eurasianet looks at the Kazakh government’s lukewarm efforts to prosecute police responsible for firing on protesting oil workers in Zhanaozen.
—Eurasianet also wonders why amateur cell phone footage caught American Humvees in Zhanaozen on the day of the shootings. The Humvees were originally sold to Astana to help with the formation of a peacekeeping brigade.
Iran
—Barbara Slavin explains why the EU’s oil embargo on Iran is designed to avert war.
—Iran Primer analyzes the potential impact of EU sanctions on Iran.
North Caucasus
—The Jamestown Foundation runs down the latest spate of insurgent attacks in Dagestan.
Random
—The New Yorker profiles the oil industry in North Dakota.
A Translation of CCTV’s Interview with NK Anchor Ri Chun-hee
Over the holidays, China’s CCTV13 broadcast an interview with the face of North Korea, Ri Chun-hee (리춘희/李春姬). Ri, KCTV’s long-time nightly news anchor, is best known for her over-the-top, emotional delivery and the tears she shed on air when announcing the deaths of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Prior to Kim’s death last year, she hadn’t been seen in public for some time, leading Pyongyang watchers to wonder if she had been purged or had fallen out of favor. But as Ri herself explains, she merely had been training new talent the whole time. Below you’ll find the report (which includes some behind-the-scenes footage of the KCTV studio) and my translation of that interview. Apologies in advance for not being tech-savvy enough to overlay subtitles on a YouTube clip.
(Tip o’ the old hat to North Korea Tech)
North Korea’s ruling ideology, official historiography, leadership hagiography, and public pronouncements are so outlandish and bombastic that one could be forgiven for believing that the average North Korean on the street must roll his eyes in exasperation everytime he reads that latest rodomontade editorial in the Rodong Shinmun or listens to KCTV announcer Ri Chun-hee’s borderline-hysterical delivery as she extols the Great Leader’s latest on-the-spot guidance visit to a provincial vinylon factory. Surely no one in their right mind could believe this stuff, could they? And certainly not the highly-educated, world-wise elite. Indeed many analysts dismiss these narratives outright in their studies of the country. But, in my opinion, to do so is a mistake.
Happy New Year From Asia (설날)
From some of us in Asia: ”새해 복 많이 받으세요.” (or Happy New Year)
Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Natural or Un-natural?
Alliances have been a feature of international relations since the time of Thucydides. Academics, politicians and pundits alike have used this term over the ages, yet its usage has been obscured over time. US has been an active proponent of alliances, special relationships and partnerships, but only alliances contain language for militarized contingencies where both parties come to their defense in case of an armed attack. Take North Atlantic Treaty Organization as an example of what constitutes an alliance:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party of Parties so attached by taking forthwith, individual and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
This idea is also spelled out in the language set forth in the respective alliance treaties with Korea and Japan.
The related literature has revolved around questions of alliance formation, intra-alliance politics, why alliances end, and why they endure. In addition to understanding alliances, the structure of the international system (bipolarity, multipolarity and unipolarity) will also play a role in shaping state choices. Options that states may choose are bandwagoning or balancing (there are other analytical constructs, but for sake of depth, I shall use these two), depending on their circumstances. We can think of bandwagoning as joining a particular side, whether or not this is wise. Balancing can be seen joining a coalition opposite of the other power.
Changing Economic Architecture: A Conduit into the Hermit Kingdom?
Over the last few decades, regional integration in Asia has increased significantly. Amy Searight, among others, notes this phenomenon. Her description of the emerging economic architecture in East Asia has one reoccurring theme: A shift in trading patterns from West to East or, more specifically, from the US to China. Different from times past when the US and Europe were the primary trading partners of states in East Asia, “[m]ore than half of all Asian trade now occurs within the region, a level of intraregional trade that is higher than in any region except the European Union.” This has significant ramifications for the political economy of the region, especially North Korea. First, a description of the changing economic architecture in the region.
Eastern versus Western culture
It’s a cultural war! President Hu Jintao has called for the strengthening of cultural production (Marxist right?) in order to stem the tide of American (Western) culture. As the New York Times reported on January 3rd, President Hu stated that Western and Chinese cultures are significantly different and are engaged in cultural warfare. That’s right, US movies, musicians and other forms of pop culture have invaded China (against its will) and declared war through the medium of YouTube, twitter (the Chinese have Weibo which is equivalent to twitter) and the blogosphere.
Now, what does this exactly mean? How to increase Chinese cultural appeal could take many forms. For example, there is your modern day Confucian Institutes that seek to educate foreigners about the Chinese language. There is an obvious need, identified by the CCP leadership, that China needs to enhance its cultural production and appeal in order to achieve great power status.
This is all good; yet, China has taken numerous steps to curb internet freedom and restrict television content. Isn’t this counterproductive? While it can be argued that the West and China have different interpretations of internet freedom, I think it can be agreed that capitalism and the free flow of information are vital to creating an alluring culture.
We arrive at an interesting intersection. As was translated by the NYT, President Hu stated that the overall strength of Chinese culture and its international influence is not commensurate with China’s international status. China continues to rise economically and militarily, yet soft power remains sub-par compared to most modern industrial nations.
China’s desire to increase its soft power is welcomed, yet how it does it will remain important. If the CCP decides to increase its cultural production by loosening regulation, then a more vibrant culture can experiment with different historical and cultural narratives. Or, the CCP may decide that some rigid plan is needed to guide China’s culture. If that is the case, there is little hope for China to create a world-class culture that is alluring to other nations. Indeed, a lot of change is happening right now in China with the transition so we should see over the year see what kind of policy Beijing creates.
The alliance between Korea and the United States was borne out in the post-Korean war period and the start of what would become a very hot Cold War. Following the war, Korea, with other regionally strategic states, was installed as a spoke to the US-centered hub-and-spokes system. The primary purpose behind this move was strategic: construct a bulwark against Soviet and Chinese influence in the region and establish a military and ideological perimeter against Communism. This is, in short, the “San Francisco System,” as described by Kent Calder – the Marshal Plan’s oriental cousin. Korea was brought into the US’s sphere of influence by the lure of military protection and economic opportunity. As Bruce Cumings points out, Korea, like Japan and Taiwan, was strategically selected for development – what he calls “development by selection” (here is one reason why Thailand and the Philippines are not Korea and Japan — but only one, there are many, many more). For being on the outer, most strategic edge of the post-Acheson defensive perimeter in the Asia-Pacific, Korea received preferential and lucrative loans in addition to a massive export market it could use to fuel its industrializing, export-driven economy. With a security guarantee (US-Korea alliance) and an economic guarantee (loans and an export market), Korea was able to take-off, catch-up and eventually reach a level of economic development on par with the rest of the developed world.
However, even a cursory glance at Korean history — or geographic location — will lead one to question whether the strong US-Korea economic and military relationship is at all “natural.” By natural I mean, exit special circumstances (e.g. a Cold War), which country would Korea more naturally gravitate towards? The answer is rather obvious: China. Korea was long an apendage of the Middle Kingdom under the tributary-state system, a political system in many ways fundamentally different from the Western European-inherited Anglo-Saxon lead nation-state system. Cultural, institutional, linguistic influence flowed from China towards the Choson (Yi) Dynasty. Most importantly, trade and commerce was conducted primarily with China, in addition to Korea’s status as a tutelage state – a sort of ancient security guarantee, if you will. Given this historical precedent, Korea’s strong economic and military ties to the US during the Cold War can be characterized as “unnatural.” The reason for Korea’s unnaturally close ties to the US is found in the chief motivation behind the establishment of the San Francisco System: winning the Cold War. One primary way the US did this was to effectively buy its allies, hence development by selection; as Cumings points out, and any student of political economy is sure to note, the US did not “choose” to develop Korea for development’s sake. It was a conscious, strategic decision on behalf of US policy makers to use their preponderance of economic and military strength to shape the US sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific that would serve the US’s Cold War strategic and political endgame.
As I explored in a recently written paper, the US-Korea relationship is a case-in-point of a large state utilizing an asymmetric trading relationship for the purpose of achieving international political and strategic goals. The dynamics of the asymmetric relationship between the US and Korea is what permitted an unnatural alliance to be formed. In exchange for priority market access and developmental aid, in addition to US support for Syngman Rhee over Kim Il-song, (South) Korea was pulled into the American sphere of influence and away from potential competitors, namely China and the Soviet Union. This relationship, however, is undergoing a fundamental shift in trajectory. As Calder points out, the US was able to “secure security” through prosperity. Stated alternatively, America exploited its economic prosperity and dominance of global trade to achieve international political and strategic goals.
As I argue in my paper, the recent Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) is an example of the US’s efforts to preserve the San Francisco System by providing Korea with greater market access. Despite its best efforts, Korea has begun — and will continue — to gravitate towards a closer relationship with China, its more natural partner. Evidence for this is found in the shift in Northeast Asia’s regional economy, particularly trading patterns.
Critiquing Realism
The following is the introduction from a research paper I am currently working on. It gets much more detailed further into the paper, taking a few steps away from the theory-side of things to discuss historical, political and social realities. I would, however, like some feedback on critique of the realist notion of anarchy in the international system. For those of you familiar with A.F.K. Organski, you will quickly recognize the influence his writing had on my conceptualization of the global order.
Organski’s Power Transition Theory: Understanding the Global Order
Introduction: Getting Realistic
Hierarchy in the Global Order
A belief at the core of all Realists’ theories is the notion that the international system is anarchic. This notion is so highly regarded by realists as to suggest it an absolute truth in the realm of international relations theory. Despite its popular appeal, the theory is an incorrect assessment of the international system. Perhaps in strictly legal terms, the international system could be conceptualized as having no central governing body, insofar as there is no “world government.” However, a more realistic assessment of the international system reveals a different world.
Libya and the “Obama Doctrine”
Any student of I.R. knows the obsession that journalists and political scientist have with “doctrines.” Monroe, Truman, Carter, and so forth have the not so uncommon honor of having a doctrine attached to their name. Apparently, Obama’s been the latest in the long list of recipients. As identified by Alan Kuperman in his article discussing the possible false pretense of intervention in Libya, the so-called “Obama Doctrine” is based on the noble principle of “the responsibility to protect… calling for intervention when possible to prevent genocide.”
I’m not nearly convinced of the positive social value and good precedent setting of humanitarian intervention to begin with, but assuming, for the time being, that humanitarian intervention is net positive and a good international precedent to set, I’m finding it hard, in light of recent reports, to see the intervention in Libya as a necessary humanitarian mission (aside from Kuperman’s article, see here and here). Instead, things are shaping up to look more like another case of western powers intermeddling with the internal affairs and violating the sovereignty of another middle eastern nation resulting in instability and chaos. But, lest I go on a idealist realist tangent about western imperialism and the cooked-up notion of the right to sovereignty, let’s stick squarely to the humanitarian issue.
Results May Vary
And along with it, things like approval rating, reputation, soft power, and legitimacy.
Regardless of what is said in public speeches or in official statements, we are at war in Libya. The most stated reason for intervention is in order to “prevent” further civilian bloodshed and destabilization in Libya and the region – when you’re the United States, almost anything you do is “preventative.” Barring a surprise, large-scale terrorist attack, the United States is extraordinarily safe and isolated from potential conflicts.
Reasons for intervention aside – because let’s be honest, the notion that we’re intervening for the sole purpose of “protecting the civilian population,” although a noble reason, is more than likely not true – the next lingering question is: what will be the outcome? Will this be a relatively brief intervention that ends in a regime change and the establishment of something “democratic-ish,” or at least a regime more responsible and responsive to its people. Or will this be another long, drawn-out conflict that, despite whatever good intentions, ends up as another prolonged Western intervention in an internal Eastern conflict?
The reason I find this question pertinent hasn’t much to do with what actually happens in Libya or why Libya’s civil war is no longer an exclusively Libyan conflict; although, for the record, I do care, in an abstract sense, what ultimately goes down there – it just doesn’t seem to me to be the most important issue, especially from an American perspective. It has more to do with political ramifications for president Obama and American/Western legitimacy in the eyes of non-Westerners, specifically those living in and around Libya. When all’s said and done, everything will boil down to results, as they almost always do – or, in the age-old political adage: the ends justify the means. A cheesy link between political reality and the overused realist adage? Maybe. But it’s more often than not true. (hone in on the word often – meaning: not always, just a lot). The results will determine whether the Western intervention was a good or bad idea. Stephen Walt says it best:
[...] what matters is not the justification that he provided for it or the ways he attempted to assuage concerns about possible precedents, the risks of getting bogged down, etc. What matters is what actually happens in Libya over the next few weeks or months. If Qaddafi is soon ousted and the rebel forces can establish a reasonably stable order there, then this operation will be judged a success and it will be high-fives all around. If a prolonged stalemate occurs, if civilian casualties soar, if the coalition splinters, or if a post-Qaddafi Libya proves to be unstable, violent, or a breeding ground for extremists, than Obama’s eloquence last night will be disregarded and his decision will be judged a mistake.
Words and justifications do matter on occasion, but in the end its results that count
Clauswitz Isn’t Well Read in the East
This is part 2 of a series of articles dealing with the differences between western and eastern development models. This article deals specifically with the difference in the way people form the east and west interpret China’s ascendance to power, in regards to how China’s rise will affect its relationship with the United States.
There are a multitude of ideas and theories that various intellectuals, statesmen, and pundits propose as a way to predict the way China will rise in the international system, given its newfound power fueled by explosive economic growth. Conventional theories, put forth by scholars like realist John Mearsheimer, state that some form of Great Power clash is likely unavoidable between the U.S. and China. According to Mearsheimer, China’s rise to power will take a path similar to the one taken by other Great Powers throughout history. China will use its immense power base to make a run at world hegemony, or to at least supplant the U.S. as the leading global power. China will essentially recreate the existing global order to reflect that which seems more suitable to its ideas and core interests. According to this theory, the result will be an intense security competition between China, the U.S. and the U.S.’s allies. As I’ve stated before, this particular interpretation of power transition points to the likelihood of military confrontation. Read more…
